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Abstract 
Trust is a concept that has been used in computing to support better decision making. For 
example, trust can be used in access control. Trust can also be used to support service 
selection. Although certain elements of trust such as reputation has gained widespread 
acceptance, a general model of trust has so far not seen widespread usage. This is due to 
the challenges of implementing a general trust model. In this thesis, a middleware based 
approach is proposed to address the implementation challenges. 
 The thesis proposes a general trust model known as computational trust. 
Computational trust is based on research in social psychology. An individual’s 
computational trust is formed with the support of the proposed computational trust 
architecture. The architecture consists of a middleware and middleware clients. The 
middleware can be viewed as a representation of the individual that shares its knowledge 
with all the middleware clients. Each application uses its own middleware client to form 
computational trust for its decision making needs. Computational trust formation can be 
adapted to changing circumstances. The thesis also proposed algorithms for 
computational trust formation.  Experiments, evaluations and scenarios are also presented 
to demonstrate the feasibility of the middleware based approach to computational trust 
formation. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Decision making is about trying to make the best possible selection from a set of 
available choices. Decisions in real life are often made through satisficing (i.e., trying to 
make a good enough selection) as opposed to aiming for the optimal solution [119]. This 
is due to the fact that human beings are cognitive misers [42] that take advantage of 
mental shortcuts (cognitive heuristics) when faced with complex decisions. Note that the 
taking of these mental shortcuts is usually not out of laziness but due to the limited 
capacity of human beings to process uncertainty and incomplete information [42]. As a 
result, when faced with complex decisions, trust is often used as a mental shortcut for 
complexity reduction. This is by eliminating choices that are not trusted from 
consideration. Trust can be thought of as an alternative to rational prediction [75].  
This chapter is organized as follow. The chapter starts with a discussion of the 
current use of trust in computing. This is followed by an introduction to computational 
trust. Two scenarios are provided as illustration of the use of computational trust in 
computing. The chapter ends with a discussion of the challenges to calculating 
computational trust and how this thesis contributes towards addressing these challenges.  
1.1 Current Use of Trust in Computing 
In computing, trust has its roots in computer security. Authentication and authorization 
are concepts commonly associated with trust [50]. In this thesis, this type of trust is 
known as access trust. The goal of access trust is to restrict access so as to protect 
computing resources from harm. One could think of an authorized user as a user that is 
trusted by the computing resource owner. The more a user is trusted, the more likely it 
would be afforded more rights.  
A common form of access trust is identity-based trust. Trust is determined from 
the identity of the user (e.g. username and password). A weakness of identity-based trust 
is its assumption that identity is a trust predictor. This may be a valid assumption in 
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closed environments such as a corporate LAN where all the LAN participants have been 
vetted (i.e., being hired by human resources) beforehand. This is not a valid assumption 
in open environments such as the Internet. On the Internet, most of the users are strangers 
to each other. Knowing the identity of the stranger (if it is even available) is not sufficient 
in determining how much the stranger can be trusted. 
In [16], the authors proposed that trust should be resolved without the use of 
identity. The paper introduced the term trust management as “a unified approach to 
specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials and relationships that allow 
direct authorization of security-critical actions” [16]. This view of trust is sometimes 
known as rule-based trust or policy-based trust. Several well-known trust management 
systems include PolicyMaker [16], KeyNote [15] and REFEREE [28]. In a trust 
management system, rules or policies are used to define the conditions in which rights are 
to be granted. This is usually based on the presence of digital certificates (credentials). 
An example is to only grant access to university computing resources if the user has a 
certificate proving that the user is a student of the university. More recently, this view of 
trust has been used to provide security for web services through WS-Security [97] and 
WS-Trust [96].  
In [50] and [40], the authors identified a number of weaknesses to trust 
management. The weaknesses include: 
 A trust management system is a binary yes/no system where a user is either 
trusted or not trusted. Trust in everyday social life however is much more 
complex. For example, John may trust both Alice and Bob but between the two, 
John may trust Alice more than Bob. Such trust dynamics are not represented in 
trust management systems. 
 In trust management, certificate issuers are unconditionally trusted. If a university 
issues a certificate stating that a user is a student, it is automatically assumed that 
this is indeed the case. This is an unrealistic assumption. There may be a conflict 
of interest or factors such as money or even carelessness that could result in the 
publishing of inaccurate certificates. 
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 Trust is not static and may change over time. For example, good experiences from 
using a service may increase trust in the service while bad experiences do the 
opposite. Instead of updating trust immediately based on a trustee’s change in 
behavior, a trust management system needs to wait for certificates to make any 
trust changes. As a result, the trust management system is completely dependent 
on the pace at which certificate issues updates and distributes certificates.  
To address the weaknesses of trust management, a more general model of trust is needed. 
In this thesis, this general model of trust is known as computational trust.  
1.2 Computational Trust 
The first part of this section covers the research that forms the foundation of 
computational trust. Next, a definition for computational trust is proposed. This is 
followed by discussion on the properties of computational trust and the different 
dimensions of computational trust. Finally, computational trust formation is explained.  
1.2.1 Foundational Research 
Many different disciplines have studied the concept of trust. In biology, research has 
shown that the hormone Oxytocin [70] when administered can increase trust among 
humans. In [17], the author examined trust as seen in social psychology, philosophy, 
economics, contract law and market research. The author discovered that different 
disciplines tend to view trust differently. For example, social psychology tends to focus 
on trust as the fulfillment of expectations. In philosophy, trust is viewed as non-rational. 
In economics, trust is viewed as rational.   In contract law, the focus is on trust as a 
complement to legal contracts. Finally in market research, the focus is on the role that 
trust plays in relationship based marketing. 
Of the different disciplines, this thesis has adopted the view of trust in social 
psychology. Basically, trust can be divided into four areas of research [27]. Individual 
trust treats trust as a personality trait. Interpersonal trust is concerned with trust as it 
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relates to a trustor and a trustee. A trustor refers to a subject
1
 that trusts others. A trustee 
is an entity
2
 that is being trusted. Relational trust believes that trust is an emergent 
property of a relationship as opposed to a directed behavior. Societal trust is concerned 
with the role that trust plays in the proper functioning of society. Trust is often credited as 
the social capital that makes cooperation in a society possible [92]. 
Of the four research areas, the focus of this thesis is on interpersonal trust. As a 
real life example, consider the case of a buyer (trustor) trying to buy a car from a used car 
salesperson (trustee). There is no way for the buyer to know whether or not the 
salesperson has the buyer’s best interest in mind. The salesperson could be trying to sell 
the buyer a lemon. The uncertainty and lack of complete information makes the car 
buying decision challenging. Trust can be used to aid in the buyer’s decision making. A 
buyer can choose to only buy cars from a trusted used car salesperson. In a computing 
context, the example could be the buying of a car from a used car website.  
Many real life decisions have computing equivalents. Thus interpersonal trust can 
be used in computing to aid the trustor in its decision making. In this thesis, 
computational trust is built on the research in interpersonal trust. This should allow 
computational trust to be used in not just computer security but also in general decision 
making such as web service selection. 
1.2.2 Definition 
Trust is a concept that is easily recognizable but surprisingly difficult to define. Many 
different definitions of trust have been proposed to address the different facets of trust. 
For example, the American Heritage Dictionary defines trust as “firm reliance on the 
integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing” [132]. Grandison and Sloman define 
trust as “the quantiﬁed belief by a trustor with respect to the competence, honesty, 
                                                 
1
 A subject could be a person, a group of people (e.g. organization) or a representative of a person (e.g. 
software agent). 
2
 An entity could refer to both animate (e.g. person) and inanimate (e.g. movie) object. 
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security and dependability of a trustee within a speciﬁed context” [51]. Note that in both 
definitions, trust is defined through the listing of the characteristics of a trustee.  
A different approach to defining trust is provided by Deutsch in [35]: 
 An individual is confronted with an ambiguous path, a path that can lead to an 
event perceived to be beneficial (Va
+
) or to an event perceived to be harmful 
(Va
−
); 
 He perceives that the occurrence of Va+ or Va− is contingent on the behavior of 
another person; 
 He perceives the strength of Va− to be greater than the strength of Va+ 
 If he chooses to take an ambiguous path with such properties, the individual is 
said to have made a trusting choice; if he chooses not to take the path, he has 
made a distrustful choice; 
In this definition, there is no listing of characteristics. This is also the case in [44] where 
Gambetta defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective probability with which an 
agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both 
before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to 
monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action”. 
 The definition of computational trust in this thesis is based on the definition 
proposed by Gambetta in [44]. The concept of roles as discussed in [24] is also 
incorporated into the trust definition. We define computational trust as follows: 
Computational trust is a particular level of subjective assessment of 
whether a trustee will exhibit characteristics consistent with the role 
of the trustee, both before the trustor can monitor such characteristics 
(or independent of the trustor’s capacity ever to be able to monitor it) 
and in a context in which it affects the trustor’s own behavior. 
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When compared to the definition presented in [44], the term “probability” has been 
replaced with the term “assessment” to highlight the fact that trust can be calculated in 
ways other than probability theory. As the term “agent” has a different meaning in social 
science than in computer science, the more general terms “trustor” and “trustee” are used 
instead to avoid confusion. Also, a trustee can be an inanimate object. So “taking action” 
may not always be possible for certain trustees. The term “action” therefore has been 
replaced with the term “exhibit characteristics”. As for decision making, there are roles in 
which both the trustor and the trustee must play. For example the decision of buying 
services from a trustee. In this example, the trustor plays the role of a buyer while the 
trustee plays the role of a seller. Whether the trustor trusts the trustee or not is dependent 
on what the trustor believes to be the role of a “good seller”. If a trustee conforms to the 
role as defined by the trustor, then the trustor can be said to trust the trustee.  
1.2.3 Properties 
Trust can be characterized by a number of basic properties [1], [52]. These properties are 
also applicable to computational trust and are briefly described in this section. 
1.2.3.1 Quantifiable and Comparable 
There are many different ways in which trust can be represented. For example in [2], trust 
is represented as a binary value of trust or mistrust. Although a binary representation is 
easy to understand, it also has the weakness of lack of expressiveness. A simple way to 
provide more expressiveness is to represent trust as multi-valued. In [1] for example, four 
different trust degrees are defined. These are “Very Trustworthy”, “Trustworthy”, 
“Untrustworthy” and “Very Untrustworthy”. It is also possible to represent trust as a 
continuous variable as opposed to a discrete variable. Common representations include 
representing trust as a value between zero and one (often seen in cases when trust is 
treated as a probability) or between negative one and one. Although representing trust as 
a real number allows for fine-grained distinction, such a representation can make it 
difficult to discern the meaning behind the calculated trust value. For example, given two 
trust values 0.73 and 0.74, what is the cause for the trust differences? Is it a rounding 
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error or is there something fundamentally different about trust in the two trustees? A 
continuous representation makes discerning trust differences more challenging. 
A trustor may feel uncertain about the result of its trust calculation. Some 
researchers choose to represent this uncertainty as separate from trust. Often times, this is 
known as reliability ( [110], [59]) or confidence ( [54], [128], [135]) in the calculated 
trust. Other researchers choose to integrate uncertainty into trust such as in [23] where 
trust is represented not as one value but as a range of possible trust values. Here, the 
larger the range, the less certain the trustor is with regards to the calculated trust value. 
1.2.3.2 Subjective 
Different trustors may have different views on whether a trustee can be trusted. The 
differences in trust are caused by the following two factors: 
 Incomplete information. A trustor may not have access to the complete history of 
a trustee. Trust is often calculated based on available information. Different 
trustors may not have access to the same information. 
 Subjectiveness of trustor. Different trustors may interpret the same information 
differently. For example, a more forgiving trustor may be willing to accept some 
failures from a trustee while a less forgiving trustor may not. Different trustors 
may also have different views on how much uncertainty is acceptable. Emotions 
like love and friendship could influence trust calculation as well. Finally, different 
trustors may view the role of a trustee differently. For example, a trustor may 
value security more than ease of use while this may not be the case for a different 
trustor. These differences in expectations may influence the level of trust that a 
trustor has for a trustee. 
1.2.3.3 Multidimensional 
A trustor may trust a trustee in one dimension but not in a different dimension. For 
example, a trustor may trust a dentist with his dental health but not trust the dentist’s 
stock picks. A trustor may trust Amazon’s EC2 Compute Cloud [8] but not trust its 
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Mechanical Turk service [9]. A trustor may trust a trustee with transactions that are less 
than a hundred dollars but not in cases when the transaction is worth a million dollars. 
Even the environment can play a role in a trustor’s trust in a trustee. For example, an 
environment in which malicious sellers are actively being identified and banned can 
increase trust in all the sellers in the environment. The associations of a trustee for 
example, the fact that a trustee is acting on behalf of the government may have an impact 
on trust as well.  
It is possible for trust in one dimension to influence trust in a different dimension. 
As an example, consider the case of general trust and specific trust [107]. An example of 
general trust is trust in Amazon [7]. An example of specific trust is trust in one of the 
services provided by Amazon. If Amazon decided to launch a new service, knowing 
nothing about the new service, the trustor’s trust in Amazon may influence the trustor’s 
initial trust in the new service. 
1.2.3.4 Dynamic 
A trustor’s level of trust in a trustee may change over time. This change may be caused 
by the presence of new information or the retirement of old information that are no longer 
relevant. It could also be caused by the lack of new information on a trustee. With no new 
information, a trustee’s behavior could have changed without the trustor knowing 
anything about it. This increases the trustor’s uncertainty with regards to the calculated 
trust value. It is important for computational trust to be regularly reevaluated so that it 
can keep up with the dynamic nature of trust.  
1.2.3.5 Reflexive, Non-Symmetrical and Non-Transitive 
Trust is reflexive as a trustor always trusts itself. Though the level of trust a trustor has 
for itself may change over time (as trust is dynamic). Since trust is also multidimensional, 
there is more than one type of self-trust. For example, a trustor that does not trust itself to 
fix the water leak would hire a plumber to do the job. A trustor that does not trust itself to 
calculate trust would have to depend on others to calculate trust for it (trust delegation).  
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In general, trust is non-symmetrical. This means that knowing the level of trust a 
trustor A has for a trustee B does not help in determining B’s level of trust in A. This 
non-symmetrical property follows from the property of trust being subjective. Therefore, 
a trust relationship between A and B can be represented as two one-way trusts.   
In general, trust is non-transitive. However, under certain semantic constraints, it 
is possible for trust to be transitive. According to [64], transitivity requires that “the last 
edge in the path represents functional trust and that all other edges in the path represent 
referral trust, where the functional and the referral trust edges all have the same trust 
purpose”. The term “trust purpose” is used to refer to why the calculated trust is needed. 
Suppose the trustor has a trust purpose for finding a good car mechanic. Referral trust 
would be the trust in a trustee to be able to recommend a good car mechanic. Functional 
trust would be the trust in a trustee as being a good car mechanic. If A trusts B to 
recommend a good car mechanic and B recommends C, then through transitivity, A can 
trust C to be a good car mechanic. A different example of trust transitivity can be found 
in a public-key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, trust transitivity is established through the 
existence of a chain of certificates (known as a certification path).  
In general, trust is weakened or diluted by transitivity [64]. As such, in a chain of 
A, B and C, A’s trust in C cannot be greater than B’s functional trust in C. 
1.2.4 Conceptual Model 
A conceptual model is used to show the “relationships between factors that are believed 
to impact or lead to a target condition” [93]. A conceptual model should be 
implementation independent. The conceptual model of computational trust is based on 
the work of Lewis and Weigert [75]. The model views trust as consisting of three 
dimensions: cognitive trust, emotional trust and behavioral trust. For the rest of this 
section, each of the dimensions is described followed by a discussion of the relationships 
between the dimensions. 
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1.2.4.1 Cognitive Trust 
Cognitive trust is trust based on reasoning. It is knowledge-driven [61] though the 
information that cognitive trust is based on can be unreliable and incomplete. Given the 
available information, a cognitive leap is needed to arrive at a trustor’s cognitive trust in a 
trustee [75]. As predicting the future is often impossible, the cognitive leap though based 
on knowledge is still a leap of faith. Different trustors may have different comfort levels 
about how much information it needs before it is willing to make a cognitive trust 
prediction. This is one of the reasons for why trust is subjective.  
1.2.4.2 Emotional Trust 
Emotional trust or affective
3
 trust is trust based on feelings and affective bonds. It is non-
cognitive and often cannot be justified by the available information. Examples of 
emotional trust includes trust based on faith, love, friendship, family, common values etc. 
It is also present in public trust such as trust in doctors, judges, politicians, etc. Due to the 
presence of emotion, a trustor would feel hurt or betrayed when the trustor realizes that 
the trustee should not have been trusted. This is seen when relationship ends or when 
someone who is highly respected such as a judge is caught in a scandal.  
1.2.4.3 Behavioral Trust 
Behavioral trust is trust as expressed through a trustor’s behavior. Experiments such as 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games [10] can be used to investigate this type of trust. In a PD 
game, a player can choose to either cooperate or defect. A player who chooses to 
cooperate can be viewed as having behavior trust in the opposing player while a player 
who chooses to defect is signaling the opposite. A strict behavioral interpretation of trust 
can be misleading as trust is not the only factor that could influence a trustor’s behavior 
[75]. For example, a trustor may decide to take action not due to trust but due to pressure 
                                                 
3
 In psychology, the term “affect” refers to feeling or emotion [4]. 
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from its superior. An interpretation of this action as trust would lead to the drawing of the 
wrong conclusion.  
1.2.4.4 Trust Relationships 
Cognitive trust, emotional trust and behavioral trust are related to each other [75]. The 
web of relationships is graphically illustrated in Figure 1. To develop emotional trust, a 
cognitive base needs to be present as it is hard to develop emotions towards complete 
strangers. When reasoning about whether to trust, a trustor’s emotions may influence how 
the available information are interpreted [72]. A trustor’s behavior can be influenced by 
its cognitive trust and emotional trust. Behavioral trust exhibited by others may influence 
a trustor’s cognitive trust and emotional trust.  
 
Figure 1: Relationships among Trust Dimensions 
In [75], it was pointed out that trust in real life can be decomposed into cognitive 
trust and emotional trust. For example, ideological trust can be viewed as trust with high 
cognition and emotion. Faith is trust with high emotion but with a lack of cognition. For 
mundane everyday decisions such as the route to drive to work or what to have for lunch, 
trust typically consists of low cognition and low emotion. A more detailed list of 
examples can be found in [75].  
12 
 
 
 
1.2.5 Trust Formation 
The conceptual model introduced in Section 1.2.4 forms the basis for computational trust 
formation. Cognitive trust can be viewed as a function of a trustor’s beliefs in a trustee 
[25]. Belief can be defined as the “degree of conviction of the truth of something 
especially based on a consideration or examination of the evidence” [12]. Evidence is any 
information that can be used in the formation of belief value. An evidence creator is also 
known as the evidence source. There are many different types of evidence. The most 
common are the trustor’s experience with a trustee, recommendation, reputation and 
signal. Experience with a trustee is the knowledge that the trustor gained after interacting 
with the trustee. Recommendation is experience that a trustor shares with others. For 
example, when a movie critic writes a review for a movie, the review is the critic’s movie 
recommendation.  Reputation is the consensus assessment of a trustee by members of a 
social network [94]. An example reputation is the Tomatometer of Rotten Tomatoes 
[106] that is used to keep track of the reputation of movies among movie reviewers. In 
the example, Rotten Tomatoes is the reputation system. The movie reviewers are 
members of Rotten Tomatoes’ social network. Signal is information that a trustee 
volunteered to the trustor. For example, by volunteering information showing that the 
trustee has just passed an inspection (information that a trustor may not be aware), this 
increases the trustor’s beliefs in a trustee.  
The formation of emotional trust is based on the trustor’s emotions towards the 
trustee. Behavior trust formation is based on the behaviors exhibited towards the trustee. 
A graphical illustration of computational trust formation is shown in Figure 2. As 
computational trust is subjective, it is the responsibility of the trustor to determine how 
the trust dimensions are to be combined to form computational trust. It is also the 
responsibility of the trustor to determine how the different trust dimensions influence 
each other. 
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Figure 2: Computational Trust Formation 
1.3 Application of Computational Trust 
To demonstrate how computational trust can be used in computing, two scenarios are 
introduced in this section. The scenarios are movie selection and web service selection. 
The scenarios are used throughout this thesis to highlight different aspects of 
computational trust. 
1.3.1 Movie Selection Scenario 
In the movie scenario, the movie selector (trustor) is interested in selecting a movie 
(trustee) to watch based on the movie’s quality. Reading a movie’s description does not 
help in making quality determination. A movie description is typically advertisement 
from the movie studios. Advertisements can be assumed to be biased towards the movie. 
To obtain evidence on a movie’s quality, a movie selector could obtain reputation values 
from movie review sites such as Rotten Tomatoes, IMDb (The Internet Movie Database) 
[60], Metacritic [91], etc. Due to differences in the underlying social network and 
differences in the reputation calculation algorithm used, different reputation systems may 
produce different reputation values. For example, the movie “Zombieland” as of October 
6, 2010 has a score of 89% on Rotten Tomatoes, a 7.8 on IMDb and a 73 on Metacritic. 
The differences in reputation values could also be due to the reputation system being 
malicious or biased. As a result, this thesis has adopted the view that a trustor should 
have access to as many evidence sources as possible. This is to provide the trustor with 
the flexibility of selecting the evidence sources for evidence gathering.  
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An example cognitive trust calculation is shown in Figure 3. In the figure, the 
movie selector chooses to only contact Rotten Tomatoes and IMDb for the reputation of 
“Zombieland”. Basically, quality belief is calculated by averaging the normalized 
reputations. As for cognitive trust, it is calculated by being assigned the same value as the 
quality belief. 
 
Figure 3: Cognitive Trust Formation (Movie) 
In terms of emotional trust, the movie selector may enjoy horror films. Such 
emotion could influence whether the movie is emotionally trusted. With respect to 
behavior trust, the movie selector’s observations that a lot of his friends have seen 
“Zombieland” and liked it can cause the movie to be behaviorally trusted. These different 
trust dimensions are combined based on the movie selector’s subjective views to form the 
selector’s computational trust in a movie. 
1.3.2 Web Service Selection Scenario 
Typically web service selection starts with web service discovery. The return value of 
discovery is a set of web service instances     *            + that satisfies the 
consumer’s functional requirements. As for the consumer’s non-functional requirements, 
let     *            + denote the set of metrics representing the non-functional 
aspects. Associated with each web service instance is an offer 
   *(      ) (      )  (       (   ))+ where     is the value that service    
promises for metric   . Many web service selection strategies focus on selecting a web 
service instance based on offers. Such approaches are often risky. A web service may not 
keep its promise to provide the agreed upon offer. This could be due to the service having 
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exaggerated or lied about its capabilities (intentional) or the service being overloaded 
(unintentional). Trust can be used to assess the validity of an offer. Figure 4 graphically 
depicts an example of how cognitive trust in a web service is calculated based on beliefs: 
qualification, timeliness, accuracy and coverage. 
 
Figure 4: Cognitive Trust Formation (Web Service) 
In terms of the qualification of the web service, this could be deduced from the 
qualification signals (certificates) issued by neutral third parties (certificate providers) 
that has validated the web service’s qualification. As for the timeliness of the web 
service, i.e., whether computation required can complete on time or not, this belief is 
formed through the weighted average of the consumer’s past experiences with the service 
and the service’s reputation. The results produced by a web service could be evaluated by 
the consumer in terms of accuracy and coverage. The results are accurate if they are 
correct. The results have good coverage if the breadth of the solutions provided meets the 
trustor’s expectations. As both accuracy and coverage cannot be obtained through 
monitoring, they are obtained by querying the consumer after service invocation. 
Accuracy belief and coverage belief are based on applying weighted average on the 
consumer’s past experiences with the service and the service’s reputation. Finally, 
cognitive trust is calculated from the four calculated beliefs. In this case, if a web service 
is believed to be qualified and the values calculated for timeliness belief, accuracy belief 
and coverage belief are all greater than zero, then cognitive trust is assigned a positive 
value of 1. Otherwise, cognitive trust is assigned the negative value of -1. 
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In the case of timeliness belief, accuracy belief and coverage belief, the beliefs are 
formed from evidence of multiple types. This is to account for the fact that evidence of 
different types has different properties. Between experience, recommendation and 
reputation, experience is considered the most important as it is created by the trustor [63]. 
It is assumed that the trustor is always non-malicious towards itself
4
. A trustor also 
always has its own best interest in mind. This may not be the case with recommendation 
created by recommender and reputation created by reputation system. Recommendation 
and reputation however can be used to guide the trustor in terms of which trustee to 
invoke to gain experience. Moreover, the number of past experiences that a trustor has 
with a trustee could be very low if the trustor had very few interactions with the trustee. 
The number may be too few to be representative of the trustee’s behavior. In this case, 
recommendations and reputation may be valued more. Between recommendation and 
reputation, recommendation is usually valued more than reputation. With 
recommendation, the trustor determines the recommenders to be contacted. This is based 
on the assumption that the trustor is familiar with the behavior of the recommenders. 
Without familiarity, a trustor has to depend on reputation. With reputation, its calculation 
is often opaque to the trustor. This means that the trustor may not be able to determine the 
effectiveness of the gathered reputation. As for signals, third-party signals are valued 
more than signals generated by the trustee. This is due to the fact that a signal created by 
the trustee about itself can be self-serving. 
As different evidence types have strengths and weaknesses, this thesis has 
adopted the view that having access to multiple evidence types is desirable in belief 
calculation. This is similar to views found in existing work such as [59] and [110]. For 
each evidence type, multiple evidence sources should be accessible. In the case of web 
services, reputation systems may include [78], [87] and [140]. 
In terms of emotional trust, this could be influenced by the branding of a web 
service. In fact, the use of branding to create an affective bond between a consumer and a 
                                                 
4
 This does not mean that the trustor cannot act maliciously towards others. 
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brand (e.g. through shared values such as caring about the environment) is known as 
emotional branding [47]. With respect to behavior trust, a consumer is more likely to 
behaviorally trust a web service that is popular and used by many. The different trust 
dimensions are combined based on the consumer’s subjective views to form the 
consumer’s computational trust in a web service. 
1.4 Challenges to Computational Trust 
The idea of applying a general model of trust to computing was first proposed by Marsh 
[84] in 1994. Since then, certain elements of trust such as reputation has gained 
widespread acceptance (e.g. eBay [38] and Amazon). However, the concept of a general 
trust model has so far failed to gain traction. We believe that this is due to the inherently 
difficulty in implementing a general trust model. For computational trust, the challenges 
are as follows:  
 Lack of standards for discovering and accessing evidence. This means that it is up 
to the application developer to implement all needed evidence discovery and 
evidence gathering protocols. This is inefficient as applications may implement 
the same protocols leading to code duplication. Also, if the trustor has preferences 
towards a certain set of evidence sources, this would need to be configured for 
each application individually. Moreover, if the trustor would like to use the 
evidence provided by an evidence source, it is not always possible as the 
protocols needed may not be supported by an application. 
 Lack of standards for representing evidence. Evidence can be represented as a 
rating. A rating is the result of evidence evaluation where the result is represented 
as a position on a scale [101]. Ratings can come in different forms. For example, 
ratings used by Rotten Tomatoes are in the form of 0 to 100 percent. Ratings used 
by IMDb are in the form of 1 to 10. There are other forms of evidence 
representations as well. For example as a X.509 certificate or in the form of a text 
review. Some evidence may even be encrypted to ensure security and privacy. 
The lack of a standard evidence representation makes it challenging for an 
application to be able to understand what the different evidence are representing. 
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 Evidence Filtering. Not all the gathered evidence should be used in belief 
calculation. Evidence may be fabricated by malicious evidence sources to 
intentionally mislead the trustor. Evidence may be biased by the views of 
evidence sources. For example, a movie reviewer (evidence source) that is biased 
against horror films may give a horror film a worse rating than what a regular 
moviegoer would considered to be fair.  
According to [63], there are currently two main approaches to evidence 
filtering. One approach is to simply exclude or give low weight to evidence that 
are outliers. This is based on the assumption that in any environment, the majority 
of the evidence are non-biased and non-malicious. In [137] for example, a beta 
distribution is computed of the evidence. Any evidence that is less than the 1% 
quantile or greater than the 99% quantile are filtered out. A different approach is 
for the trustor to identity those evidence sources that can be trusted to provide the 
trustor with quality evidence. When evidence is needed, only those trusted 
evidence sources would be contacted for evidence gathering. An example can be 
found in [30] where evidence source trust depends on whether the evidence 
source agrees with the trustor. 
 Computational Trust is subjective and multidimensional. There are many different 
ways in which computational trust in a trustee can be calculated. Factors such as 
the trustor’s emotion (e.g. feeling pessimistic), the trustor’s preferences (e.g. 
valuing accuracy over coverage), the decision the trustor is trying to make (e.g. 
movie selection or web service selection), the importance of the decision, etc. 
could all have an influence on computational trust calculation. 
1.5 Contributions of Thesis 
Listed below are the contributions of this thesis: 
 A general trust model known as computational trust. The model is based on work 
by Lewis and Weigert [75]. As a result, unlike most work on trust in computing, 
computational trust has a social psychological underpinning. The model is also 
different from other work in that it considers trust dimensions and treats evidence 
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based trust (cognitive trust and behavioral trust) and non-evidence-based trust 
(emotional trust) differently. When implementing the computational trust model, 
a number of adaptations have been made to Lewis and Weigert’s model including 
the merging of cognitive and behavioral trust, deriving emotions from the 
trustor’s knowledge of the trustee and the simplification of the relationships 
among the trust dimensions 
 An architecture for supporting computational trust formation. The architecture 
consists of a middleware known as SCOUT (Services supporting COmpUtation of 
Trust). SCOUT consists of a set of web services that can be used by Trust 
Calculators for computational trust calculation. The calculated computational trust 
can be used to support decision making. The computational trust architecture is 
designed to address the challenges outlined in Section 1.4. 
 Algorithms for computational trust formation. 
 Experiments, evaluations and scenarios demonstrating the feasibility of the 
proposed architecture in supporting computational trust formation. 
1.6 Thesis Organization 
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides more 
background on trust. Chapter 3 reviews the trust literature. Chapter 4 provides a high 
level overview of the computational trust architecture. The components of the 
architecture are introduced in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The algorithms implemented in 
the architecture are described in Chapter 7. Our prototype implementation is described in 
Chapter 8. Experiments using the prototype are described in Chapter 9. The prototype is 
applied to two different scenarios in Chapter 10. We evaluated the architecture with 
respect to our stated goals in Chapter 11. Finally, the thesis ends with conclusions and 
future works in Chapter 12. 
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1.7 Summary 
Trust is a concept has been investigated by many different disciplines including 
computing. There are a number of weaknesses to the current computing approach to trust. 
This could be addressed through the adoption of a more general trust model. In this 
thesis, the trust model is known as computational trust. It is based on research on 
interpersonal trust in the field of social psychology. A definition for computational trust 
is provided along with discussion of its properties, conceptual model, formation and 
application. The rest of this thesis focuses on addressing the challenges to calculating 
computational trust. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Trust Primer 
The focus of this chapter is on providing more background on trust. As computational 
trust is a type of trust, the discussions in this chapter also apply to computational trust. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section describes the preconditions for 
trust. Next, several concepts that are related to trust are introduced and explained. This is 
followed by a discussion of the role that privacy plays in trust calculation. The fourth 
section of this chapter covers the relationship between trust and risk. The last section 
discusses how trust can be used in decision making. 
2.1 Preconditions for Trust 
Trust is not always needed for decision making. In [69], the authors identified three 
preconditions for trust. The preconditions are dependence, uncertainty and vulnerability. 
Dependence is about having to rely on others to fulfill a specific need. Uncertainty occurs 
when one is not one hundred percent certain about the outcome of a decision. As for 
vulnerability, it is the cost for making of a wrong decision. Uncertainty and vulnerability 
together are commonly known as risk [69]. There would be no need for trust if a decision 
poses no risk to the trustor [82]. 
In the movie selection scenario, the selector depends on the movie being of high 
quality. Without actually seeing the movie, there is always uncertainty about the actual 
movie quality. Finally, making the wrong movie selection could result in wasted money 
and time. As the scenario satisfied all three preconditions, trust can be used in the 
scenario to facilitate movie selection. Similar arguments can also be made for the web 
service selection scenario.  
2.2 Concepts Related to Trust 
In this section, several concepts are introduced with the goal of clarifying how these 
concepts are related to trust. 
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2.2.1 Untrust, Distrust and Mistrust 
In [86], the authors introduced the concepts: untrust, distrust and mistrust. Mistrust is 
used to describe trust that turns out to be misplaced. Distrust is the negative form of trust 
where the trustee is believed to be actively working against the trustor. Finally, untrust is 
when there is trust in a trustee but not enough to overcome the perceived risk. A 
graphical illustration of the different concepts is shown in Figure 5. In the figure, the 
cooperation threshold is used to represent the perceived risk associated with a decision. 
 
Figure 5: From Distrust to Trust [86] 
In movie selection and web service selection, a selection is only made if trust in a 
movie or a web service is above the cooperation threshold. Distrust occurs if a movie is 
believed to be of low quality or if a web service is believed to be incompetent or 
malicious. Untrust occurs if trust exists but just not enough for a selection to be made. As 
for mistrust, this occurs after a selection when the trustor discovers that it should not have 
selected the movie or web service. 
2.2.2 Trustworthiness 
Trust and trustworthiness should not be used interchangeably [31], [45]. Trust is 
associated with the trustor and could influence the behavior of a trustor. Trustworthiness 
is a characteristic of the trustee. A trustee is perceived to be trustworthy. A trustor is more 
likely to trust a trustee that exhibits the characteristic of trustworthiness [122].  
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In movie selection, a movie directed by a competent director is perceived to be 
trustworthy. Whether a selector would trust such a movie is a completely separate 
question. A web service could behave in a trustworthy manner by trying its best to satisfy 
all consumer requests. Whether the displayed trustworthiness is enough for a consumer to 
trust the web service is subjective and consumer dependent.  
2.2.3 Contract 
A trustor and a trustee may decide to enter into a contract. By doing so, the trustor and 
trustee are delegating the responsibility for contract enforcement to some agreed upon 
authority. An authority could be the legal system or an impartial mediator. It is the 
authority’s responsibility to assess whether there is any contract violation and if so to 
impose punishment. The introduction of a contract does not mean that there is no need for 
trust [25]. Trust in the authority to be able to enforce signed contracts underlies the entire 
rationale for contracts. A trustor also needs to trust that that the trustee would be deterred 
by the punishment. Otherwise, the trustee could choose to accept the punishment and 
violate the contract at will. 
Contracts are not always available for all decision making. For example, there is 
usually no contract for movie watching. Contracts are more commonly associated with 
web services. A web service could offer a standardized contract to all its consumers. A 
web service could also choose to negotiate with each of its consumers to offer customized 
contracts to suit each of the consumer’s needs. 
2.2.4 Confidence 
A trustor trusts a trustee to complete the assigned job. A trustor is confident that the 
trustee can complete the assigned job. In the previous examples, trust and confidence are 
used interchangeably. Different researchers have offered different views on how to 
distinguish between the two concepts. According to Luhmann in [82], confidence is the 
expectation of not being disappointed. For example, a trustor is confident that the light 
would turn on with the flip of a switch. Luhmann argues that trust also involves 
expectation except it presupposes a situation of risk. With trust, a trustor is given a choice 
while this is not the case with confidence. For example, whom a trustor should buy a used 
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car from is a trusting decision. This is not the view in [31] where trust is defined as “an 
attitude of confident expectation…”. In this definition, confidence is considered a part of 
trust which seems to contradict the view of Luhmann [86]. 
In [118], the authors argued that trust is only relevant in risky situations where 
familiarity with the trustee is low. Moreover, trust can only applied to a trustee that is a 
person or a person-like entity. Confidence on the other hand is based on a high level of 
familiarity and can be applied to just about anything. Carole Smith in [121] proposed an 
alternate view where trust is seen as a moral exercise of free will. With trust, there is 
uncertainty about the possible outcomes and a lack of objective information. With 
confidence, there is an explicitly established outcome where information is collected in 
an objective and scientific manner. For example, holding public servants accountable 
through performance reviews can increase public confidence in a public institution. The 
focus on performance measurements however can have a negative effect instilling 
distrust between employees and managers.  
There is a distinct lack of agreement among different researchers on how to 
distinguish between trust and confidence. As the disagreement is mainly a naming issue 
(i.e., when should trust be used and when should confidence be used to describe a 
situation), we do not see how introducing the concept of confidence could benefit 
decision making. As a result, we ignore confidence and focus on trust exclusively in this 
thesis. Note that in some computer science literature, the term confidence is sometimes 
used to refer to confidence in the calculated trust. This specific usage of the term is 
unrelated to the discussion in this subsection and therefore the usage is acceptable. 
2.3 Privacy 
It is up to an evidence source to determine whether evidence should be disclosed to a 
trustor. Without evidence, cognitive trust cannot be calculated. Yet when evidence is 
disclosed, privacy may be lost. It is difficult to recover from privacy loss. As an example, 
consider a trustee’s identity. Identity is needed for trust calculation. For maximum 
privacy, a trustee could choose anonymity. However, it is almost impossible to calculate 
trust if a trustor does not know who the trustee is. As a result, trustees are often provided 
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with lesser privacy through pseudonymity. Even with pseudonymity, it can be difficult to 
hold a trustee accountable for its bad behavior if the trustee can change its pseudonym at 
will. So for pseudonymity to work, it needs to be difficult for a trustee to acquire more 
than one pseudonym. 
In the field of trust negotiation [13], disclosure policies are used to implement 
conditional evidence disclosure. The goal is to provide privacy protection by only 
revealing evidence on an as needed basis. However as pointed out by Danah Boyd in 
[18], privacy is more than just control over evidence disclosure. It is also about providing 
the user with control over how its evidence is being distributed. There is a difference 
between making private evidence publicly accessible and having that evidence being 
widely publicized without the user’s consent [18].  
2.4 Risk 
Trust is a concept that is inherently linked to risk [22], [65]. Risk involves uncertainty 
and vulnerability. In [73], risk is defined as the likelihood and severity of an accident. In 
[88], the authors argued that risk should consider more than just the accidents or negative 
outcomes. If a decision involves the possibility of both positive and negative outcomes, 
the aggregate level of risk (i.e., risks from all possible outcomes of a decision) should be 
different than if there is only the possibility of negative outcomes. This view of risk is the 
one that is adopted in this thesis. Risk is also considered to have the following properties: 
quantifiable, subjective, multidimensional and dynamic. 
 In [25], the authors argued that there are two types of risk. The first is the risk of 
failure. This is the gain the trustor could have had had it not make the wrong decision. 
The second is the risk of wasted effort. This is the investment of the trustor that had gone 
to waste. Example investments could be time or money. As for how trust and risk are 
related to each other, [45] proposed three possibilities: 
 Mediating relationship. In this relationship, trust does not have a direct impact on 
decision making. Instead, trust is used to reduce the riskiness of a decision. It is 
risk that is responsible for determining whether a decision should proceed. 
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 Moderating relationship. In this relationship, risk is responsible for moderating 
the effect of trust on decision making. Basically when risk is high, trust has an 
influence on decision making. When risk is low, trust is considered irrelevant to 
decision making. 
 Threshold model. In this relationship, trust and risk are both independently 
formed. A trustor would only implement a decision if its level of trust surpasses 
its threshold of risk. 
Of the three relationships, the mediating relationship is reported as having the widest 
acceptance among ecommerce researchers [45]. As for the threshold model, although it is 
widely used in computing, surprisingly it has no ecommerce research underpinning [45]. 
2.5 Decision Making 
There are many factors that could influence a trustor’s decision making. Several example 
factors include company policies, the cost of each decision choices, trust in a trustee, 
loyalty to a trustee, etc. During decision making, a trustor may prefer a certain trustee but 
is held back by its lack of trust in the trustee. An example of this could be whether to use 
an unknown web service that is being offered at a great price point. If more trust is 
needed, one possible solution could be to demand more accountability from the trustee. 
An example could be to demand heavier punishment for contract violation. A different 
approach to solve this problem could be to simply reduce the risk associated with the 
decision. For example by buying insurance, a trustor could hedge against possible 
negative outcome thereby reducing the need for high level of trust in the trustee. 
2.6 Summary 
For trust to be useful in decision making, there needs to be dependence, uncertainty and 
vulnerability associated with the decision. The chapter introduced several concepts 
related to trust including untrust, distrust, mistrust, trustworthiness, contract and 
confidence. The concepts are explained and distinguished from trust. The role that 
privacy and risk plays in trust is also explained. Finally, the chapter ends with a 
discussion of trust’s influence on decision making. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Literature Review 
The focus of this chapter is to distinguish our work from others in the trust literature. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a survey of work on trust and 
reputation. Next, arguments for a middleware approach to computational trust formation 
are presented. The arguments are based on insights gained from the literature survey. 
Finally, the last part of this chapter covers work on trust middleware. None of the work 
on trust middleware covers all the elements that we have identified as critical to 
supporting computational trust formation. 
3.1 Survey of Trust and Reputation 
The literature survey on trust and reputation covers four different areas of computing. 
These are the World Wide Web, peer-to-peer environments, virtual communities (e.g. 
agent societies, grid computing, business networks, etc.) and pervasive environments 
(e.g. mobile and wearable computing, context-aware computing, etc.). In each area, we 
describe in detail how trust and reputation is used. Note that the survey is not intended to 
be complete. Instead, the focus is on presenting representative works in each of the 
computing areas. As there is no commonly accepted definitions for trust and reputation, 
footnotes are used to point out differences in definitions whenever necessary. 
3.1.1 The World Wide Web (WWW) 
There are many different uses for trust and reputation on the World Wide Web. For 
example, trust and reputation can be used to promote e-commerce. Such uses could be 
found in Amazon [7], Best Buy [14], [26], eBay [38], Epinions [39] and [83]. Trust and 
reputation can also be used for identifying quality information. Examples of such use 
include Advogato [3], PageRank [19], IMDb [60], Metacritic [91], Rotten Tomatoes 
[106], Slashdot [120], Stack Overflow [126] and Web of Trust [135]. In the field of 
Semantic Web, trust and reputation are used to determine how much an information 
source should be trusted [48] [104]. For the rest of this subsection, three works on the 
WWW are described in detail.   
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3.1.1.1 eBay 
In eBay [38], a reputation system (feedback forum) is responsible for calculating the 
reputation of each eBay member. After each transaction, a buyer and seller are allowed to 
rate each other by leaving feedback. A feedback consists of both a rating (positive, 
neutral or negative) and a short comment. If a member is a buyer, it can also leave 
detailed ratings (scale of one to five stars) on the seller. The ratings are on criteria such as 
communication and shipping time. The reputation of a member is calculated as the 
difference between the positive and negative ratings left by eBay members (eBay’s social 
network). To capture a member’s recent behavior, the ratings from the last one, six and 
twelve months are summarized and presented as shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: eBay’s Feedback Forum 
Although there is a number of weaknesses to eBay’s reputation system such as its 
counter intuitiveness (member with higher reputation is not always better on eBay) and 
disproportionately positive feedbacks [102], the feedback forum has been shown to be 
effective in encouraging transactions [102]. In fact, an analysis done by [81] on the 
auctioning of collectible one-cent coins found that a seller’s reputation have a statistically 
significant impact on the coin auction prices. 
3.1.1.2 Web of Trust 
Web of Trust (WOT) [135] is a browser add-on that is designed to promote safe 
browsing. WOT uses user ratings and carefully selected information sources (e.g. listings 
of phishing sites) to calculate the reputation of websites. A reputation in WOT is based 
on assessments of four different components: trustworthiness, vendor reliability, privacy 
and child safety. WOT also calculates its confidence in the calculated reputation. 
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Confidence is based on the amount of evidence and the quality of the evidence sources. A 
WOT user can also leave comments on a site. A comment could belong to one of 
seventeen categories: good site, entertaining, spam, useless, etc. In WOT, the reputation 
of a web subdomain actually contributes to the reputation of the parent web domain. 
The reputations calculated by WOT are displayed as coloured icons next to search 
results and links in emails. For example, a website with excellent reputation is assigned a 
green icon while a site with poor reputation is assigned a red icon. A website could also 
obtain a WOT Trust Seal as proof of its trustworthiness. The seal can be obtained for a 
monthly fee. As of writing, WOT has rated over 28 million sites with over 10 million 
add-on downloads.  
3.1.1.3 Object Scoring by Chen and Singh 
In [26], it is proposed that the reputation of a rater (member of a social network) should 
be structured as a tree. The reputation tree has the rater’s reputation as the root with each 
of its children being the reputation of the rater in different knowledge domains (subject 
areas). To build a reputation tree, the first step is to perform comment evaluation. A 
comment refers to the numeric rating giving to an object (product or service) along with 
the associated text review. After comment evaluation, the reputation of a rater in a 
specific knowledge domain can be calculated. This is based on all the evaluations in the 
specific knowledge domain. Finally, the reputation of a rater can be calculated based on 
the rater’s reputation in different knowledge domains. 
The score of an object is calculated as the weighted average of the object’s 
received ratings. The weight of a rating is assigned based on the rater’s reputation. If a 
rater’s reputation in a specific knowledge domain is unavailable, the solution is to move 
up the reputation tree and use the rater’s more general reputation instead. As for 
confidence in the object score, this is calculated based on the total number of received 
ratings, reputation of raters and degree of consistency among the ratings. During 
experimentation, the authors compared their work with Epinions [39] and discovered that 
raters with high reputation actually correspond well to those good raters selected by the 
site manager and users of Epinions. 
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3.1.2 Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Networks 
Trust and reputation are used in P2P networks to improve resource selection. They also 
encourage cooperation by ensuring that good peers are rewarded while bad peers are 
punished. Some works in P2P include [2], [20], [32], [54], [55], [56], [68], [71], [76], 
[77], [90], [116], [123], [127], [130], [133], [134], [139] and [143]. In this subsection, six 
of those works are described in greater detail. 
3.1.2.1 XREP 
XREP [32] is a reputation
5
 sharing protocol that is designed for Gnutella-like systems. In 
XREP, each servent
6
 and each resource is assumed to have a unique identity. The XREP 
protocol consists of five phases: resource searching, resource selection and vote
7
 polling, 
vote evaluation, best servent check (confirm resource digest is valid from best servent) 
and resource downloading (with a confirmed resource digest, one could download 
resource from any servent). Votes take only two values: 1 for positive opinion and 0 for 
negative opinion. 
A distinguishing feature of XREP is that it not only calculates the reputation
8
 of 
servents but also the reputation of resources as well. By considering both types of 
reputation, this allows XREP to solve the cold-start problem, i.e., the problem of the lack 
of reputation on newcomers. For a new resource, XREP proposes that the resource can 
establish its reputation through the reputation of the servent. As for a new servent, it can 
gain reputation by offering access to reputable resources. 
                                                 
5
 Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” actually corresponds to “recommendation” in this thesis. 
One could also think of XREP as a protocol for how recommendations can be exchanged in Gnutella-like 
systems. 
6
 A servent is a node in a P2P network. It is both a trustee and an evidence source. 
7
 A “vote” is basically a recommendation represented as a rating. 
8
 Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” as used in this paragraph actually corresponds to “trust” in 
this thesis. 
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3.1.2.2 Bayesian Reputation System by Buchegger and Le Boudec 
In [20], a reputation rating
9
 is defined as the opinion formed by node   about node  ’s 
behavior in a P2P system. A reputation rating is updated based on a node’s first-hand 
observation (experience) and first-hand observations shared by other nodes 
(recommendations). In the former case, a modified Bayesian approach is used to update 
the reputation rating. The modifications proposed in [20] include giving past evidence 
less weight and to forget old observations through decay over time. In the latter case, the 
reputation rating is updated by taking the received observations into account. As nodes 
may provide false reports, [20] proposes to only update the reputation rating if the 
reporter
10
 is considered trustworthy or if the reported observations is similar to the node’s 
own observations. The trustworthiness of a reporter (trust rating
11
) is calculated using the 
same modified Bayesian approach based on observation similarity.  
[20] also proposed to classify the different P2P nodes based on the expected value 
of their beta distribution. For example, if a node   is willing to tolerate at most 25% 
misbehavior, then a node   will be classified as normal if its expected value is less than or 
equal to 0.25. Otherwise, node   will be classified as misbehaving. The same approach 
can also be used to classify the trustworthiness of reporters. 
3.1.2.3 Fuzzy Trust by Griffiths, Chao and Younas 
In [54], fuzzy logic is proposed as a way to calculate trust in P2P systems. The idea is for 
a trustor to keep track of its experiences interacting with other member peers in the 
dimensions of success, cost, quality and timeliness. Trust is then calculated from 
experiences using fuzzy inference rules. The input fuzzy term is experience which could 
have the value of negative big, negative medium, negative small, zero, positive small, 
positive medium and positive big. The output fuzzy term is trust which could have the 
                                                 
9
 Due to differences in definitions, “reputation rating” actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis. 
10
 A “reporter” is basically a recommender in this thesis. 
11
 Unlike in [20], this thesis does not distinguish between trust in nodes and trust in reporters. So, “trust 
rating” actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis. 
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value of high distrust, distrust, undistrust, untrust, trust and high trust. Confidence is also 
calculated for each experience dimension to ensure that there are sufficient experiences 
available to perform trust calculation. If the calculated confidence is below a certain 
threshold, then a default experience value (chosen based on the trustor’s trusting 
disposition) is used as oppose to the trustor’s actual experiences. The paper also points 
out that sometimes selecting a peer based solely on trust may not be enough. So, 
additional fuzzy inference rules could be introduced that combines trust with other 
decision factors (e.g. advertised cost). 
3.1.2.4 DCRC and CORC 
In P2P networks like Gnutella, cooperation among peers is essential to the searching and 
downloading of content. It is therefore important for there to be incentives to encourage 
cooperation among peers. In [55], the authors proposed a reputation based incentive that 
is tied to a peer’s level of participation in the system. The paper proposed two different 
ways to calculate the reputation score
12
 of a peer. These are the debit-credit reputation 
computation (DCRC) scheme and the credit-only reputation computation (CORC) 
scheme. 
With DCRC, a peer does not calculate its own reputation score. Instead, this is 
outsourced to a reputation computation agent (RCA). A peer presents its actions within 
the P2P network to the RCA and in return gets back its new reputation score. There are 
three types of credits that can be claimed by a peer. These are the Query-Response Credit 
(QRC) for proof of having responded to a query message, the Upload Credit (UC) for 
proof of having served content to a peer and the Sharing Credit (SC) for proof of having 
been online and for having contents that could be shared with others. As for debits, the 
only type of debit supported is the Download Debit (DD) for proof of content download. 
Together, the debits and credits are used to compute a peer’s reputation score.  
                                                 
12
 A “reputation score” is basically reputation that is calculated using either DCRC or CORC scheme. 
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CORC is functionally similar to DCRC with the only difference being that it does 
not support DD. There is incentive in CORC for a peer to stop contributing to the P2P 
network as soon as it has obtained a good reputation score. To prevent this from 
happening, the RCA time-stamps the calculated reputation score for expiration. Both 
DCRC and CORC have their respective strengths and weaknesses. A detailed comparison 
of the two reputation computation schemes is available in [55]. 
3.1.2.5 Anomaly Detection by Stakhanova, et al. 
In a P2P network, trust can be used to determine whether a peer should accept or send 
traffic to a different peer. In [127], trust is calculated based on four types of actions:  
resource search, resource upload, resource download and traffic extensiveness. Each time 
an action is taken, it can be classified as good (successful outcome) or bad (fail outcome). 
The classification is based on anomaly detection. The idea is for the creation of a peer 
profile that establishes a peer’s typical behavior in the P2P network. Periodically, a peer’s 
online session data is analyzed using a one-class support vector machine (SVM) for any 
deviation from the peer profile. Once an anomaly is discovered, Chebyshev’s rule is used 
to determine the impact the anomaly has on an action. 
The trust score
13
 of a peer is calculated as the percentage of bad actions during a 
given time period. In [127], the authors proposed to reject all traffic from peers with trust 
score that is greater than the distrust threshold. Traffic from peers with trust score that is 
lower than the full trust threshold is always accepted. If a peer’s trust score is between the 
two thresholds, then only part of the peer’s traffic is accepted. 
3.1.2.6 PET and M-CUBE 
PET [77] is a trust model that is designed to encourage cooperation in P2P resource 
sharing. The trust model consists of a reputation model and a risk model. Reputation
14
 in 
                                                 
13
 Due to differences in definitions, “trust score” actually corresponds to the inverse of “trust” in this 
thesis. 
14
 Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” in the paper actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis. 
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PET represents the accumulative assessment of a peer’s long-term behavior. Interaction-
derived information (experience) and recommendations are used in reputation 
calculation. Risk
15
 in PET represents a peer’s short-term behavior. Risk is calculated 
using interaction-derived information and is normalized to the worst case scenario. When 
calculating trust, weights are assigned to both reputation and risk. The paper recommends 
risk be assigned a high weight especially in dynamic systems. 
M-CUBE (Multiple Currency based Economic Model) [76] is a decentralized 
trading scheme that utilizes the trust calculated by PET to enforce cooperative resource 
sharing. The idea is for each peer to issue its own currency and to set its own price for the 
offered resources. If a peer needs the resource offered by a different peer, the first step is 
to obtain the currency of the other peer. This can be done through a currency exchange 
protocol where initially the currency ratio is set to one to one. The currency ratio will 
self-adjust over time. This is to force a less trusted peer to pay more than a trusted peer. 
Once currency has been obtained, the peer could now use the currency to acquire the 
shared resource. If a peer refuses to share its resources, its trustworthiness will decrease 
making currency exchange more expensive over time. When the trustworthiness of a peer 
drops below a certain threshold, the peer would get banned from the P2P community. 
3.1.3 Virtual Communities 
A virtual community is in many ways similar to a real life community [1]. The role that 
trust and reputation plays in a physical community therefore are applicable to virtual 
communities as well. Some work on virtual communities includes the following: 
 Agent societies: [24], [25], [53], [59], [84], [100], [110], [111], [114], [142] and 
[144] 
 Grid computing: [11], [79], [98], [129] and [136] 
                                                 
15
 The paper’s definition of “risk” is different from the definition in this thesis. In fact, their definition is 
really just a different way to calculate trust. 
35 
 
 
 
 Web services: [5], [78], [87], [115] and [144] 
 Others: [1], [108] and [147] 
In this subsection, six representative works are described in detail. 
3.1.3.1 Regret 
The Regret system [110] assumes that the reputation
16
 of an agent is based on three 
dimensions: individual dimension, social dimension and ontological dimension. The 
individual dimension is concerned with direct interaction (experience). Sociograms 
(graphs representing social relations) are used to calculate reputation in the social 
dimension. In Regret, it is assumed that each agent has its own sociograms. These 
sociograms represent an agent’s view of the competition, cooperation and trade within 
the agent society. Regret supports three types of social reputations: witness reputation, 
neighborhood reputation and system reputation. The ontological dimension is concerned 
with the creation of complex reputation. An example complex reputation could be an 
agent’s reputation as a swindler that could be based on the agent’s reputation to 
overcharge and its reputation for providing poor quality products.  
Implementation wise, Regret is designed to be modular [109]. This means that an 
agent can pick and choose the types of reputation to be used in reputation calculation. For 
example, if one does not have any experiences with an agent, it could choose to calculate 
the agent’s reputation based solely on social reputations. After some interactions with the 
agent, there is now enough experiences so that any future reputation calculation will 
include both individual and social dimensions. 
3.1.3.2 FIRE 
FIRE [59] is a trust and reputation model that is designed for open multi-agent systems 
(MAS). Specifically, trust in FIRE is calculated based on interaction trust, role-based 
trust, witness reputation and certified reputation. Interaction trust is calculated based on 
                                                 
16
 Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” in the paper actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis. 
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the direct experiences of an agent. Role-based trust uses rules to determine how much an 
agent can be trusted. Witness reputation is calculated by employing a referral based 
approach. Certified reputation is calculated based on certified references. By taking into 
account a variety of information, this means that even if some information sources are 
unavailable, trust can still be calculated. FIRE assumes that all agents are honest when 
exchanging information. The possibility of there being disinformation is considered to be 
future work.  
3.1.3.3 Grid Computing by Azzedin and Maheswaran 
In a grid computing system, trust [11] can be used to encourage resource sharing among 
grid domains (GDs). Associated with each GD are two virtual domains: the resource 
domain (RD) and the client domain (CD). It is assumed that a trust agent exists in each 
GD and is responsible for calculating the GD’s trust in the other domains. As for the 
resources and clients within a GD, they automatically inherit the trust attributes of their 
RD and CD. Trust in a domain is calculated based on direct trust (experiences) and 
reputation (recommendations from other domains). For domain-to-domain resource 
sharing to occur, it is required for both GDs to have enough trust in each other (      
                    ).  
3.1.3.4 Service Selection by Ali, Ludwig and Rana 
A framework for web services discovery and selection is proposed in [5]. A trust 
relationship in [5] consists of three phases: unknown, volatile and mature. A trust 
relationship starts in the unknown phase. After some interactions, the relationship enters 
the volatile phase. After developing a deeper understanding of a web service, the 
relationship enters the more stable mature phase. A trust policy is used to capture a user’s 
trust disposition. A policy can also be used to specify the conditions for transitioning 
from one trust phase to another.  
Trust in [5] is calculated using QoE (Quality of Experience) and QoC (Quality of 
Compliance). QoE is concerned with how the service delivered is when compared to the 
user’s expectations. QoC is concerned with whether the service delivered met the agreed 
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upon quality of service (QoS). As for trust calculation, it is based on Fuzzy Cognitive 
Maps (FCM). The paper proposed to only trust a web service if the subjective expected 
utility to trust is greater than the subjective expected utility to distrust.  
3.1.3.5 The TuBE Trust Management System 
The TuBE trust management system [108] is responsible for facilitating inter-enterprise 
collaborations. The Guard component of TuBE intercepts SOAP messages from 
collaborating partners and passes the messages on to the trust decision maker. The 
decision maker needs to decide whether a SOAP message should be allowed to proceed 
or not. To make a trust decision, the decision maker passes information on the trustee 
along the action that the trustee would like to take on to the data processing component. 
In return, the decision maker receives a risk analysis and a constraint set. The constraint 
set represents the acceptable risk given the current situation. By determining whether the 
risk estimates can fit within the risk constraints, a decision is made on whether the SOAP 
message should be blocked or not.  
The data processing component of TuBE consists of four subcomponents. These 
are risk, importance, reputation
17
 and context evaluators. Experience data used by the 
reputation evaluator comes from the reputation management component. Reputation in 
TuBE is calculated using locally monitored experiences and experiences reported by 
other peers in the reputation network
18
.  
3.1.3.6 Information Trustworthiness by Zuo and Panda 
In [147], the authors presented a model for evaluating trust in information in a virtual 
organization (VO). The model is based on the concept of objects where an object is a 
piece of information on a topic or issue (e.g. unemployment rate). Different subjects may 
have different views. This could result in the creation of multiple object versions. Since 
                                                 
17
 Due to differences in definitions, “reputation” in this paper actually corresponds to “trust” in this thesis. 
18
 This is basically recommendations from other peers. 
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new information can be created from existing information, it is possible to create a 
compound object version from object versions as well. How a compound object version 
is created can be represented using a version dependency tree.  
There are many different ways to calculate trust in an object version. For 
example, trust can be calculated by multiplying the owner’s trust in the object version 
and the trust the evaluator (trustor) places on the owner. If the calculated trust is not 
enough to satisfy the needs of the evaluator, the principle of object trust combination can 
be used to increase the evaluator’s trust in the object version. The idea here is that if two 
object versions are similar but are created through different approaches (have dissimilar 
version dependency trees), then the average of the two object versions should be more 
trustworthy than the individual object versions.  For example, if two subjects through 
completely different approaches arrived at the same conclusion with regards to the 
unemployment rate, then the “multiple-proofs” should increase the level of trust in the 
unemployment rate.  
3.1.4 Pervasive Computing Environments 
Works on trust and reputation in pervasive computing environments include [22], [23], 
[52], [80] and [112]. In this subsection, the discussion focuses on two such works. 
3.1.4.1 The SECURE Project 
The SECURE project [22] is concerned with trust-based security in pervasive computing 
environments. Trust and risk are viewed as having a mediating relationship in SECURE 
where risk is seen as dependent on trust and an outcome’s intrinsic cost. SECURE also 
supports trust delegation where a trustor’s trust in a trustee is just a reference to the trust 
calculated by someone else. 
When an interaction request is made to the SECURE framework, it is the 
responsibility of the request analyzer to decide on whether the request is to be allowed or 
denied. The request analyzer makes its decision based on information provided by the 
entity recognition component, trust calculator and risk evaluator. The entity recognition 
component is responsible for recognizing new or previously encountered entities. The 
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trust calculator performs trust calculation based on information it obtained from the trust 
lifecycle management component. The trust lifecycle management component is 
responsible for the formation and evolution of trust based on information stored in the 
evidence store. The risk analyzer uses the information provided by the risk configuration 
component to calculate the potential risk of the interaction request. The risk configuration 
component updates risk information based on the data stored in the evidence store. The 
evidence store holds all the trust and risk-related data. This includes the experiences of 
the trustor that can be obtained through monitoring and recommendations that are 
obtained through recommendation gathering. 
3.1.4.2 Trust-Based Admission Control by Grey et al. 
In [52], a trust framework is used to enable access control in collaborative ad hoc 
applications (e.g. blackjack game). To gain admission to an ad hoc application, the user 
first needs to specify the member role (e.g. dealer) it is interested in joining as. At the 
global level, an application manager will ask each existing member to vote on the 
admission. Based on the voting results, the application manager will either accept or 
reject the admission request. At the local level, each member uses its own trust-based 
policies to determine whether or not to support the admission. As for trust, it is calculated 
by the Trust Formation System based on a user’s past interactions (experiences). 
3.2 Middleware Support for Computational Trust Formation 
There are many applications for trust in computing. Depending on the application, trust 
may be calculated differently. For example in P2P, trust is used to encourage cooperation. 
Cooperation however is rarely an issue with web services. With web services the main 
concern is whether the demanded QoS would be provided. Due to differences in concern, 
trust calculation is different between P2P and web services. As a concrete example, 
comparisons could be made between [55] and [5]. In [55] (Section 3.1.2.4), the authors 
use trust to measure a peer’s level of participation in the network. Trust calculation 
therefore involves a peer’s level of upload, download, resources shared and response rate 
to queries. In [5] (Section 3.1.3.4), trust in a web service is calculated using the trustor’s 
quality of experience and the web service’s quality of compliance. 
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Although there are many different ways to calculate trust, there are still some 
commonalities shared across the different trust calculation approaches. These 
commonalities can be abstracted into a middleware. Applications that need trust 
calculated therefore can leverage the services provided by the middleware in its trust 
calculation. Specifically, this thesis has identified three different areas of computational 
trust calculation that can benefit from middleware support. The areas are evidence 
gathering, belief calculation and emotional trust calculation. 
To calculate cognitive trust, an application needs access to quality evidence. As 
for how evidence are to be collected and how evidence quality is to be determined, this is 
an issue that can be delegated to a middleware. Belief calculation can also be delegated to 
the middleware. This is based on the view that a trustor’s beliefs about a trustee should be 
consistent across different applications. Cognitive trust calculation has therefore been 
simplified to a problem of selecting the relevant beliefs and determining how the beliefs 
are to be combined to form cognitive trust. In terms of emotional trust, emotions are 
associated with the trustor. It therefore makes sense for the middleware to keep track of 
the trustor’s emotional trust so that it maintains consistent across different applications. 
3.3 Survey of Trust Middleware 
In this section, a literature survey is provided on trust middleware. As far as we know, 
there is only one paper on trust middleware. It is the Personalized Trust Framework 
(PTF) by Huynh in [58]. Note that Huynh’s paper does not cover all the issues discussed 
in this thesis. Specifically, the paper does not presuppose the existence of a conceptual 
model nor concern itself with evidence gathering. PTF only addresses the challenge of 
trust being subjective and multidimensional. A description of PTF is provided below. 
The Personalized Trust Framework (PTF) [58] is concerned with how a user’s 
trust evaluation process can be captured and replicated by computers. The way PTF 
works is for a document and its meta-data to be submitted to the Trust Manager. A 
document in PTF refers to any piece of information that needs to be evaluated. As for 
meta-data, this covers information such as document type, context type, originator, etc. 
The Trust Manager matches the meta-data with the user’s trust profile (preferences) to 
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determine the trust model to be used in trust calculation. An implementation of the trust 
model, i.e., a trust engine is then initialized to perform trust calculation. If a specific trust 
representation is required by the user, a converter could also be instantiated to perform 
the necessary trust transformation before the calculated trust value is returned to the user. 
Auditing is also supported by PTF. This allows a user to examine how trust is calculated. 
Implementation wise, an ontology has been developed and forms the basic 
building blocks of PTF. It is also the language that is used to write the trust profiles. A 
trust profile contains the rules that are used for trust engine selection. It also contains 
information on the concepts to be used in trust calculation. Rules in PTF are executed by 
the Jena Rule Engine [103]. Both trust engines and converters can be written using Jena 
rules or implemented as Java classes.  
3.4 Summary 
Trust and reputation are used differently in different areas of computing. In the literature 
survey, the focus is on four areas: WWW, P2P networks, virtual communities and 
pervasive computing environments. Based on insights gained from the literature survey, a 
case is made for a middleware based approach for supporting computational trust 
formation. PTF as a trust middleware does not address all of the identified trust 
challenges. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Computational Trust Architecture 
The focus of this chapter is to provide a high level overview of the computational trust 
architecture. The individual components of the architecture are described in detail in the 
next two chapters. The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
describes the assumptions made when designing the computational trust architecture. 
Next, an overview of the architecture is provided. The final section of this chapter 
describes how information flows through the architecture.  
4.1 Assumptions 
The computational trust architecture is designed with the following assumptions in mind. 
4.1.1 Identity and Type 
Trustors, trustees and evidence sources all need to have unique identities. As explained in 
Section 2.3, identities needs to be verifiable and long lived. How this can be achieved is 
outside the scope of this thesis. Some possible references to learn more about identity 
includes X.509 [57], PGP [146] and Sybil attack [36], [74]. It is assumed in this thesis 
that any identity used in the proposed architecture has already been verified and can be 
trusted. If this is not the case, identity can be treated as evidence. Belief in a trustee’s 
identity therefore forms the basis for computational trust formation. 
 Trustors, trustees and evidence sources also need to be categorizable into their 
respective types. For example, a trustee could be a movie in the fantasy genre. A trustee 
could be a web service providing cloud computing. It is assumed that an ontology and 
taxonomy is in place for performing the categorization. How this can be achieved is 
outside the scope of this thesis. Some possible references include UDDI [29] and 
RosettaNet [105]. 
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4.1.2 Computational Trust Formation 
Computational trust formation is introduced in Section 1.2.5. The computational trust 
architecture currently only supports a limited form of computational trust formation. 
More support has been identified as future work. Basically, the architecture makes a 
number of formation assumptions. The assumptions are the following: 
 The relationship between cognitive trust and emotional trust is not explicitly 
supported by the architecture. Capturing the impact that a trustor’s emotions have 
on its beliefs in a trustee is a difficult problem. So is the capturing of how beliefs 
can impact a trustor’s emotions. Further compounding the problem is the fact that 
the relationship is circular where emotions can influence beliefs which again can 
influence emotions. As a result, this relationship is currently not explicitly 
supported by the architecture. Instead, any changes in cognitive trust and 
emotional trust due to their relationship would necessitate the trustor making 
manual adjustments to cognitive trust and emotional trust. 
 Behavior trust is not explicitly represented in the architecture. If a trustor 
observes other trustors’ behaviors towards a trustee, such behavioral knowledge 
can be treated as evidence. The evidence can be used in cognitive trust 
calculation, thereby removing the need to explicitly represent behavior trust.  
Figure 7 shows the resulting computational trust formation where computational trust is 
calculated from cognitive trust and emotional trust.  
 
Figure 7: Computational Trust Formation (Architecture) 
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4.1.3 Evidence 
There are many different types of evidence. The computational trust architecture 
currently supports four different evidence types: 
 Experience. Experience is the knowledge that the trustor gained about the trustee. 
There are two ways that a trustor can gain experience with a trustee. One is to 
directly interact with the trustee. Another is to directly observe the trustee 
interacting with another trustor. In the first approach, monitoring is used to record 
the trustee’s behaviors during an interaction. Besides monitoring, a trustor could 
also be asked for its view on a completed interaction. In the second approach, if a 
trustee is aware of the presence of observers, it may behave differently (e.g. 
perform better) than when it is not being observed. Therefore when calculating 
belief from experience, it is important to take into account the means used in 
experience gathering.  
 Recommendation. When a trustor shares its experience with others, the shared 
experience is known as recommendation. All gathered recommendations should 
be filtered. This is to avoid using recommendations from biased or malicious 
recommenders in belief calculation.  
An endorsement is a type of recommendation. When a movie advertises 
that it is recommended by movie critics, this can be seen as the critics endorsing a 
movie. With recommendation, the burden is on the trustor to discover the 
available recommendations. With endorsement, the burden is shifted to the 
trustee. It is the responsibility of the trustee to provide the trustor with all of its 
endorsements. As an endorsement could be neutral or negative, it is in the 
trustee’s interest to throw away these non-positive endorsements. Therefore, 
endorsements are often biased towards the trustee. This can be seen in movie 
advertisements where all mentioned reviews are positive. Due to the inherent bias, 
care should be taken when using endorsements in belief calculation. 
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 Reputation. Reputation is the consensus assessment of a trustee by members of a 
social network. All gathered reputations should be filtered. This is to avoid using 
reputations from biased or malicious reputation systems in belief calculation.  
 Signal. In economics, signaling [124] is used by a party to provide information 
about itself. The provided information can be used by the interacting parties to 
overcome the challenge of information asymmetry. In decision making, a trustee 
could send signals to the trustor explaining why it should be believed.  
4.1.4 Belief 
There are many different types of beliefs. To better organize the different beliefs, the 
computational trust architecture aggregates beliefs into aggregate belief. An aggregate 
belief is calculated from its constituent beliefs. The computational trust architecture hides 
the mappings from beliefs to aggregate belief from the applications that need 
computational trust calculated. By only exposing aggregate beliefs, this makes it easier 
for an application to specify the aggregate beliefs needed for cognitive trust calculation. 
The computational trust architecture currently supports eight different aggregate beliefs: 
 Accessibility belief. This is belief in a trustee as being reachable when needed. 
Example constituent beliefs include availability belief, latency belief, etc. 
 Competence belief. This is belief in a trustee as being qualified for what is 
expected of the trustee. Example constituent beliefs include qualification belief, 
popularity belief (i.e., inferring competence from the trustee being popular), etc. 
 Dependability belief. This is belief in a trustee as being reliable and has the 
trustor’s best interest in mind. A dependable trustee is one who would not betray 
the trustor. An example betrayal could be the violation of a signed service level 
agreement (SLA). Example constituent beliefs include compliance belief (i.e., 
level of compliance with SLA), popularity belief, etc. 
 Identity belief. This is belief in a trustee as being who it says it is. Example 
constituent beliefs include personal knowledge belief (i.e., having knowledge that 
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only the trustee would know such as password), behavioral belief (i.e., behaving 
in a way that is similar to the trustee), etc. 
 Performance belief. This is belief in a trustee as being able to carry out what is 
expected of the trustee. Example constituent beliefs include timeliness belief, 
response time belief, etc. Competence belief and performance belief are not the 
same. Competence is concern with capability. For example, having graduated 
from the Computer Science program is proof of competence. Performance is 
concern with usage of the capability. For example, being able to apply what is 
learned in the program to solve computing problems is proof of performance. A 
competent trustee could choose to perform well or to perform poorly. An 
incompetent trustee however by definition cannot perform well. 
 Privacy belief. This is belief in a trustee as being in compliance with the trustor’s 
policies with respect to the trustor’s information. Example constituent beliefs 
include information retention belief, information sharing belief, etc. 
 Quality belief. This is belief in the excellence of a trustee. Quality belief is used in 
cases when the trustee is an inanimate object. It is used in place of performance 
belief. For example, a trustor forms its belief in the quality of a novel. It does not 
form its belief in the performance of a novel. Example constituent beliefs include 
accuracy belief, bias belief (i.e., is the trustee bias?), etc. 
 Security belief. This is belief in a trustee as being able to protect the interest of the 
trustor from harm. Example constituent beliefs include auditability belief, 
integrity belief (includes data and transactional integrity), etc. 
There are many possible mappings from belief to aggregate belief. For example, a 
positive mapping would be availability belief that has a positive influence on the 
aggregate belief accessibility. A negative mapping would be bias belief that has a 
negative influence on the aggregate belief quality. A belief could also be a constituent 
belief in multiple aggregate beliefs. For example, popularity belief has a positive 
influence on both competence and dependability beliefs. 
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In terms of the scenarios, in movie selection, quality belief is already an aggregate 
belief; therefore cognitive trust formation remains the same as in Figure 3 of Section 
1.3.1. As for web service selection, the cognitive trust formation needs to be updated with 
the incorporation of aggregate beliefs. The resulting cognitive trust formation is shown in 
Figure 8. In the figure, competence belief, performance belief and quality belief are 
accessible to the consumer. How these aggregate beliefs are formed (from constituent 
beliefs or from evidence directly) is hidden from the consumer.  
 
Figure 8: Cognitive Trust Formation from Aggregate Beliefs (Web Service) 
4.1.5 Emotional Trust Formation 
The computational trust architecture does not support the formation of emotional trust 
from the trustor’s emotions directly. This is due to the difficulty in monitoring the 
trustor’s emotions. Instead, emotional trust is formed through the recognition of the 
trustee. For example, based on the trustee’s type and identity, the trustor may be 
predisposed to emotionally trust or distrust the trustee. An example is shown in Figure 9 
where trustee types and identities are organized into a hierarchy. Each node in the 
hierarchy is assigned an emotional trust value. If there is no emotional trust value set for 
a trustee, the emotional trust value of its closest parent is used instead. For example, there 
is no emotional trust value set for the horror film “Zombieland” in Figure 9. Therefore, 
the trustor’s emotional trust value in horror movies is used as an approximation.   
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Another example is to create a hierarchy based on the trustee’s relationship with 
the trustor. Example relationships could include family, friend, acquaintance and 
stranger. Multiple hierarchies can be used together to form the trustor’s emotional trust in 
a trustee. An example of the use of multiple hierarchies is for emotional trust to be 
formed based on the sum of the emotional trust from each hierarchy. Another example is 
for emotional trust to be based on the maximum emotional trust value obtained from all 
the hierarchy. 
 
Figure 9: Hierarchy of Trustee Type and Identity 
4.1.6 Factors Influencing Computational Trust Formation 
There are many factors that influence computational trust formation. The computational 
trust architecture grouped the factors into decision, trustor and trustee.  
4.1.6.1 Decision Factors 
Decision factors are factors associated with a decision. An example is decision type 
where the trustor calculates computational trust differently for movie selection and web 
service selection. Another example is the importance of a decision where more evidence 
may be demanded if a decision is important. Table 1 shows an example of how trust 
types can influence computational trust formation. Other example decision factors 
include decision cost, decision environment, etc. 
Trustee 
Movie 
Comedy Horror 
Alien 
Web 
Service 
Amazon 
EC2 Compute 
Cloud 
Mechanical 
Turk 
HP IBM 
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Table 1: Trust Types and Computational Trust Formation 
Types of Trust Computational Trust Formation 
Faith                    
Emotion                                     
Cognition and Emotion                                     
Cognition                                     
Rational                    
 
4.1.6.2 Trustor Factors 
Trustor factors are factors associated with the trustor. A change in a trustor factor may 
influence computational trust formation of many decisions. Trustor factors include:  
 Trust Disposition. A trustor could be an optimist, a realist or a pessimist in its 
trust disposition [85]. An optimist may demand less evidence in belief calculation 
while the opposite is the case for a pessimist. A realist’s evidence demands falls 
somewhere in between an optimist and a pessimist.  
 Trust Preference. A trustor`s trust preferences could influence the algorithms used 
for computational trust calculation (e.g. Bayesian vs. average). It could also 
influence how evidence are gathered (e.g. prefer one evidence source over 
another) and how beliefs in a trustee are formed (e.g. Bayesian vs. average).  
 Culture. The culture upbringing of a trustor could influence computational trust 
formation. For example, the presence of credit card symbols had been shown to 
have a bigger impact on trust in Latin American and Brazil than in the US [131]. 
Basically, different cultures may interpret the same evidence (a credit card signal 
in this case) differently. Moreover, different cultures may instill in a trustor 
different norms and values. For example, business relationships in Japan are more 
personal than in more “legalistic” cultures such as the US [17]. Trustors living in 
cultures with a high degree of power inequality (high power distance) or cultures 
that are less tolerant of change (high uncertainty avoidance) have been shown to 
have a higher use of evidence from personal sources (e.g. friends) and a lower use 
of evidence from impersonal sources (e.g. Consumer Reports) [34].  
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4.1.6.3 Trustee Factors 
Trustee factors are factors associated with the trustee. An example is the identity of the 
trustee where computational trust is calculated differently depending on whether the 
trustor recognizes the trustee. If a trustee is recognizable, it can be calculated using 
emotion. Otherwise, it is calculated using cognition. Other trustee factors include trustee 
type, trustee’s relationship with the trustor, etc. 
4.1.7 Privacy 
As explained in Section 2.3, privacy plays an important role in computational trust 
formation. Due to the complexity of the issues involved, privacy is considered outside the 
scope of this thesis. Some possible references to learn more about privacy includes [13], 
[18], [49] and [113]. This is an important area that should be addressed in future work.  
4.1.8 Architecture Deployment 
Computational trust is subjective as detailed in Section 1.2.3.2. To accommodate the 
trustor’s subjective views, it is assumed that each trustor has its own computational trust 
architecture deployment.  
4.1.9 Summary 
A summary of all the discussed assumptions is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Assumptions of Computational Trust Architecture 
 Assumptions 
Identity and Type  Identity is unique and long lived 
 Identity has already been verified through means outside 
the scope of this thesis 
 Every trustor, trustee and evidence source has a type 
property whose assignment is outside the scope of this 
thesis 
Computational trust formation  Computational trust is calculated from cognitive trust and 
emotional trust 
 Behavioral trust is treated as a form of cognitive trust 
 The relationship between cognitive trust and emotional 
trust is not represented in the proposed architecture 
Evidence  Evidence types: Experience, recommendation, reputation 
and signal 
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Belief  Aggregate belief is calculated from constituent beliefs 
 Aggregate beliefs: Accessibility, competence, dependability 
identity, performance, privacy, quality and security 
Emotional trust formation  Emotional trust is calculated from properties of a trustee 
 The properties can be organized into a hierarchy 
Factors influencing 
computational trust formation 
 Decision factors 
 Trustor factors: Disposition, preference and culture 
 Trustee factors 
Privacy  Outside the scope of this thesis 
Architecture deployment  Each trustor deploys its own architecture 
 
4.2 Overview of Architecture 
A graphical illustration of the computational trust architecture is shown in Figure 10. The 
architecture consists of three components: SCOUT (Services supporting COmpUtation of 
Trust), Evidence Repository and Trust Calculator. SCOUT is a middleware that provides 
three different web services: Evidence Gathering Service (EGS), Belief Formation 
Service (BFS) and Emotional Trust Service (ETS). EGS is responsible for the discovery 
and gathering of evidence. Any gathered evidence is normalized (i.e., mapped to standard 
evidence representation) before being stored in the Evidence Repository. The Evidence 
Repository is the storage for all the gathered evidence. BFS uses the evidence stored in 
the Evidence Repository for belief and aggregate belief calculation. ETS is responsible 
for calculating the trustor’s emotional trust in a trustee. An application could contact EGS 
directly for evidence gathering. It could also contact BFS or ETS to obtain the trustor’s 
aggregate belief or emotional trust. An application could also subscribe to BFS or ETS to 
be informed of any changes to the trustor’s aggregate belief or emotional trust. 
The Trust Calculator is a client that can be used to access the SCOUT services. It 
calculates computational trust based on the belief values and emotional trust values 
calculated by SCOUT. An application could either query or subscribe to the 
computational trust calculated by the Trust Calculator. 
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Figure 10: Computational Trust Architecture 
4.3 Information Flow of Architecture 
The computational trust architecture can be viewed from the perspective of the flow of 
information. Such a perspective is graphically illustrated in Figure 11. In the figure, 
computational trust formation is described as a three step process. The process starts with 
a request for a computational trust calculation. This results in evidence gathering. 
Evidence may be found locally. For example by parsing the log file of the trustor’s 
interaction with a trustee. Evidence may also be found in the open environments. For 
example by requesting reputation from an Internet-based reputation system. In both 
cases, the gathered evidence are normalized before being stored in an Evidence 
Repository. The next step is the calculation of the trustor’s beliefs and aggregate beliefs 
in a trustee based on the stored evidence. Finally, the last step is to perform the trust 
calculation. This involves the calculation of cognitive trust from aggregate beliefs and 
emotional trust from the trustor’s knowledge about the trustee. Computational trust is 
calculated from cognitive and emotional trust. There are many different algorithms that 
can be used in belief, aggregate belief and trust calculations. The different algorithms 
used in the literature are summarized in Table 3. 
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Figure 11: Information Flow of Architecture 
Table 3: Algorithms for Belief, Aggregate Belief and Trust Calculation 
Categories Examples 
Arithmetic  Summation: [38], [55]... 
 Average: [7], [14]… 
 Weighted average: [11], [39], [91], [135]... 
 Others: [23], [53], [71], [84]… 
Probability Theory  Bayesian approach: [20], [43], [62], [80]… 
 Belief theory: [64], [142]… 
 Others: [2], [114]… 
Fuzzy Logic  [5], [41], [54], [145]… 
Others  [59], [68], [110], [117]… 
 
4.4 Summary 
The computational trust architecture consists of a SCOUT middleware, an Evidence 
Repository and Trust Calculators that are used by applications to perform computational 
trust calculation. When designing the architecture, a number of assumptions were made. 
The assumptions include identity, computational trust formation, evidence, belief, 
emotional trust formation, factors influencing computational trust formation, privacy and 
architecture deployment. To provide a different perspective on how the computational 
trust architecture operates, the chapter also describes how information flows through the 
architecture. The information flow helps illustrates how information changes as it passes 
through the computational trust architecture.  
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Chapter 5  
5 SCOUT 
The focus of this chapter is on introducing the SCOUT middleware. This chapter is 
divided into four sections. The first section provides a high level overview of the 
middleware design. The next three sections focuses on the introduction of each of the 
SCOUT services in detail. 
5.1 SCOUT Design 
SCOUT is designed with the following properties in mind: 
 Modularity. SCOUT is designed to support evidence gathering, belief calculation 
and emotional trust calculation. To achieve modularity, all three functionalities 
are implemented as web services that can operate independently of each other.  
 Extensibility. There are many algorithms and protocols that can be used to 
implement the different SCOUT functionalities. To achieve extensibility, a plug-
in approach has been adopted for cases when there is no best way to implement a 
specific functionality.   
 Adaptability. Computational trust is subjective and multidimensional. The 
SCOUT services therefore should be adaptable to meet the needs of 
computational trust formation. To achieve this, a policy based approach has been 
adopted. A policy refers to “a rule that defines a choice in the behavior of a 
system” [33]. Policies are used in SCOUT to determine how each service 
responds to the trustor’s queries or subscriptions. For example, a policy could 
specify that a specific algorithm is always to be used in calculating quality belief 
in movies as this is the trustor’s preferences. Another example could be that if a 
decision is important, this may entail the gathering of more evidence, the 
consideration of more evidence types and the use of a higher threshold for 
evidence filtering. All these requirements can be presented as policies for 
important decisions. As every trustor is different, policies are selected as it is 
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challenging to program for adaptability ahead of time. Moreover, a trustor may 
change over time. Policies allow for any change to be captured without requiring 
the coding and compilation of the SCOUT services. 
5.2 Evidence Gathering Service 
The Evidence Gathering Service (EGS) is responsible for gathering the evidence needed 
for belief calculation. A graphical illustration of EGS is shown in Figure 12. In the figure, 
the Evidence Gathering Manager is responsible for processing any request for evidence 
gathering. This is accomplished through the exposed gatherEvidence method that has as 
input the following three parameters: 
 Trustee. Information about the trustee can be represented as attribute-value pairs. 
There are two attribute-value pairs that must be present for each trustee: the 
trustee’s identity and the trustee’s type. For example, the online retailer Amazon 
has an identity of “www.amazon.com” and type of “OnlineRetailer”. Amazon’s 
EC2 Service has an identity of “aws.amazon.com/ec2/” and type of 
“WebService/ComputeCloud”. In this case, since EC2 is both a web service and a 
compute cloud, both are specified with the more general type specified first and 
the types separated by a slash. Other attributes could include the trustee’s 
relationship with the trustor, signals that the trustee is willing to provide, etc. 
 Belief. Evidence could be gathered for aggregate belief calculation or belief 
calculation. As aggregate belief is just a special type of belief, EGS does not 
differentiate between aggregate belief and belief. Instead, both are treated the 
same when it comes to evidence gathering. 
 Hints. This is an optional parameter that is represented as attribute-value pairs. It 
is used to provide hints to EGS with regards to how evidence gathering should be 
changed. Some example hints may include the importance of decision, the 
evidence types to be used, etc. 
The input parameters are used in policies to determine how evidence are to be gathered. 
This may involve the invocation of one or more Evidence Gatherers for evidence 
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discovery and gathering. The gathered evidence are then handed over to the Evidence 
Handler for processing. After processing, the last step is for the evidence to be stored in 
the Evidence Repository. 
As for evidence filtering, EGS has adopted the trust-based approach (see evidence 
filtering bullet point in Section 1.4 for a review). This is due to the fact that the outlier-
approach depends on the gathered evidence exhibiting certain statistical properties [63]. 
The assumption that outliers should be filtered out is not always a valid assumption. A 
trustor may have views that are more similar to the outliers than the majority of evidence. 
In the trust-based approach, trust is used for identifying and avoiding of distrusted 
evidence sources. To calculate evidence source trust, EGS first needs to identify whether 
an evidence source can provide evidence of high quality. Feedbacks provided by 
evidence gathering requesters can be used for assessing the quality of evidence. 
Feedbacks can be provided to EGS by calling the provideFeedback method of the 
Evidence Gathering Manager. This method takes two input parameters: trustee and belief 
feedbacks. The two input parameters are used in policies to determine the Evidence 
Source Assessor to be invoked for assessing evidence quality and for calculating 
evidence source trust. The calculated evidence source trust can be taken into account 
during evidence gathering. For the rest of this section, each of the components of EGS is 
described in detail. 
 
Figure 12: Evidence Gathering Service 
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5.2.1 Evidence Gatherer 
There is currently no standard for evidence discovery and evidence gathering. As a result, 
to gather evidence from multiple evidence sources, different discovery and gathering 
protocols have to be implemented. Moreover, not all evidence sources provide evidence 
in formats that are machine friendly. For example Rotten Tomatoes does not provide an 
API for accessing the reputation of movies. The only way to access a movie’s reputation 
is to access the movie page and parse the html file to extract the movie’s reputation. This 
in turn makes evidence gathering challenging. 
In EGS, each Evidence Gatherer is responsible for one evidence discovery and 
gathering protocol. An Evidence Gatherer may be responsible for a single evidence 
source (e.g. IMDb) or multiple evidence sources (e.g. locating reputation systems through 
a registry). Evidence Gatherers are implemented as plug-ins to EGS. This allows an 
Evidence Gatherer to be implemented by a third party (e.g. the evidence source) and used 
in multiple SCOUT deployments. This in turn reduces the burden on application 
developers as they no longer have to write and support different evidence discovery and 
gathering protocols.  
Finally, all Evidence Gatherers deployed in EGS are registered with a registry. 
The registry is used by the Evidence Gathering Manager (Section 5.2.4) to discover the 
available Evidence Gatherers for evidence gathering.   
5.2.2 Evidence Handler 
In EGS, Evidence Handler is responsible for mapping the gathered evidence to a standard 
representation. For example, all evidence could be mapped to an interval of [-1, 1] where 
1 is the best and -1 is the worst. By having a single standard evidence representation, this 
simplifies evidence interpretation. No longer would an evidence user have to worry about 
what a piece of evidence is representing.  
Besides evidence mapping, the Evidence Handler is also responsible for the 
metadata needed for evidence interpretation. The following metadata are supported by the 
Evidence Handler: timestamp of evidence creation, timestamp of evidence gathered, 
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identity of evidence source, identity of trustee and belief. The metadata could be provided 
by the evidence source (e.g. timestamp of evidence creation), generated by the Evidence 
Handler itself (e.g. timestamp of evidence gathered) or obtained from the Evidence 
Gatherer (e.g. identity of evidence source, identity of trustee and belief). The mapped 
evidence along with their metadata are stored into the Evidence Repository by the 
Evidence Handler.  
Evidence Handlers are implemented as plug-ins to EGS. This allows EGS to be 
extended to support new evidence representations. As with Evidence Gatherers, all 
deployed Evidence Handlers are registered with a registry. The registry is used by the 
Evidence Gatherers to discover the available Evidence Handlers. The selection of an 
Evidence Handler is based on evidence type and evidence representation. 
5.2.3 Evidence Source Assessor 
There are many ways in which an evidence source can be assessed. For example, 
evidence source trust
19
 in [30] is represented as a triplet: (servent_id, num_agree, 
num_disagree). For each servent
20
, the trustor records the number of times the servent’s 
recommendations agrees or disagrees with the trustor’s feedback. In a recommendation
21
, 
a servent either votes for or against another servent as a content provider. After a 
successful download, any servent that voted for the content provider would have its 
num_agree increase by one. Those servents that voted against the content provider would 
have their num_disagree increase by one. If a download failed, any servent that voted for 
the content provider would have its num_disagree increase by one. Those servents that 
voted against the content provider would have their num_agree increase by one. Based on 
the calculated evidence source trust (i.e., num_agree vs. num_disagree), a decision can 
now be made on whether to contact a servent for recommendation. Other evidence source 
                                                 
19
 Known as “credibility” in [30]. 
20
 A servent is a node in a P2P network. It is both a trustee and an evidence source. 
21
 Known as “vote” in [30]. 
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assessment algorithms include [1], [11], [80] and [142]. In this thesis, an evidence source 
assessment algorithm is introduced in Section 7.2. 
In EGS, each Evidence Source Assessor is responsible for implementing its own 
evidence source assessment algorithm. The Evidence Source Assessors are implemented 
as plug-ins. This allows EGS to be easily extended to support new evidence source 
assessment algorithms. The Evidence Source Assessors are also provided with access to a 
scheduler. The scheduler can be used to schedule when trust in an evidence source is to 
be reevaluated. This is to provide an evidence source with enough time to prove its 
trustworthiness as oppose to having evidence source trust calculated after every feedback. 
As with Evidence Gatherers, all deployed Evidence Source Assessors are registered with 
a registry. The registry is used by the Evidence Gathering Manager (Section 5.2.4) to 
discover the available Evidence Source Assessors. 
5.2.4 Evidence Gathering Manager 
The Evidence Gathering Manager (EGM) employs policies to determine how evidence is 
to be gathered and how evidence sources are to be assessed. It is the responsibility of the 
trustor to deploy the needed policies. Policies are in the form of if condition then action 
and are the focus for the rest of this section. 
5.2.4.1 Evidence Gathering Policy 
The Evidence Gathering Manager uses evidence gathering policies (EG-Policies) to 
determine how the evidence needed for belief calculation is to be gathered. The syntax 
for EG-Policies is discussed in Appendix A. An EG-Policy may state that specific 
evidence gatherers are to be used for evidence gathering. An example is shown in Figure 
13. In the figure, “Trustee”, “Belief” and “Hint” are obtained through the gatherEvidence 
method. If it is hinted at that the decision is of low importance, evidence gatherers with 
identity of “EG1” (lines 1-7) and “EG2” (lines 9-16) are invoked for evidence gathering. 
For decision of high importance, “EG1” (lines 1-7) and “EG3” (lines 18-25) are invoked 
instead. A possible reason for the EG-Policies in Figure 13 is that some evidence sources 
may be more costly than others. A trustor may only be willing to use the costlier evidence 
sources (i.e., invoking “EG3”) if it is hinted at that the decision is of high importance. 
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1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" ) 
4 then  
5 gatherer = Registry.lookup("EG1");  
6 gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief); 
7 end 
8  
9 when  
10 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
11 belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" ) 
12 Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "Low" ) 
13 then  
14 gatherer = Registry.lookup("EG2");  
15 gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief); 
16 end 
17  
18 when  
19 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
20 belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" ) 
21 Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "High" ) 
22 then  
23 gatherer = Registry.lookup("EG3");  
24 gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief); 
25 end 
Figure 13: EG-Policies (Identity) 
It is not always the case that a trustor would know in advance which evidence 
sources should be contacted for evidence gathering. In such cases, the better approach is 
to let EGM handle the Evidence Gatherers to be invoked. Such an example is shown in 
Figure 14. In the figure, the registry is used to look up all the Evidence Gatherers with 
properties that satisfy the trustor’s evidence gathering requirements (line 8). Since no 
evidence type is specified, the policy assumes that reputation is to be gathered. A 
different approach would be to throw an exception if evidence type is not specified. After 
the Evidence Gatherers are found, they are invoked for evidence gathering. An advantage 
of this property-based approach is that if a new evidence gatherer is deployed, the 
evidence gatherer would be included in evidence gathering if it has the necessary 
properties. This is not the case with the identity-based approach where the EG-Policies 
need to be updated before the new Evidence Gatherer can be used in evidence gathering.  
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1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" ) 
4 then  
5 properties = [ "TrusteeType" : trustee.getType(),  
6                                  "Belief" : belief.getType(), 
7                     "EvidenceType" : "Reputation" ]; 
8 gatherers = Registry.lookup(properties); 
9  
10 for (gatherer: gatherers) 
11 gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief); 
12 end 
Figure 14: EG-Policy (Properties) 
 
1 when 
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" ) 
4 then 
5  properties = [ "TrusteeType" : trustee.getType(),   
6                                   "Belief" : belief.getType(), 
7                      "EvidenceType" : "Reputation" ]; 
8 gatherers = Registry.lookup(properties); 
9  
10 sortByEvidenceourceTrust(gatherers); 
11  
12 for (int i=0; i<3; i++) { 
13 gatherer = gatherers.get(i); 
14  
15 if (gatherer.getEvidenceourceTrust() > 0) 
16 gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief); 
17 else 
18 break; 
19 } 
20 end 
Figure 15: EG-Policy (Evidence Source Trust) 
A weakness of the EG-Policies presented in Figure 13 and Figure 14 is that the 
policies do not take evidence source trust into account during evidence gathering. The 
policies implicitly assume that that all the evidence sources can be trusted. This is often 
not a valid assumption. The use of evidence source trust in evidence gathering is 
demonstrated in Figure 15. In the figure, it is assumed that each Evidence Gatherer has 
access to a single evidence source. As such, the Evidence Gatherers can be sorted based 
on evidence source trust (line 10). After sorting, the three Evidence Gatherers that have 
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access to the most trusted evidence sources are invoked for evidence gathering. The 
invocation is under the condition that an Evidence Gatherer may be skipped if the 
corresponding evidence source trust is less than or equal to zero. 
As seen in Figure 15, the EG-Policy turns out to be rather complex. This is not 
considering the case of an Evidence Gatherer having access to multiple evidence sources. 
To simplify the use of evidence source trust in an EG-Policy, an abstraction known as 
strategy has been implemented. A strategy is an encapsulation of all the steps that need to 
be taken to perform evidence gathering. EGM currently supports two strategies: the 
broadcast strategy and the evidence source trust strategy. The broadcast strategy involves 
the invocation of all matched Evidence Gatherers in evidence gathering. An example is 
shown in Figure 16. The example is functionally the same as the EG-Policy shown in 
Figure 14. The evidence source trust strategy performs evidence gathering based on 
evidence source trust. An example is shown in Figure 17. The example is functionally the 
same as the EG-Policy shown in Figure 15. The only difference is that the example 
actually works with Evidence Gatherers that have access to multiple evidence sources.  
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" ) 
4 then 
5 strategy = new BroadcastStrategy(); 
6 strategy.set("EvidenceType", "Reputation"); 
7 strategy.execute(trustee, belief); 
8 end 
Figure 16: EG-Policy (Broadcast Strategy) 
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 belief: Belief( type == "Timeliness" ) 
4 then 
5 strategy = new EvidenceourceTrustStrategy(); 
6 strategy.set("EvidenceType", "Reputation"); 
7 strategy.set("NumOfEvidence", 3); 
8 strategy.set("EvidenceourceTrustThreshold", 0); 
9 strategy.execute(trustee, belief); 
10 end 
Figure 17: EG-Policy (Evidence Source Trust Strategy) 
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5.2.4.2 Evidence Source Assessment Policy 
The Evidence Gathering Manager uses evidence source assessment policies (EA-
Policies) to determine the Evidence Source Assessor that is responsible for processing the 
incoming feedback. The syntax for EA-Policies is discussed in Appendix A.  An example 
EA-Policy is shown in Figure 18. In the figure, an Evidence Source Assessor is selected 
based on its identity “EA1”. Next, the assessor is configured using the set method (lines 
6-7). For example, an “EvidenceWindow” of 60 restricts assessment to evidence that 
have been created in the last 60 minutes. If creation timestamp is unavailable, the 
timestamp associated with evidence gathering is used instead. There is no point in 
assessing outdated evidence. After the completion of configuration, the assessor is 
invoked to calculate evidence source trust. Depending on the evidence source assessment 
algorithm implemented, an Evidence Source Assessor may choose to not calculate 
evidence source trust right away. Instead, a scheduler can be used by the assessor to 
schedule evidence source trust to be calculated periodically. 
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 feedback: BeliefFeedback( type == "Timeliness" ) 
4 then  
5 assessor = Registry.lookup("EA1"); 
6 assessor.set("EvidenceWindow", 60); 
7 … 
8 assessor.assessEvidenceource(trustee, feedback); 
9 end 
Figure 18: EA-Policy 
5.3 Belief Formation Service 
The Belief Formation Service (BFS) is responsible for calculating the trustor’s aggregate 
beliefs from the available evidence. A graphical illustration of BFS is shown in Figure 
19. In the figure, the Belief Formation Manager is responsible for processing any request 
for the trustor’s aggregate belief. This is accomplished through the exposed 
getAggregateBelief method that has as input three parameters: trustee, aggregate belief 
and hints. These input parameters are used in policies to determine how aggregate belief 
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is to be calculated. This may involve the invocation of one or more Belief Engines to 
perform belief calculation.  
 A trustor can also subscribe to the aggregate beliefs calculated by BFS. This is 
accomplished through subscribeAggregateBelief method exposed by the Belief 
Formation Manager. The method has the same input parameters as getAggregateBelief. 
The return value of the method is a unique identifier: subscriptionId. The subscriptionId 
identifier is used in the unsubscribeAggregateBelief method to unsubscribe from an 
existing subscription. Aggregate belief subscription is the responsibility of the 
Subscription Manager.  
BFS also exposes a provideFeedback method that has as input three parameters: 
trustee, aggregate belief feedbacks and hints. The input parameters are used in policies to 
determine how an aggregate belief feedback can be mapped to constituent belief 
feedbacks. The provideFeedback method of EGS is then invoked with the trustee and 
belief feedbacks. For the rest of this section, each of the components of BFS is described 
in detail. 
 
Figure 19: Belief Formation Service 
5.3.1 Belief Engine 
There are many ways to calculate a trustor’s belief in a trustee (Table 3 of Section 4.3). In 
BFS, belief calculation is the responsibility of the Belief Engines. Basically, each Belief 
Engine is responsible for implementing its own belief formation algorithm. Evidence 
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needed for belief calculation can be retrieved from the Evidence Repository. If the 
evidence available in the repository are not enough for belief calculation to proceed, EGS 
could be invoked to perform additional evidence gathering. 
Belief Engines are implemented as plug-ins to BFS. This allows BFS to be 
extended to support new belief formation algorithms. All Belief Engines deployed in BFS 
are registered with a registry. The registry is used by the Belief Formation Manager 
(Section 5.3.2) to discover the available Belief Engines for belief calculation. 
5.3.2 Belief Formation Manager    
The Belief Formation Manager (BFM) employs policies to determine how aggregate 
belief in a trustee is calculated and how feedback to aggregate belief is mapped to 
feedback to constituent beliefs. It is the responsibility of the trustor to deploy the needed 
policies. The rest of this section is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the 
belief formation policies. The second part describes aggregate belief subscription. The 
last part introduces the aggregate belief feedback policies. 
5.3.2.1 Belief Formation Policy 
The Belief Formation Manager uses belief formation policies (BF-Policies) to determine 
how beliefs and aggregate beliefs are to be calculated. The syntax for BF-Policies is 
discussed in Appendix A.  An example BF-Policy is shown in Figure 20. In the figure, 
“Trustee”, “AggregateBelief” and “Hint” are obtained through either the 
getAggregateBelief method or subscribeAggregateBelief method. The trustor’s 
performance belief in a web service is calculated based on the trustor’s experiences. To 
calculate performance belief, its constituent belief timeliness needs to be calculated (see 
Figure 8 in Section 4.1.4 for reference). To calculate timeliness belief, a Belief Engine 
identified as “BE1” is selected (line 6). The belief formation algorithm implemented by 
the Belief Engine is then configured (lines 7-8) based on the trustor’s preferences. The 
configuration step is optional as a trustor may be satisfied with the defaults of the Belief 
Engine. Documentation associated with the Belief Engine should detail the defaults of the 
belief formation algorithm along with what can and cannot be configured. The last step is 
to invoke the Belief Engine (line 9) to calculate timeliness belief. The calculated belief 
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value is returned as the belief value of aggregate belief performance. If an aggregate 
belief has multiple constituent beliefs, the constituent beliefs can all be calculated by 
different Belief Engines. The constituent beliefs can also be calculated by the same Belief 
Engine invoked multiple times. 
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Performance" ) 
4 hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Experience" ) 
5 then  
6 beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("BE1"); 
7 beliefEngine.set("ExperienceWindow", 30); 
8 ... 
9 beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, new Belief("Timeliness")); 
10 end 
Figure 20: BF-Policy 
A different example could be to employ different formation algorithms based on 
the trustor’s trust disposition. A pessimistic trustor could invoke multiple Belief Engines 
and take the minimum of the calculated beliefs as its belief in the trustee. For an 
optimistic trustor, the maximum belief value could be selected. For a realistic trustor, its 
belief in a trustee could be based on the average of the beliefs calculated by the Belief 
Engines. 
5.3.2.2 Aggregate Belief Subscription 
Upon invocation of the subscribeAggregateBelief method, the EGM creates a new 
subscription and adds it to the Subscription Manager. Periodically (as defined by the 
trustor), the Subscription Manager examines each of its subscriptions to determine 
whether it is time for an aggregate belief to be reevaluated. If so, the aggregate belief is 
calculated based on the deployed BF-Policies and returned to the subscriber. When a 
subscription is no longer needed by the subscriber (i.e., invocation of 
unsubscribeAggregateBelief method), EGM deletes the subscription from the 
Subscription Manager. As a subscriber may not be interested in all the changes in the 
calculated aggregated belief, the Subscription Manager supports the registration of a filter 
to filter out those aggregate belief changes the trustor is not interested in knowing. The 
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syntax for aggregate belief filter is discussed in Appendix A. An aggregate belief filter 
could be specified as a hint with the name of “AggregateBeliefFilter”. Several example 
types of filters supported by the Subscription Manager are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Example Aggregate Belief Filters 
Aggregate Belief Filter Description 
aggBelief.belief < 0 Only notify subscriber if aggregate belief has 
dropped below zero 
aggBelief.belief != lastAggBelief.belief Only notify subscriber if aggregate belief has 
changed from last published aggregate belief 
Math.abs(aggBelief.belief – 
lastAggBelief.belief) > 0.2 
Only notify subscriber if the change in aggregate 
belief from the last published aggregate belief is 
greater than 0.2 
 
5.3.2.3 Aggregate Belief Feedback Policy 
The Belief Formation Manager uses aggregate belief feedback policies (AF-Policies) to 
determine how feedback to aggregate belief is mapped to feedback to beliefs. The syntax 
for AF-Policies is discussed in Appendix A. An example AF-Policy is shown in Figure 
21. In the figure, feedback to aggregate belief performance is mapped to feedback to 
timeliness belief. Since there is only one constituent belief, timeliness belief is simply 
assigned the timestamp and feedback of performance belief. As EGS expects a list of 
belief feedbacks as input, the square brackets ([ ]) are used to create a list. The 
provideFeedback method of EGS is then invoked with the belief feedbacks (line 8).  
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Performance" ) 
4 then  
5 feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Timeliness",                                                                                                                    
6 aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),  
7 aggFeedback.getFeedback()); 
8 EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]); 
9 end 
Figure 21: AF-Policy 
If an aggregate belief is formed from multiple constituent beliefs, then more 
complex mappings are needed. For example, a quality belief feedback of 1.0 can be 
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mapped to feedback of 1.0 to accuracy belief and coverage belief. A quality belief 
feedback of 0.5 can be mapped to feedback of 0.75 for accuracy belief but feedback of 
0.25 for coverage belief. The mappings are based on the idea of assigning meaning to the 
provided aggregate belief feedback. The mappings can be defined as different AF-
Policies. For example, there is an AF-Policy for when quality belief feedback is 1.0 and 
another for when quality belief feedback is 0.5.  
5.4 Emotional Trust Service 
The Emotional Trust Service (ETS) is responsible for calculating the trustor’s emotional 
trust in a trustee. A graphical illustration of ETS is shown in Figure 22. In the figure, the 
Emotional Trust Manager (ETM) is responsible for processing any request for the 
trustor’s emotional trust. This is accomplished through the exposed getEmotionalTrust 
method that has as input one parameter: trustee. The input parameter is used in policies to 
determine the trustor’s emotional trust in the trustee. For emotional trust subscription, 
ETM exposes two methods: subscribeEmotionalTrust and unsubscribeEmotionalTrust. 
Both methods function in the exact same way as in the case of BFS. The syntax for 
emotional trust filter is discussed in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 22: Emotional Trust Service 
Emotional trust formation is based on the establishment of a hierarchy (Section 
4.1.5). The hierarchy can be constructed using emotional trust policies (ET-Policies). The 
syntax for ET-Policies is discussed in Appendix A. An example of ET-Policies is shown 
in Figure 23. In the figure, a hierarchy has been established for horror movies. By using 
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“salience”, the trustor can prioritize which policy should fire when there are multiple 
conditional matches. For example, if the trustee is the horror movie “Zombieland”, then 
the first three policies (lines 1-6, 8-13 and 15-20) in Figure 23 could fire. This is due to 
the fact that the first policy (lines 1-6) matches any trustee; the second policy (lines 8-13) 
matches any trustee that is of type movie while the third policy (lines 15-20) matches any 
trustee that is of type horror movie. As only one policy can fire, the policy with the 
highest “salience” would fire, thereby returning the emotional trust value of 0.8. ETS 
currently only supports one hierarchy. Support for multiple hierarchies will be part of our 
future work.  
 
1 salience 0 
2 when  
3 trustee: Trustee( ) 
4 then  
5 0 
6 end 
7  
8 salience 10 
9 when  
10 trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie.*" ) 
11 then  
12 0.5 
13 end 
14  
15 salience 20 
16 when  
17 trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie/Horror.*" ) 
18 then  
19 0.8  
20 end 
21  
22 salience 30 
23 when  
24 trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie/Horror.*" && id == "Alien" ) 
25 then  
26 1.0 
27 end 
Figure 23: ET-Policies 
5.5 Summary 
SCOUT is a middleware designed to support computational trust formation. SCOUT 
currently consists of three services: Evidence Gathering Service (EGS), Belief Formation 
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Service (BFS) and Emotional Trust Service (ETS). EGS is responsible for evidence 
gathering. BFS is responsible for aggregate belief formation. ETS is responsible for 
emotional trust formation. All three services are designed with modularity, extensibility 
and adaptability in mind. 
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Chapter 6  
6 Trust Calculator 
The focus of this chapter is on introducing the Trust Calculator. This chapter is divided 
into three sections. The first section provides a high level overview of the Trust 
Calculator design. The second section explains how computational trust calculation can 
be described using a trust calculation plan. The final section of this chapter covers the 
Trust Calculator. The Trust Calculator calculates computational trust based on the 
supplied trust calculation plan. 
6.1 Trust Calculator Design 
The Trust Calculator is designed with the following properties in mind: 
 Adaptability. There are many factors that could influence computational trust 
calculation (see Section 4.1.6 for reference). To capture the different ways to 
calculate computational trust, the Trust Calculator uses trust calculation plans 
(TcPlans). A TcPlan is basically a description of how computational trust is to be 
calculated. The Trust Calculator associates with each set of factors a TcPlan and 
switches TcPlans as the factors change.  
 Ease of Use. A TcPlan provides a high level abstraction of how computational 
trust calculation is implemented. By separating the design of computational trust 
formation from its implementation, even non-developers such as domain experts 
can participate in determining how computational trust is formed. 
 Reusability. Different TcPlans may share similar computational trust formation 
algorithms. To achieve reusability, these algorithms are implemented as nodes 
that can be referenced in TcPlans. The nodes can also be packaged into libraries. 
A library can either be home grown or obtained from third parties. By leveraging 
the libraries when implementing computational trust calculation, a developer 
could save on development time and effort by not having to implement all the 
algorithms from scratch. 
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6.2 Trust Calculation Plan 
Trust calculation is a form of inductive reasoning [1]. The reasoning can be modeled as 
the invocation of a tree. Computational trust calculation therefore is represented as a tree 
in a TcPlan. The structure of a TcPlan is shown in Figure 24. A TcPlan is divided into 
two segments: nodeDefinition and trustCalculation. In nodeDefinition (lines 3-5), the 
nodes of the tree (i.e., the algorithms needed for computational trust calculation) are 
defined. The trustCalculation segment (lines 6-9) consists of two parts. The trigger part 
(line 7) specifies when computational trust calculation is to take place. If no trigger is 
specified, the assumption is for computational trust calculation to take place now. The 
tree part (line 8) specifies the aggregate beliefs and emotional trust to be obtained from 
SCOUT. It also specifies the tree’s construction (i.e., how the nodes are to be applied to 
aggregate beliefs and emotional trust to form computational trust). 
 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2 <tcplan> 
3 <nodeDefinition> 
4 … 
5 </nodeDefinition> 
6 <trustCalculation> 
7 <trigger> … </trigger> 
8 <tree> … </tree> 
9 </trustCalculation> 
10 </tcplan> 
Figure 24: Structure of TcPlan 
An example TcPlan is shown in Figure 25. In the figure, computational trust is 
calculated for movie selection. Four nodes are defined in the nodeDefinition segment 
(lines 3-14). Each node is given an identifier through node id that is referenced in tree 
construction. The class attribute specifies the implementation of a node. 
“AggregateBeliefQuery” (lines 4-6) and “EmoTrustQuery” (line 7) are used to query 
SCOUT for aggregate belief and emotional trust respectively. In the case of 
“AggregateBeliefQuery”, any non-“aggregateBelief” parameter would be treated as hints 
to the getAggregateBelief method of BFS (Figure 28 shows some possible hints). 
“AggregateBeliefToTrust” (line 8) maps the trustor’s aggregate belief to cognitive trust. 
“WeightedAvg” (lines 9-13) weights all of its inputs based on the “weights” parameter. 
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In the tree part of the trustCalculation segment (lines 15-22), an XML element with child 
elements represents a node with child nodes. Based on the elements, a tree can be 
constructed. The tree is graphically represented in Figure 26. In the figure, nodes that 
interact with the SCOUT middleware are represented as squares. All other nodes are 
represented as circles. 
 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2 <tcplan> 
3 <nodeDefinition> 
4 <node id="qualityBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery"> 
5 <parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Quality</parameter> 
6 </node> 
7 <node id="emoTrust" class="EmoTrustQuery"/> 
8 <node id="cognitiveTrust" class="AggregateBeliefToTrust"/> 
9 <node id="computationalTrust" class="WeightedAvg"> 
10 <parameters name="weights" type="double"> 
11 <parameter>0.7</parameter><parameter>0.3</parameter> 
12 </parameters> 
13 </node> 
14 </nodeDefinition> 
15 <trustCalculation> 
16 <tree> 
17 <computationalTrust> 
18 <cognitiveTrust><qualityBelief/></cognitiveTrust> 
19 <emoTrust/> 
20 </computationalTrust> 
21 </tree> 
22 </trustCalculation> 
23 </tcplan> 
Figure 25: TcPlan (Movie) 
 
Figure 26: Tree of TcPlan (Movie) 
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In Figure 25, computational trust is calculated with cognitive trust being assigned 
a weight of 0.7 and emotional trust being assigned a weight of 0.3. Different movie 
selectors may have different views on the appropriate weight to assign to cognitive trust 
and emotional trust. As a result, when constructing a TcPlan, it is not always possible to 
fill in the weights a priori. A Trust Calculation Template (TcTemplate) is used to allow 
portions of the TcPlan to be filled in when appropriate. An example TcTemplate is shown 
in Figure 27. Figure 27 is basically Figure 25 with the weights replaced by variables. The 
variables are identified by being surrounded by curly brackets (lines 8-9). Also, 
comments “BEGIN: TcTemplate” (line 2) and “END: TcTemplate” (line 15) are included 
to identify the TcPlan as a TcTemplate. By assigning values to the variables, the 
parameterization allows for the creation of a TcPlan from a TcTemplate. Variables in a 
TcTemplate are commonly associated with information that are subjective (e.g. weights) 
or decision dependent (e.g. decision importance). This information cannot be known until 
the application is configured or during decision making.  
 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2 <!-- BEGIN: TcTemplate --> 
3 <tcplan> 
4 <nodeDefinition> 
5 … 
6 <node id="computationalTrust" class="WeightedAvg"> 
7 <parameters name="weights" type="double"> 
8 <parameter>{COG _WEIGHT}</parameter> 
9 <parameter>{EMO_WEIGHT}</parameter> 
10 </parameters> 
11 </node> 
12 </nodeDefinition> 
13 … 
14 </tcplan> 
15 <!-- END: TcTemplate --> 
Figure 27: TcTemplate (Movie) 
A different TcPlan example is shown in Figure 28. In the figure, computational 
trust is subscribed and used in web service selection. A “timer” of class “Timer” is 
defined in the nodeDefinition segment (lines 4-7). The “timer” is set to trigger 
computational trust calculation immediately with zero delay (line 5). After which, 
calculation is set to trigger every 60 minutes (line 6). Besides triggering calculation by 
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time, the Trust Calculator also supports triggering through SCOUT subscription. For 
example, by subscribing to emotional trust or aggregate belief, a TcPlan could trigger 
computational trust calculations only if there has been a change in the emotional trust or 
aggregate belief obtained from SCOUT.  
In the figure, cognitive trust is calculated from competence belief, performance 
belief and quality belief. The “expression” parameter of the “cognitiveTrust” node (lines 
30-32) is associated with conditions for “aBelief1”, “aBelief2” and “aBelief3”. The 
numbering used on “aBelief” refers to the order of the elements in the tree part of 
trustCalculation segment (lines 44-46). Therefore, “aBelief1” refers to aggregate belief 
competence; “aBelief2” refers to aggregate belief performance, “aBelief3” refers to 
aggregate belief quality. All three conditions need to be evaluated to “True” for the 
cognitive trust value to be set to 1 (i.e., cognitively trusted). Otherwise, cognitive trust 
value is set to -1 (i.e., cognitively distrusted). As the conditions are all “AND” together, 
the “cognitiveTrust” node can short circuit the evaluation process if one of the conditions 
is evaluated to false.  Aggregate beliefs are obtained from SCOUT through 
“AggregateBeliefQuery”. Hints are provided to BFS in terms of “importance” (lines 10, 
18, 26) and “evidenceType” (lines 14-17, 22-25). 
In terms of computational trust formation, the “cause” parameter of the 
“computationalTrust” node (line 35) is used to determine the calculated computational 
trust value. If the value obtained from the node’s left child (i.e., “emoTrust”) has a value 
that is greater than zero (trust > 0), then computational trust is assigned the value of the 
node’s right child (i.e., “cognitiveTrust”). Otherwise, the returned computational trust 
value is -1 (i.e., distrusted). Since emotional trust is evaluated first, the 
“computationalTrust” node does not need to invoke the “cognitiveTrust” node if 
emotional trust is not greater than zero. This is another demonstration of how 
computational trust formation can be short circuited. The tree constructed from the 
TcPlan is graphically represented in Figure 29.  
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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2 <tcplan> 
3 <nodeDefinition> 
4 <node id="timer" class="Timer"> 
5 <parameter name="delay" type="integer">0</parameter> 
6 <parameter name="period" type="integer">60</parameter> 
7 </node> 
8 <node id="competenceBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery"> 
9 <parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Competence</parameter> 
10 <parameter name="importance" type="string">High</parameter> 
11 </node> 
12 <node id="performanceBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery"> 
13 <parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Performance</parameter> 
14 <parameters name="evidenceType" type="string"> 
15 <parameter>Experience</parameter> 
16 <parameter>Reputation</parameter> 
17 </parameters> 
18 <parameter name="importance" type="string">High</parameter> 
19 </node> 
20 <node id="qualityBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery"> 
21 <parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Quality</parameter> 
22 <parameters name="evidenceType" type="string"> 
23 <parameter>Experience</parameter> 
24 <parameter>Reputation</parameter> 
25 </parameters> 
26 <parameter name="importance" type="string">High</parameter> 
27 </node> 
28 <node id="emoTrust" class="EmoTrustQuery"/> 
29 <node id="cognitiveTrust" class="ConditionalTrust"> 
30 <parameter name="expression" type="string"> 
31 aBelief1 == 1 && aBelief2 > 0 && aBelief3 > 0 
32 </parameter> 
33 </node> 
34 <node id="computationalTrust" class="CausalTrust"> 
35 <parameter name="cause" type="string">trust > 0</parameter> 
36 </node> 
37 </nodeDefinition> 
38 <trustCalculation> 
39 <trigger><timer/></trigger> 
40 <tree> 
41 <computationalTrust> 
42 <emoTrust/> 
43 <cognitiveTrust> 
44 <competenceBelief/> 
45 <performanceBelief/> 
46 <qualityBelief/> 
47 </cognitiveTrust> 
48 </computationalTrust> 
49 </tree> 
50 </trustCalculation> 
51 </tcplan> 
Figure 28: TcPlan (Web Service) 
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Figure 29: Tree of TcPlan (Web Service) 
6.3 Trust Calculator 
A Trust Calculator is responsible for computational trust formation. Each application has 
its own Trust Calculator that can be customized to satisfy the application’s computational 
trust needs. A graphical illustration of a Trust Calculator is shown in Figure 30. The Trust 
Calculator consists of two components: the Trust Calculation Planner (TcPlanner) and the 
Trust Calculation Engine (TcEngine). The TcPlanner is responsible for TcPlan selection 
based on existing factors. The TcEngine is responsible for the execution of the selected 
TcPlan. 
  
Figure 30: Trust Calculator 
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The calculateTrust method of the Trust Calculator has as input two parameters: 
trustee and decision factors. The parameter trustee consists of trustee factors. An 
application factors parameter has also been defined and can be supplied to the Trust 
Calculator through the setApplicationFactors method. Unlike trustee and decision 
factors, application factors are not discarded after computational trust formation. As a 
result, application factors can be reused across decisions. Trustor factors are application 
factors since they generally do not change across decisions. Trustee factors and decision 
factors can also be application factors. An example is decision type where an application 
that only makes one type of decision can specify decision type as an application factor 
thereby no longer needing to provide decision type for every calculateTrust method 
invocation. All three factor types are represented as attribute-value pairs. The TcPlanner 
treats all the factors as the same during TcPlan selection. If there is any attribute conflict 
(e.g. decision type being provided through both decision factors and application factors), 
application factors are overwritten by trustee and decision factors.  
The TcPlanner uses the factors to determine the TcPlan to be selected for 
execution. For example, a decision factor could be importance. There may be different 
TcPlans associated with different levels of importance. Thus there may be a TcPlan 
associated with a decision of high importance and another TcPlan associated with a 
decision of low importance. The factors could also influence the hints to be passed to 
BFS. For example, a TcPlan corresponding to a decision of high importance may cause a 
hint to be passed to BFS that reflects the importance of the decision. 
If the selected TcPlan is a TcTemplate, the variables in the TcTemplate need to be 
parameterized by the TcPlanner. It is the responsibility of the application developer to 
define the mapping from factors to TcPlans (see Section 8.2.1 for examples). After 
TcPlan selection, the next step is for the TcEngine to execute the TcPlan. This is by 
instantiating a calculation tree from the TcPlan. By invoking the tree, the TcEngine 
executes computational trust formation. The final step is for the Trust Calculator to return 
the calculated computational trust to the application. The entire process is graphically 
illustrated in Figure 31. 
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The subscribeTrust method of the Trust Calculator has as input three parameters: 
trustee, decision factors and trust listener. The trust listener is notified of any calculated 
computational trust value. The return value of the method is a unique identifier: 
subscriptionId. The subscriptionId identifier is used in the unsubscribeTrust method to 
unsubscribe from an existing subscription. For a subscription to succeed, the 
corresponding TcPlan needs to have a trigger defined. There is no reason for 
computational trust subscription if a TcPlan only needs to be invoked once. The 
TcEngine automatically ignores any trigger definition in the case of calculateTrust. As a 
result, the same TcPlan can be used for both computational trust query and subscription. 
 
Figure 31: Trust Calculator’s Execution 
Although in most cases having access to computational trust is enough for making 
trust-based decisions. There are exceptions when an application may be interested in how 
computational trust is formed. For example, if the computational trusts calculated for two 
trustees are the same, examining the underlying calculations may help determine which 
of the two trustees should be selected. To provide this information to the application, the 
TcEngine logs the output of each of the nodes in the TcPlan. The log is then returned to 
the application as part of the calculated computational trust. 
6.4 Summary 
The Trust Calculator is responsible for computational trust calculation. It consists of two 
components: the Trust Calculation Planner (TcPlanner) and the Trust Calculation Engine 
(TcEngine). The TcPlanner takes the trustee, decision factors and application factors into 
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account when performing TcPlan selection. A TcPlan is basically a description of how 
computational trust is to be calculated. The selected TcPlan is passed to the TcEngine for 
execution. The calculated computational trust value is returned to the requesting 
application. In this thesis, it is assumed that each application has its own Trust Calculator. 
The Trust Calculator is designed with adaptability, ease of use and reusability in mind.  
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Chapter 7  
7 Algorithms 
The focus of this chapter is on introducing the algorithms used in the computational trust 
architecture. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses an 
approach for calculating belief from evidence. The second section explains how evidence 
source trust can be calculated.  
7.1 Belief Formation 
There are many ways to calculate belief from evidence (see Table 3 in Section 4.3 for a 
summary of the algorithms used in the literature). A belief formation algorithm is 
introduced in this section. The algorithm is applicable to both belief and aggregate belief. 
The equations used in belief formation are as follows: 
                  
                                                           
                   
 (1)  
               
                                                                               
                   
 (2)  
In equation (1),           is belief calculated from the trustor’s experiences. The values 
of          ,           and           are calculated from recommendations, reputations 
and signals respectively. Since different evidence types have different properties, these 
properties need to be taken into account when evaluating beliefs calculated from the 
evidence types. Therefore, a trustor’s belief in a trustee is calculated as the weighted 
average of beliefs calculated from different evidence types. A possible weight assignment 
is                    .  
In equation (2), the reliability of        is calculated. In this thesis, reliability is 
an evaluation of the quality of the underlying evidence used in belief calculation. Like 
belief, reliability is calculated as weighted average of reliabilities calculated from the 
evidence types. The calculated        and             can be used in cognitive trust 
calculation. 
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If there is no evidence of a specific type, its weights in equations (1) and (2) can 
be set to zero. The equations can be used in a BF-Policy where        and             
are the values returned by the Belief Formation Service (BFS). Alternatively, the 
equations can be a node in the Trust Calculator. The return values of BFS are then 
         ,          ,           and          . Both approaches are viable as demonstrated 
in Section 10.2.1.1. The calculation of          ,          ,           and           are 
the responsibility of the Belief Engines. The algorithms used are the focus of the rest of 
this section. 
7.1.1 Experience 
The equations used for calculating belief from experiences are as follows: 
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Equation (3) is based on the equations proposed in Regret [110] and FIRE [59]. Belief is 
calculated as the weighted average of the trustor’s experiences. Each experience      is 
assigned a weight of    that is based on the age of the experience. Newer experiences are 
assigned greater weights since these experiences are more likely to reflect the trustee’s 
current behavior. In weight calculation,   (    ) is the time difference between the 
current time and the creation time of the experience. The recency scaling factor or λ 
determines how much   (    ) influences   . The relationship between   (    ) and    
for different values of   are shown in Figure 32. As seen in the figure,    decreases as 
  (    ) increases. As   increases, the rate of decrease of    slows down. For   
     ,          when   (    )    but for         ,          when 
  (    )     and for         ,          when   (    )    . Increases in 
values of   reduces the calculated belief’s sensitivity to changes in the trustee’s 
behaviors. As anomalies do happen, it may be desirable to not punish a trustee too 
severely for a single misbehavior. 
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Figure 32: Experience Weights 
In equation (4), the reliability of           is calculated based on two factors. The 
first factor is the age of the experiences. If belief is calculated from old experiences, the 
calculated belief may be unreliable. As    in equation (3) already takes into account the 
age of an experience, a simple solution is to sum all the weights as an approximation of 
the age of the experiences [59]. The problem with this approach is that the summed 
weight is influenced by not just    but also the number of experiences. Having more old 
experiences does not imply higher reliability. To address this problem, only the weight of 
the newest experience is used as an approximation of the age of the experiences. The 
newest experience is assigned the maximum weight and is represented in equation (4) as 
    . This is a reasonable approximation as the newest experience is also the experience 
that has the most influence on the calculated          .  
The second factor that influences reliability is the number of experiences used in 
belief calculation. As explained in [110], experiences are needed for the trustor to 
become familiar with the trustee. As familiarity with the trustee increases, so should 
reliability in the calculated belief. However, once familiarity is established having more 
experiences should have no impact on belief reliability. Therefore,        is used to 
represent the number of experiences used in belief calculation. The value of 
             represents the number of experiences needed to establish familiarity. In 
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equation (4), if familiarity is established, the factor is assigned the value of one. 
Otherwise, the factor is represented as the ratio of        and             .  
Finally,                is calculated as the weighted average of experience age 
and experience count factors. The assignment of the weight    is based on the trustor’s 
preferences. Old experience that are no longer relevant can be filtered out using an  
experience window (         ). For example, a one year experience window implies 
that all experiences that are older than one year are to be filtered out and cannot be used 
in belief formation. 
7.1.2 Recommendation 
The equations used for calculating belief from recommendations are as follows: 
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In equation (5), belief is calculated as the weighted average of the gathered 
recommendations. Each recommendation      is assigned a weight based on the trustor’s 
level of trust in the recommendation’s recommender (      ) [20], [22], [26]. This is so 
that more trusted recommenders have a larger influence on           than less trusted 
recommenders. 
In equation (6), the reliability of           is calculated based on two factors. The 
first factor is the trustor’s level of trust in the recommenders. The more recommendations 
are gathered from trusted recommenders, the higher should be the reliability of the 
calculated belief. This factor is calculated by applying weighted average to recommender 
trust. The weights (      ) used are the same as those in equation (5). The second factor 
is the number of recommendations used in belief calculation. As a recommender is not 
the trustor, even the most trusted recommender could on occasion deviate from the 
trustor. Therefore having recommendations from more than one recommender is 
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desirable and can help increase the reliability of the calculated belief. The calculation of 
this factor is similar to the calculation of the experience count factor in Section 7.1.1. 
Finally,                is calculated by subtracting the inverse of recommendation 
count factor from the recommender trust factor. As the recommendation count factor 
decreases, this should negatively impact               . The magnitude of the impact 
could be adjusted using the weight    which is based on the trustor’s preferences. 
7.1.3 Reputation 
The equations used for calculating belief from reputations are as follows: 
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In equation (7), belief is calculated as the weighted average of the gathered reputations. 
Each reputation      is assigned a weight    that is calculated based on two factors. The 
first factor is the trustor’s level of trust in the reputation’s reputation system (      ). A 
reputation should be given more weight if it is created by a more trusted reputation 
system. The second factor is the number of feedbacks used by the reputation system in its 
reputation calculation. If a reputation is calculated from very few feedbacks, it is less 
reliable and should be given less weight. The number of feedbacks used in reputation 
calculation is a metric that can readily be found in web-based reputation systems. For 
example, Amazon provides information on the number of reviews available for each of 
its products. The same information is also found at Best Buy, eBay, Rotten Tomatoes, 
IMDb, etc. The calculation of this factor is based on the same approach used for 
calculating experience count factor and recommendation count factor. Finally,    is 
calculated as the product of reputation system trust factor and feedback count factor. 
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In equation (8), the reliability of           is calculated using the same approach 
used for calculating                in Section 7.1.2. The value of                is 
calculated by subtracting the inverse of reputation count factor from the weight factor. 
7.1.4 Signal 
A signal can be mapped to a numeric domain. An example signal is an Extended 
Verification (EV) certificate [21] that is used as confirmation of a website’s identity. The 
signal could be mapped to the domain of -1, 0 and 1. If a trustee does not have an EV 
certificate, this could be mapped to 0. If the EV certificate failed to be validated, this 
could be mapped to -1. Otherwise, the mapping would be to 1. After mapping, the signals 
can now be used in belief formation. The equations used for calculating belief from 
signals are as follows:  
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(10) 
In equation (9), belief is calculated as the weighted average of the supplied signals. The 
calculation uses the same approach used for calculating           in Section 7.1.2. In 
equation (10), the reliability of           is calculated using the same approach used for 
calculating                in Section 7.1.2. The value of                is calculated by 
subtracting the inverse of signal count factor from the signaler trust factor. 
7.1.5 Summary 
Several algorithms have been proposed for belief formation. For belief formation from 
experiences, the recency scaling factor λ is used to influence the weight assigned to each 
experience. As λ increases, the calculated belief becomes less sensitive to the age of the 
experiences. The weight    is used to determine whether age of experiences or amount 
of experiences (influenced by subjective             ) should be the main determinant 
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for belief reliability. For trustees that change behaviors frequently, smaller λ and larger 
   is preferable. The opposite would be the case for trustees that seldom change.  
 As for belief formation from recommendations, recommender trust can be used 
to weigh each of the gathered recommendation. The subjective weight    is used to 
determine the influence that the amount of recommendations (influenced by subjective 
            ) have on belief reliability. The same concept is also applicable to belief 
formation from reputations. The only difference is that reputation is weighted by not 
just reputation system trust but also by the number of feedbacks used in reputation 
calculation. Finally, belief formation from signals is calculated using the same approach 
as that for recommendations. The beliefs calculated from different evidence types can 
be aggregated using weighted average with the weight assignments dependent on the 
properties of evidence types.  
7.2 Evidence Source Assessment 
There are many ways to calculate evidence source trust as discussed in Section 5.2.3. An 
evidence source assessment algorithm is introduced in this section. The algorithm can be 
viewed as consisting of two stages: evidence assessment and evidence source trust 
assessment. Both stages are described in detail in the rest of this section. 
7.2.1 Evidence Assessment 
There are many ways to perform evidence assessment. In [127], Chebyshev’s rule [89] is 
used. In [6], [67] and [115], assessment is based on compliance level. The compliance 
level approach has been adopted in this section. The approach calls for the evaluation of 
the gathered evidence with respect to some evidence quality standard. The standard used 
in this section is the trustor’s feedback. A trustor provides feedback to the Evidence 
Gathering Service (EGS) after it has interacted with the trustee. To be in compliance 
therefore means that the gathered evidence should be similar to the trustor’s feedback. 
The equation used to perform evidence assessment is as follows: 
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(11) 
In equation (11),              has an interval of [-1, 1]. Any calculated              
that is less than -1 is mapped to -1 instead. Similarity is represented as the absolute 
difference between the feedback      and the evidence    . If the absolute difference is 
zero, then the evidence is assigned the maximum assessment of one. Increases in the 
absolute difference should have a negative impact on the calculated assessment. The level 
of impact can be adjusted through           . The relationships between |        | 
and              for different            values are shown in Figure 33. In the figure, 
as            increases, the rate of decrease of              slows down. Changes in 
           therefore can be used to adjust how sensitive EGS should be to evidence 
noncompliance. 
 
 
Figure 33: Evidence Assessments 
Using equation (11), a single feedback can be can be used to assess the qualities 
of multiple evidence. However, not all gathered evidence should be considered in 
evidence assessment. As a trustee’s behavior may change over time, it is unreasonable to 
expect old evidence to be in compliance with the trustor’s feedback. Therefore, an 
evidence window (        ) has been defined that can be used to limit the evidence 
considered during evidence assessment. As an example, an evidence window of 60 
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minutes would limit the evidence to those that have creation timestamp (or gathered 
timestamp if creation timestamp is unavailable) that is within the past hour of the 
feedback’s creation. 
An evidence could have multiple assessments as it could be within the          
of multiple feedbacks. If so, these assessments need to be aggregated to form the trustor’s 
overall assessment of the evidence. The equation used for calculating overall evidence 
assessment is as follows: 
             
∑                  
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(12) 
In equation (12), the overall assessment is calculated as the weighted average of the 
individual assessments. Each assessment              is assigned a weight based on the 
difference between feedback creation time and evidence creation time (or evidence 
gathered time if evidence creation time is unavailable). The time difference is represented 
as the difference in evidence age (  (   )) and feedback age (  (    )). The resulting 
difference is normalized using         . The inverse of which is the weight assigned to 
an assessment. If an evidence is created or gathered close to when the trustor interacts 
with the trustee (i.e., when feedback is created), it is more likely to be correct than an 
older evidence. As a result, the assessment of this evidence should be given more weight 
than assessment of older evidence that has a higher likelihood of being wrong. 
7.2.2 Evidence Source Trust Assessment 
Evidence source trust can be viewed as a form of computational trust. As a result, 
evidence source trust can be calculated from cognitive trust and emotional trust. In terms 
of cognitive trust, the overall evidence assessments calculated using equation (12) in 
Section 7.2.1 can be viewed as the trustor’s experiences with the evidence sources. 
Equations (3) and (4) in Section 7.1.1 therefore can be used to calculate the trustor’s 
quality belief in the evidence provided by an evidence source. With belief calculated, the 
last step is the calculation of cognitive trust. The equation for cognitive trust calculation 
is as follows: 
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(13) 
In equation (13), cognitive trust in an evidence source   is calculated as the difference 
between belief and the inverse of reliability. As belief reliability decreases, this should 
have a negative effect on the calculated cognitive trust. The magnitude of the effect can 
be adjusted through             . For example if               , the calculated cognitive 
trust would be solely based on the calculated belief.  
In terms of emotional trust, it can be calculated based on the trustor’s recognition 
of the evidence source. As for computational trust, its calculation is as follows: 
                          (     )            
(14) 
In equation (14), computational trust is calculated as the weighted average of cognitive 
trust and emotional trust. The assignment of the weight     is based on the trustor’s 
preferences. Some possible values are shown in Table 1 of Section 4.1.6.1. 
7.2.3 Summary 
An algorithm for calculating evidence source trust is proposed in this section. The 
algorithm assesses the gathered evidence by comparing the evidence to the trustor’s 
feedback. If the evidence is similar to the trustor’s feedback, a positive assessment would 
be assigned to the evidence. Otherwise a negative assessment would be assigned. 
Similarity’s influence on the calculated assessment can be adjusted through           . 
For an optimistic trustor, the value assigned to            could be larger than that for a 
pessimistic trustor that views any dissimilarity from feedback with suspicion. The 
window          is used to limit the evidence to be considered during assessment. The 
value for          could be based on the rate at which the trustees change behaviors. 
As evidence can be reused, they may be multiple feedbacks for each piece of evidence. 
An equation therefore has been proposed on how evidence assessment can take into 
account multiple feedbacks.  
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Finally, the assessments are treated as experiences from evidence gathering. This 
in turn allows for the calculation of cognitive trust with subjective weight              
being used to determine the influence that belief reliability has on cognitive trust. As for 
the calculation of computational trust in an evidence source, the subjective weight to be 
placed on cognitive trust and emotional trust is determined by    . 
7.3 Summary 
Two algorithms have been proposed in this chapter. The first algorithm is used to 
calculate belief from evidence of different types. The second algorithm calculates 
evidence source trust in two stages: evidence assessment and evidence source trust 
assessment. 
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Chapter 8  
8 Implementation 
The focus of this chapter is on describing the implementation of the computational trust 
architecture. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section introduces the 
prototype implementation of SCOUT. The second section introduces the prototype 
implementation of the Trust Calculator.  
8.1 SCOUT 
SCOUT (Figure 34) is a web application that is implemented in Java EE 5. The 
implementation is deployed on GlassFish [46], an open source application server. 
SCOUT consists of three services: Evidence Gathering Service (EGS), Belief Formation 
Service (BFS) and Emotional Trust Service (ETS). EGS consists of Evidence Gathering 
Manager (EGM), Policy Engine, Evidence Gatherers, Evidence Handlers, Evidence 
Source Assessors and Job Scheduler. BFS consists of Belief Formation Manager (BFM), 
Subscription Manager, Policy Engine and Belief Engines. ETS consists of Emotional 
Trust Manager (ETM), Subscription Manager and Policy Engine. Implementation wise, 
the SCOUT services shared a number of SCOUT components.  
 
 
Figure 34: SCOUT Implementation 
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EGM, BFM and ETM are implemented as EJBs (Enterprise Java Beans) with web 
service frontends. All three managers depend on the Policy Engine for interacting with 
the deployed plug-ins (Evidence Gatherers, Evidence Source Assessors and Belief 
Engines). The Policy Engine is an EJB that uses the Drools rule engine [37] for policy 
processing. The policies are stored in a Policy Repository. It is the responsibility of the 
managers to retrieve and deploy the policies to the Policy Engine. As for the different 
plug-ins, they are all implemented as EJBs with communication with the Policy Engine 
being based on JMS (Java Message Service). With JMS, messages are delivered by 
specifying the destination of a message (as oppose to communicating using an EJB 
reference) which in our implementation is based on identities of the plug-ins and the 
Policy Engine. 
The Subscription Manager is implemented as an EJB. It uses the Timer Service 
offered by Glassfish to perform periodic subscriptions re-evaluation. As for the 
specification and processing of aggregate belief filters and emotional trust filters, these 
are based on the MVEL expression language [95]. The filtered aggregate beliefs and 
emotional trusts are stored in a JMS message queue. A subscriber can retrieve its 
subscribed information using its subscriptionId. 
The Job Scheduler is implemented as a Servlet. It is based on the open source job 
scheduling service Quartz [99]. The Job Scheduler is used by the Evidence Source 
Assessors to trigger periodic evidence source trust calculation. It is also used to perform 
Evidence Repository maintenance. As an example, evidence stored in the Evidence 
Repository are periodically examined. If the evidence is outdated, they are removed from 
the Evidence Repository. 
8.2 Trust Calculator 
The Trust Calculator is implemented as a Java SE 6 library. The implementation of the 
Trust Calculation Planner (TcPlanner) and the Trust Calculation Engine (TcEngine) is 
described in the rest of this section. 
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8.2.1 Trust Calculation Planner 
The TcPlanner is implemented as a Java interface. It consists of a single method 
formulateTcPlan that has as input a single parameter factors. The return value of the 
method is the formulated TcPlan. An application developer could implement its own 
TcPlanner based on the TcPlanner interface. An application developer could also use one 
of the two implementations included in the Trust Calculator library for TcPlan selection. 
The first TcPlanner implementation in the library is the XMLTcPlanner. The 
planner reads an XML document that describes the mappings from factors to TcPlan. An 
example document is shown in Figure 35. In the figure, if the decision type is movie 
selection (line 5), then the TcTemplate named “MovieTrust” is retrieved and 
parameterized with the supplied parameters (lines 7-13). The parameterization is based 
on the Jtpl template engine [66]. If the mapping is to a TcPlan, then the “tctemplate” tag 
is replaced by the “tcplan” tag. XMLTcPlanner offers a simple way to perform factors to 
TcPlan mapping. If more complex mappings are needed, the PolicyTcPlanner in the 
library can be used instead. The PolicyTcPlanner performs TcPlan selection based on 
policies. The implementation uses the Drools rule engine [37] for policy processing. An 
example policy is shown in Figure 36. The example is the same as Figure 35 except the 
mapping is in policy form. 
 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2 <mappings> 
3 <mapping> 
4 <factors> 
5 <factor name="DecisionType">MovieSelection</factor> 
6 </factors> 
7 <tctemplate> 
8 <name>MovieTrust</name> 
9 <parameters> 
10 <parameter name="COG_WEIGHT">0.7</parameter> 
11 <parameter name="EMO_WEIGHT">0.3</parameter> 
12 </parameters> 
13 </tctemplate> 
14 </mapping> 
15  </mappings> 
Figure 35: Factors-TcPlan Mapping (Movie) 
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1 when  
2 Factor( name=="DecisionType" && value == "MovieSelection" ) 
3 then  
4 template = new TcTemplate("MovieTrust"); 
5 template.set("COG_WEIGHT", 0.7); 
6 template.set("EMO_WEIGHT", 0.7); 
7 template.parse(); 
8 end 
Figure 36: Factors-TcPlan Policy (Movie) 
8.2.2 Trust Calculation Engine 
The TcEngine performs computational trust calculation by parsing the TcPlan supplied 
by the TcPlanner. First the nodes defined in the nodeDefinition segment of the TcPlan are 
parsed and instantiated. The nodes all belong to one of three types: belief-belief, belief-
trust and trust-trust. A belief-belief node takes aggregate belief as input and produces 
aggregate belief as output. An example belief-belief node is the AggregateBeliefQuery 
node that retrieves aggregate belief from SCOUT. A belief-trust node takes aggregate 
belief as input and produces trust as output. An example belief-trust node is the 
AggregateBeliefToTrust node that calculates cognitive trust from aggregate belief. A 
trust-trust node takes trust as input and produces trust as output. An example trust-trust 
node is EmoTrustQuery node that retrieves trust from SCOUT. If a node needed for 
computational trust calculation is not available in the Trust Calculator library, an 
application developer can choose to implement the node by extending one of the three 
basic node types. 
With the nodes instantiated, the next step is to consult the tree part of the 
trustCalculation segment. For each element and its children, the corresponding nodes are 
retrieved and their parent-children relationships established. By performing breadth-first 
traversal, a tree can be constructed. The last step is to invoke the root node of the tree to 
perform computational trust calculation. It is the responsibility of each parent node to 
determine which of its child nodes should be invoked to continue the calculation. 
As for computational trust subscription, besides the creation of a calculation tree, 
a tree also needs to be created for triggering the computational trust calculation. This 
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involves the parsing of the trigger part of the trustCalculation segment. The approach 
taken is exactly the same as for calculation tree creation. After both trees are created, the 
next step is for the TcEngine to invoke all the leaf nodes of the trigger tree. Associated 
with each trigger node are conditions that have to be satisfied before its parent node can 
be triggered. This would continue on until the root node of the tree has been triggered. 
This causes the invocation of the root node of the calculation tree to perform 
computational trust calculation. If a node needed for triggering computational trust 
calculation is not available in the Trust Calculator library, an application developer can 
choose to implement the node by extending the basic trigger node type. 
8.3 Summary 
SCOUT is implemented as a web application. The components of SCOUT are shared by 
all three SCOUT services. As an example, the Policy Engine is shared by all three 
SCOUT managers. The managers interact with the SCOUT plug-ins through the 
deployed SCOUT policies. As for the Trust Calculator, it is implemented as a library that 
can be used to perform computational trust calculation. In terms of the TcPlanner, two 
implementations have been showcased. In terms of the TcEngine, the focus is on how a 
TcPlan can be parsed and instantiated for computational trust query and subscription. 
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Chapter 9  
9 Experiments 
The focus of this chapter is on presenting the experimental results. This chapter is divided 
into eight sections. The first section discusses the goals of the experiments. The second 
section examines the assumptions made in the experiments. Next, the metrics for 
measuring the effectiveness of computational trust are introduced. This is followed by an 
introduction to the experimental testbed. In section five, the experiments based on 
experiences are explained. Next, the experiments based on recommendations are 
discussed. This is followed by discussion of experiments based on both experiences and 
recommendations. The last section of this chapter examines the conclusions that could be 
drawn from the experiments. 
9.1 Goals 
The experiments in this chapter are designed to show the following: 
 Evidence source type and behavior plays a key role in computational trust 
formation. An evidence source could be of type: trustor, recommender, reputation 
system or signal provider. An evidence source could behave in an honest or 
malicious manner. The experiments are designed to evaluate how the 
effectiveness of computational trust changes with changes in the availability of 
evidence source type and evidence source behavior. 
 Effectiveness of different computational trust formation algorithms. Specifically, 
the averaging of evidence is used as a base case. The comparison is between the 
use of a window to discard old evidence (          on page 84 of Section 7.1.1) 
and the use of weighted average (equation (3) of Section 7.1.1 including varying 
recency scaling factor or λ) to give newer evidence more weight. The goal is to 
investigate which approach is more effective. Thresholds (e.g.             ) are 
not considered in the experiments. We consider the varying of belief reliability to 
be part of future work.  
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9.2 Assumptions 
The experiments in this chapter are designed with the following assumptions in mind: 
 Computational trust is evaluated in a web service selection scenario. There are 
many different approaches to evaluate computational trust. In this chapter, 
computational trust is evaluated based on its effectiveness in supporting web 
service selection. 
 Computational trust formation. Emotional trust evaluation is considered future 
work. Instead, the focus of the experiments is on cognitive trust. Basically, 
cognitive trust and computational trust are treated as the same in the experiments. 
As for cognitive trust formation, it is assumed that cognitive trust is formed from 
the aggregate belief performance and that the aggregate belief is formed from 
either experiences or recommendations. For simplicity sake, it is assumed that the 
calculated belief reliability has no influence on cognitive trust. These 
assumptions are setup to limit the number of variables in the experiments. The 
assumptions should be reduced or even eliminated in future work. Also, it is 
assumed that experience, recommendation, aggregate belief, cognitive trust, 
computational trust and feedback are all in the interval of [-1, 1].   
 Most web services provide average usage experiences. The web services are 
configured as in Table 5 where most of the web services (40%) provides usage 
experiences of 0 while few of the web services (10%) provides extremely high 
(0.8) or extremely low (-0.8) usage experiences. The setup is chosen as it is a 
reflection of the belief that extreme usage experiences are rare while average 
usage experiences are common in everyday life. This is just one possible web 
services setup. Other setups such as when extremes are more common than 
average or when all usage experiences are equally likely are part of future work. 
It is expected that different setups may lead to different experimental outcomes. 
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Table 5: Web Services (Experiments) 
Number of Web Services Usage experience 
1 0.8 
2 0.4 
4 0 
2 -0.4 
1 -0.8 
 
 Most evidence sources are honest. It is assumed that most evidence sources 
would not change its evidence just to mislead the trustor. The setup is chosen the 
belief that most honesty is more prevalent in everyday life. Other setups such as 
most evidence sources being dishonest are considered future work. It is expected 
that different setups may lead to different experimental outcomes. 
9.3 Metrics 
The effectiveness of computational trust is evaluated using the following two metrics 
 Mean experience (   ). After a web service is selected, the trustor could invoke 
the web service to gain experience. The mean experience is calculated by 
averaging all of the gained experiences. This is to evaluate the effectiveness of 
computational trust in terms of its contribution to the trustor’s overall experiences. 
 Percentage of positive experiences (    ). A trustor should avoid invoking web 
services that provide below average usage experiences (i.e.,           ). The 
percentage of the trustor’s experiences that are greater than or equal to zero can be 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of computational trust in terms of its ability to 
minimize the trustor’s negative experiences. 
9.4 Experimental Testbed 
The experiments in this chapter are conducted using an experimental testbed that is 
described in this section. This is followed by a discussion of the different factors that can 
be configured in the testbed. 
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9.4.1 Overview 
The experimental testbed was developed using the Java programming language. It 
implements the algorithm presented in Figure 37. In the setup phase (lines 1-4), the web 
services, evidence sources and selector are configured. The selector implements an 
algorithm for performing web service selection. A timer is also initialized to keep track of 
time in the testbed. 
With the completion of the setup phase, the testbed could begin web service 
selections (lines 6-19). For all of the experiments in this chapter, repeatCount is set to 
100 (line 6) and selectionCount is set to 50 (line 7). The testbed therefore performs 50 
web service selections. Afterwards,     and      are calculated. This process is 
repeated 100 times in order to reduce the impact that randomness has on the experiments. 
After 100 experimental runs, the calculated     and      are averaged to form the     
and      of an experiment.   
 
1 configure web_services 
2 configure evidence_sources 
3 configure selector                         
4 initialize timer            
5  
6 for i = 1 to repeatCount 
7 for j = 1 to selectionCount 
8 web_service = selector.select(web_services) 
9 experience = web_service.invoke() 
10  
11 EGS.provideFeedback(web_service, experience) 
12 Evidence_Repository.store(web_serivce, experience) 
13  
14 increment timer 
15 end 
16  
17 reset selector, timer 
18 cleanup Evidence_Respository 
19 end 
Figure 37: Experimental Testbed’s Algorithm 
9.4.2 Web Services 
The testbed can be configured with four different types of web services: 
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 Static web service. A static web service always provides its default usage 
experience to the trustor. For example, a web service with              always 
provide experience of     when invoked. 
 Fluctuating web service. A fluctuating web service provides its default usage 
experience to the trustor. Occasionally, the web service may provide usage 
experience that deviates from the default. The fluctuation is usually temporary 
and lasts for a short period of time. An example of a fluctuating web service is an 
online retailer whose performance fluctuates during boxing week sales due to its 
servers being overloaded. The fluctuation of a web service is represented using 
two parameters. The parameter       represents the likelihood of fluctuation. 
The parameter           represents the maximum duration of fluctuation. 
Duration is measured in time units generated by the testbed’s timer. The 
magnitude and duration of the fluctuation is randomly generated with a uniform 
distribution. For example, a web service with             ,            and 
            has a 10% chance of fluctuation. During fluctuation,          is 
assigned a randomly generated value. This represents the magnitude of the 
change. The duration of the fluctuation is randomly generated to be less than or 
equal to          . By the end of the duration,          is reset. In the example, 
         is reset to 0.4. 
 Dynamic web service. A dynamic web service is a static web service whose 
default usage experience changes over time. For example, the installation of new 
servers may permanently improve the usage experience of the trustor. As a web 
service’s popularity increases, the increased traffic may permanently deteriorate 
the usage experience of the trustor. The dynamisms of a web service is 
represented by the       parameter. The parameter shows the likelihood of a 
default usage experience change. For each change, a new default usage 
experience is randomly generated with a uniform distribution. The web service’s 
usage experience is then updated by 0.1 every time unit to move towards the new 
default usage experience. For example, a web service with              and 
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           has a 4% chance of dynamism. During dynamism, a new default 
usage experience is generated. Assume that the generated value is 0.7. For the 
next three time units, the usage experience provided by the web service becomes 
0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 respectively. After arriving at 0.7 (i.e., the new default usage 
experience), the usage experience remains at 0.7 until the next dynamism. 
 Fluctuating-Dynamic (FD) web service. A FD web service has the properties of 
both fluctuating web service and dynamic web service. The usage experience 
provided by a FD web service is represented using three parameters:      , 
          and      . For example, a web service with             , 
         ,             and            has a 4% chance of dynamism. 
During dynamism, the web service’s usage experience is updated as in the case of 
a dynamic web service. Otherwise, it needs to be determined whether there is the 
10% chance of fluctuation. During fluctuation, the web service’s usage experience 
is updated as in the case of a fluctuating web service. Otherwise, the usage 
experience provided by the web service would remain the same at    . For 
simplicity sake, it is assumed that a FD web service cannot be both fluctuating 
and dynamic at the same time. 
9.4.3 Evidence Sources 
The testbed can be configured with four different types of evidence sources: 
 Trustor. The trustor provides its experiences with a web service to be used in 
performance belief formation. 
 Honest recommender. An honest recommender provides its own experiences as 
recommendation to be used in performance belief formation. As a recommender 
may have different experiences than the trustor, the           parameter is used 
to represent the difference between the trustor’s usage experience and 
recommendation. The value of           is randomly generated with a uniform 
distribution within a specified range. For example if           ,        -, 
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then any recommendation provided by the honest recommender would deviate by 
at most 0.1 from the trustor’s usage experience. 
 Malicious recommender. The goal of a malicious recommender is to mislead the 
trustor. Therefore, recommendation provided by a malicious recommender is the 
inverse of the trustor’s usage experience. For example, if the trustor’s usage 
experience is 0.5, then the recommendation provided would be -0.5.  
 Oscillating recommender. An oscillating recommender changes its 
recommendation from honest to malicious and vice versa at regular intervals. The 
interval is determined by the           parameter. For example with 
           , the oscillating recommender would provide honest 
recommendations for 5 time units. The recommender would then switch to 
providing malicious recommendations for 5 time units. The transition between 
honest to malicious and vice versa would continue to occur every 5 time units. 
9.4.4 Web Service Selection Strategies 
There are many different ways to perform web service selection. The simplest strategy is 
the random strategy where a web service is selected at random. Web services could also 
be selected based on computational trust. An example is to always select the web service 
that is most trusted. This strategy is known as the max-trust strategy. An assumption 
inherent in this strategy is that computational trust can be calculated for each of the web 
services. If the trustor only has access to its own experiences, then it is possible that 
computational trust cannot be calculated for those web services that the trustor does not 
have experiences with. When faced with this challenge, exploration may be needed. 
Exploration and several other terms are defined as follows: 
 Unknown web service: If a web service has never been invoked by the trustor, the 
web service is unknown to the trustor. Therefore, computational trust cannot be 
calculated for the web service. 
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 Known web service: If a web service is known to the trustor, then the trustor has 
experience with the web service. Therefore, computational trust can be calculated 
for the web service.  
 Exploration: Exploration is the random selection of an unknown web service for 
invocation. Exploration allows the trustor to gain experience with an unknown 
web service thereby the transitioning the unknown to a known web service. 
 Exploitation: Exploitation utilizes the max-trust strategy to select from the known 
web services. 
Web service selection between unknown and known web services can be viewed as a 
tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. By choosing exploration, a trustor could 
determine whether an unknown web service could be trusted. By choosing exploitation, 
the trustor could take advantage of the calculated computational trust for known web 
services. There are different heuristics for determining when to explore and when to 
exploit. The testbed supports two strategies: ε-greedy exploration strategy and Boltzmann 
exploration strategy. Both strategies are introduced in the rest of this section.  
9.4.4.1 ε-greedy Exploration Strategy 
The ε-greedy exploration strategy uses the calculated exploration ratio to determine when 
to explore and when to exploit. By generating a random number between 0 and 1, the 
random number could be compared to the exploration ratio. If the random number is less 
than the exploration ratio, selection is based on exploration. Otherwise, the selection is 
based on exploitation. The equation for calculating exploration ratio is the following: 
                 
 
  (       )
 (15) 
In equation (15), time is a determinant for the value of the exploration ratio. When 
      , the                   . As the time unit value increases, the exploration 
ratio decreases. The strategy is based on the observation that at       , the web 
services are all unknown, therefore the trustor should explore. As the time unit value 
increases and as more and more web services become known, the strategy should 
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transition to mainly exploitation. The parameter    determines how much      
influences                 . The relationship between                  and      
for different values of    are shown in Figure 38. In the figure, higher values of    
speeds up the rate at which                  decreases over     . 
 
Figure 38: Exploration Ratios 
9.4.4.2 Boltzmann Exploration Strategy 
The Boltzmann exploration strategy uses the calculated exploration probability to 
determine when to explore and when to exploit. By generating a random number between 
0 and 1, the random number could be compared to the exploration probability. If the 
random number is less than the exploration probability, selection is based on exploration. 
Otherwise, the selection is based on exploitation. The equations used for calculating 
exploration probability are the following: 
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In equation (16), exploration probability is influenced by two factors: the experience the 
trustor would gain from exploration (              ) and the experience the trustor would 
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gain from exploitation (               ). The                is estimated by averaging all 
of the trustor’s past experiences from exploration. The                 is estimated from 
the computational trust calculated for the most trusted web service. If the calculated 
                               , then the strategy prefers exploration. If the calculated 
                              , then the strategy prefers exploitation. If the calculated 
                              , then the strategy has no preference.   
The influence that                and                 have on exploration 
probability is determined by the             parameter. Temperature is calculated 
using equation (17) and is updated after every time unit value increment. The calculated 
temperature decreases as the time unit value increases. The rate of decrease is determined 
by the parameter   . The parameter       determines the minimum value of 
temperature. As             is used as a divisor in equation (16),        . The 
relationship between                        and      for different values of 
              ,                ,    and       are shown in Figure 39. The legend of the 
figure is shown in Table 6.  
 
Figure 39: Exploration Probabilities 
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Table 6: Legend of Figure 39 
                                         
Series1 0.00 -0.40 0.25 0.01 
Series2 0.00 0.00 0.25 / 0.90 0.01 / 0.25 
Series3 0.00 0.40 0.25 0.01 
Series4 0.00 -0.40 0.90 0.01 
Series5 0.00 0.40 0.90 0.01 
Series6 0.00 -0.40 0.25 0.25 
Series7 0.00 0.40 0.25 0.25 
 
In Figure 39, if                                as is the case with Series2, then 
exploration and exploitation are equally likely (                          ) since 
both would return a usage experience of 0. As    increases, this slows down the rate of 
change of                        as shown in Series4 and Series5. Higher values of 
      results in a smaller range of values for                          as shown in 
Series6 and Series7. 
9.5 Experiments Based on Experience 
In this section, the testbed is configured with the trustor as the only evidence source. In 
each of the subsections, the experiments conducted are based on a different web service 
type. The web service selection strategies are configured as follows: 
 Random strategy 
 ε-greedy exploration strategy 
o                       
 Boltzmann exploration strategy 
o                                      
o                                   
o                           
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The max-trust strategy is not used in the experiments as computational trust cannot be 
calculated for unknown web services. The computational trust formation algorithms are 
configured as follows: 
 Average  
o              
 Average 
o                          
 Weighted average 
o                              
9.5.1 Static Web Services  
All the experiments in this subsection are based on static web services. The section is 
divided into two parts. The first part describes the averaging of all the trustor’s usage 
experiences. The second part explores the filtering of usage experiences using experience 
window and the assignment of weights based on usage experience age. 
9.5.1.1 Average 
Table 7 shows a summary of the experimental results from web service selection. As a 
web service selection strategy could have numerous configurations, the table only shows 
the minimum and maximum values for all configurations of a strategy. The columns in 
the table show the values for the minimum mean experience, the maximum mean 
experience, the minimum percentage of positive experiences and the maximum 
percentage of positive experiences.  
Table 7: Result Summary (Static Web Services, Average:             ) 
                               
Random -0.007 -0.007 69.26% 69.26% 
ε-greedy 0.399 0.640 94.00% 97.26% 
Boltzmann 0.223 0.722 94.00% 99.34% 
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The experimental results show that the random strategy performs significantly 
worse than the ε-greedy exploration strategy and the Boltzmann exploration strategy. 
This demonstrates the effectiveness of computational trust calculated from experiences. 
Between ε-greedy and Boltzmann, the experimental results are not as clear cut. Both 
strategies produce a high percentage of positive experiences. As for mean experience, ε-
greedy has the better        value while Boltzmann has the better        value. This is 
due to the fact that Boltzmann is a more complicated strategy that when configured 
properly could be better than ε-greedy (i.e.,       ) but when misconfigured could be 
worse than ε-greedy (i.e.,       ). As an example, a good configuration is when 
                  ,      and           . With this configuration, exploration 
could continue until the web service with              is found. After that, only 
exploitation could take place which leads to        of Boltzmann. An example of a bad 
configuration is when                    ,      and           . With this 
configuration, as long there is a web service to exploit, exploitation would be conducted. 
As a result, after the first exploration, all that would happen is the exploitation of the first 
explored web service. This is undesirable and would lead to        of Boltzmann. 
9.5.1.2 Experience Window and Weights 
When experience window is applied to computational trust formation, a decrease in 
window size has been shown to have a negative impact on web service selection. An 
example is shown in Table 8. With all of its old experiences discarded, a known web 
service may be treated as an unknown web service. This means that the known web 
service may be selected during exploration. As a web service’s usage experiences never 
changes, exploring a web service that has already been explored would only lead to 
worse usage experiences. 
Table 8: Result Summary (Static Web Services, Average:            ) 
                               
ε-greedy -0.006 0.464 69.36% 97.20% 
Boltzmann 0.223 0.699 81.20% 99.34% 
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Weights when applied to computational trust formation should have no effect on 
the experimental results. This is due the fact that usage experiences from a web service 
never changes. Therefore, the observations made in Section 9.5.1.1 are applicable to 
weighted average. 
9.5.2 Fluctuating Web Services 
All the experiments in this subsection are based on fluctuating web services. Unless 
otherwise specified, the web services are assumed to have           and 
           . This is a pessimistic assumption as it assumes a 10% chance of service 
fluctuation. The section is divided into two parts. The first part describes the averaging of 
all the trustor’s usage experiences. The second part explores the filtering of usage 
experiences using experience window and the assignment of weights based on usage 
experience age. 
9.5.2.1 Average 
Table 9 shows a summary of the experimental results from web service selection. The 
results demonstrated that computational trust calculated from experiences is effective in 
improving the selection of fluctuating web services. However when compared to Table 7, 
the values for the metrics are lower. This is due to the fact that the usage experiences 
obtained during fluctuation are not representative of the web service’s default usage 
experience. As a result, if a fluctuation is in the positive direction, this may cause the 
trustor to overestimate a web service. If a fluctuation is in the negative direction, this may 
cause the trustor to avoid a web service that should have been selected for invocation.  
Table 9: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services, Average:            ) 
                               
Random -0.014 -0.014 66.54% 66.54% 
ε-greedy 0.361 0.514 88.72% 91.20% 
Boltzmann 0.284 0.567 88.42% 92.84% 
 
To examine how changes to       and           influences web service 
selection, two additional experiments have been conducted. Representative results are 
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seen in Table 10 and Table 11. Table 10 shows the experimental results when there is an 
increase in      . Table 11 shows the experimental results when there is an increase in 
         . In both cases, the experimental results are lower than those in Table 9. This 
is due to the fact that an increase in       would cause more fluctuation while an 
increase in           would cause longer fluctuation. 
Table 10: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services:                     
 , Average:           ) 
                               
Random -0.002 -0.002 65.38% 65.38% 
ε-greedy 0.311 0.402 84.60% 86.44% 
Boltzmann 0.254 0.455 83.82% 88.14% 
 
Table 11: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services:                     
 , Average:           ) 
                               
Random -0.009 -0.009 65.78% 65.78% 
ε-greedy 0.313 0.433 86.32% 89.08% 
Boltzmann 0.220 0.480 86.38% 91.08% 
 
9.5.2.2 Experience Window and Weights 
When experience window is applied to computational trust formation, a decrease in 
window size has been shown to have a negative impact on web service selection. An 
example is shown in Table 12. In the table, the values of the different metrics all are 
lower than in Table 9 with the only exception being the        of Boltzmann. In this 
particular case, the value in Table 9 is due to a bad configuration which led to a lack of 
exploration. With a smaller experience window, the calculated computational trust 
becomes more sensitive to fluctuation which in turn led to more exploration. The increase 
in exploration led to improvement in       . As for the reasoning for the negative 
impact on web service selection, this is due to the fact that fluctuations are rare and that 
the exploration of already explored web services in general is not worth the risk. 
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Table 12: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services, Average:            ) 
                               
ε-greedy 0.002 0.367 67.80% 90.80% 
Boltzmann 0.310 0.464 81.82% 92.18% 
 
When weights are applied to computational trust formation, this has been shown 
to have a negative impact on mean experience but a positive impact on the percentage of 
positive experiences. An example is shown in Table 13. By incorporating weights, 
computational trust becomes more sensitive to usage experience changes. The increase in 
sensitivity may cause more mistrusting during fluctuation which in turn causes the drop 
in values of the     metric. However, fluctuation could last for more than one time unit. 
If the fluctuation produces a negative usage experience, the increase sensitivity could 
cause the trustor to switch to a different web service. The trustor therefore would not 
have to experience the rest of the negative usage experiences. This in turn improves the 
values of the      metric. 
Table 13: Result Summary (Fluctuating Web Services, Weighted Average:   
     ) 
                               
ε-greedy 0.284 0.407 89.40% 91.46% 
Boltzmann 0.235 0.403 89.24% 93.02% 
 
9.5.3 Dynamic Web Services 
All the experiments in this subsection are based on dynamic web services. Unless 
otherwise specified, the web services are assumed to have           . The       is 
chosen to be less than       as it is assumed that dynamic behavior changes occur less 
frequently than fluctuations. The section is divided into two parts. The first part describes 
the averaging of all the trustor’s usage experiences. The second part explores the filtering 
of usage experiences using experience window and the assignment of weights based on 
usage experience age. 
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9.5.3.1 Average 
Table 14 shows a summary of the experimental results from web service selection. The 
results demonstrated that computational trust calculated from experiences is effective in 
improving the selection of dynamic web services. However when compared to Table 7, 
the values for the metrics are lower. This is due to the fact that changes in a web service’s 
default usage experience could cause the calculated computational trust to be outdated by 
the time of web service selection.    
Table 14: Result Summary (Dynamic Web Services, Average:           ) 
                               
Random -0.018 -0.018 58.00% 58.00% 
ε-greedy 0.318 0.416 85.54% 87.36% 
Boltzmann 0.234 0.493 84.62% 90.60% 
 
To examine how changes to       influences web service selection, an 
experiment is conducted with       increased to 0.08. The experimental results are 
shown in Table 15. The results show that the increase in dynamism could have negative 
impact on web service selection. 
Table 15: Result Summary (Dynamic Web Services:           , Average: 
           ) 
                               
Random 0.005 0.005 56.98% 56.98% 
ε-greedy 0.267 0.336 80.80% 82.32% 
Boltzmann 0.212 0.404 77.94% 86.00% 
 
9.5.3.2 Experience Window and Weights 
When experience window is applied to computational trust formation, a decrease in 
window size has been shown to have a positive impact on web service selection. An 
example is shown in Table 16. In the table, the values of the different metrics all 
performed better than Table 14 with the exceptions being        and        of ε-
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greedy. In this particular case, the parameter    of ε-greedy is set to 0, therefore 
preference would always be given to exploration. With            , this means that 
there is always unknown web services to explore (due to discarding of old experiences). 
As a result, the strategy would always explore and never exploit leading to lower 
experimental results. As for the reasoning for the positive impact on web service 
selection, this is due to the fact that a web service’s default usage experience may change 
over time. As a result, it is worthwhile to re-explore web services to see if anything has 
changed from the last exploration. 
Table 16: Result Summary (Dynamic Web Services, Average:            ) 
                               
ε-greedy -0.007 0.422 58.72% 92.74% 
Boltzmann 0.295 0.532 86.28% 95.54% 
 
When weights are applied to computational trust formation, this has been shown 
to have a positive impact on both mean experience and percentage of positive 
experiences. An example is shown in Table 17. By incorporating weights, computational 
trust becomes more sensitive to usage experience changes. The increase in sensitivity 
allows the trustor to more quickly switch web services when faced with dynamism. 
Table 17: Result Summary (Dynamic Web Services, Weighted Average:        ) 
                               
ε-greedy 0.380 0.463 91.72% 94.74% 
Boltzmann 0.317 0.547 91.64% 96.42% 
 
9.5.4 Fluctuating-Dynamic Web Services  
All the experiments in this subsection are based on FD web services. Unless otherwise 
specified, the web services are assumed to have          ,             and 
          . This assumption is based on the parameter assumptions in Section 9.5.2 
and Section 0. The section is divided into two parts. The first part describes the averaging 
of all the trustor’s usage experiences. The second part explores the filtering of usage 
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experiences using experience window and the assignment of weights based on usage 
experience age. 
9.5.4.1 Average 
Table 18 shows a summary of the experimental results from web service selection. The 
results demonstrated that computational trust calculated from experiences is effective in 
improving the selection of FD web services. However when compared to Table 7, the 
values for the metrics are lower. This is due to the fact that fluctuation and dynamism 
both can negatively impact web service selection. 
Table 18: Result Summary (FD Web Services, Average:            ) 
                               
Random -0.009 -0.009 58.40% 58.40% 
ε-greedy 0.250 0.345 80.86% 81.96% 
Boltzmann 0.211 0.397 79.48% 85.52% 
 
9.5.4.2 Experience Window and Weights 
When experience window is applied to computational trust formation, a decrease in 
window size has been shown to have a positive impact on web service selection. An 
example is shown in Table 19. In the table, the values of the different metrics all 
performed better than Table 18 with the exceptions being        and        of ε-
greedy and         of Boltzmann. In the case of ε-greedy, the reasoning is the same as 
in Section 0. In the case of Boltzmann, the bad configuration causes the strategy to 
perform too much exploration and not enough exploitation (21 explorations and 29 
exploitations). As for the reasoning for the positive impact on web service selection, this 
is due to the fact that exploration of already explored web services is worthwhile. This is 
the case with dynamism as shown in Section 0. Although the impact is negative with 
fluctuation, the negative impact is not big enough to overcome the positive impact of 
avoiding dynamism.  
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Table 19: Result Summary (FD Web Services, Average:            ) 
                               
ε-greedy -0.004 0.350 59.04% 86..44% 
Boltzmann 0.277 0.411 77.34% 88.44% 
 
When weights are applied to computational trust formation, this has been shown 
to have a positive impact on both mean experience and percentage of positive 
experiences. An example is shown in Table 20. By incorporating weights, computational 
trust becomes more sensitive to usage experience changes. The increase in sensitivity 
allows the trustor to more quickly switch web services when faced with dynamism. 
Although this may lead to unnecessary switches in the case of fluctuation (it is better to 
wait out the fluctuation that switch web services), the negative impact is not big enough 
to overcome the positive impact of avoiding dynamism. 
Table 20: Result Summary (FD Web Services, Weighted Average:        ) 
                               
ε-greedy 0.288 0.373 86.10% 87.94% 
Boltzmann 0.294 0.414 85.52% 89.20% 
 
9.6 Experiments Based on Recommendation 
In this section, the testbed is configured with recommender as the only type of evidence 
source. In each of the subsections, the recommenders are configured differently. The 
testbed is also configured with static web services. There is no need to experiment with 
fluctuating, dynamic or fluctuating-dynamic web services. This is due to the fact that 
recommendation is calculated based on deviation from the trustor’s usage experience. As 
usage experience changes with different web service type, the change would also be 
reflected in the recommendations. As a result, any observations made concerning a static 
web service should be applicable to the other web service types as well. This is a 
weakness of our recommendation definition that should be addressed in future work. In 
terms of web service selection, only the max-trust strategy is evaluated. This is due to the 
fact that recommendations are available for each of the web services.  
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In terms of computational trust formation, it is based on equation (5) of Section 
7.1.2. The formation is configured as follows: 
                        
                          
 Evidence source assessment (Section 7.2) 
o Evidence assessment 
                
            
o Evidence source trust assessment 
 Cognitive trust formation 
 Average  
o              
 Average  
o              
 Weighted average 
o          
                
       
In equation (5), recommender trust is used as weights for each of the gathered 
recommendations. As a trustor may not have evidence source trust in all of the 
recommenders, exploration of recommenders (similar to exploration of web services) is 
needed. For each recommendation gathering, recommendations are gathered from both 
unknown recommenders and known recommenders. For example, if               
and               , 1 unknown recommender and 2 known recommenders are 
contacted for recommendation gathering. The recommendations gathered from unknown 
recommenders are not used in performance belief formation. The recommendations 
however are used in evidence source assessment. This in turn allows evidence source 
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trust to be calculated for unknown recommenders without their recommendations 
influencing computational trust formation.  
As for the formation of evidence source trust, since it is a form of computational 
trust, it is assumed to be based solely on cognitive trust without considering belief 
reliability. For simplicity sake, it is assumed that recommendations would be gathered at 
every time unit. Moreover, the feedback provided would only be used to assess the 
recommendation gathered in the previous time unit. The calculated recommendation 
assessments are used in evidence source trust formation. The formation is based on either 
average, average with experience window or weighted average. 
9.6.1 Similar Recommenders 
The recommenders in this subsection are configured as in Table 21. In the table, there are 
four different variations of honest recommenders. The variations are based on either 
disposition or magnitude. A recommender could either be more optimistic (          
,     -) or more pessimistic (          ,      -) than the trustor. The magnitude of 
deviation could be either 0.1 (          ,        -) or 0.2 (          
,        -). As                in the experiments configuration (Section 0), this 
means that there would be no negative assessment for any recommendation obtained 
from honest recommenders. These honest recommenders can be thought of as being 
“similar” to the trustor. In terms of the “bad” recommenders, 2 malicious and 2 
oscillating recommenders (minority of recommenders) have been configured.  
Table 21: Similar Recommenders (Experiments) 
Number of Recommenders Recommender Type 
3 Honest (          ,        -) 
3 Honest (          ,        -) 
2 Honest (          ,     -) 
2 Honest (          ,      -) 
2 Malicious 
1 Oscillating (            ) 
1 Oscillating (             ) 
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As for the rest of this subsection, it is divided into two parts. The first part 
describes the calculation of evidence source trust through the averaging of all the 
recommendation assessments. The second part explores the filtering of recommendation 
assessments using experience window and the assignment of weights based on 
recommendation age. 
9.6.1.1 Average 
The relationship between     and              for different values of             are 
shown in Figure 40. The relationship between      and              for different 
values of             are shown in Figure 41. By comparing the experimental results of 
the max-trust strategy with the experimental results of the random strategy (Table 7 of 
Section 9.5.1.1), the results demonstrated that computational trust calculated from 
recommendations (similar recommenders) is effective in improving the selection of static 
web services. 
 
Figure 40: Mean Experience (Similar Recommenders, Average:            ) 
The figures also suggest that an increase in exploitation has a positive effect on 
mean experience and percentage of positive experiences. This is due to the fact that most 
recommenders are honest and similar to the trustor. An increase in exploitation allows the 
gathered honest recommendations to overwhelm the recommendations provided by the 
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“bad” recommenders. The only exception in the figures is when               . In 
this case, the overwhelm scenario is impossible when a “good” recommendation and a 
“bad” recommendation cancel each other out. As for exploration, the figures suggested 
that exploration is always preferable over no exploration. However, the impact of 
increase in exploration is small. This is due to the fact that most recommenders are honest 
and similar to the trustor. Therefore, similar recommenders can be easily located even 
with              . 
 
Figure 41: Percentage of Positive Experiences (Similar Recommenders, Average: 
           ) 
9.6.1.2 Experience Window and Weights 
When experience window is applied to evidence source trust assessment, a decrease in 
window size has been shown to have a negative impact on web service selection. The 
negative impact only applies to small number of exploitations. This is due to the fact that 
the positive impact of exploitation is able to overwhelm the negative impact of smaller 
experience window. An example is shown in Figure 42 and Figure 43. The negative 
impact of experience window is due to the fact that for the majority of recommenders, 
there is no need to reevaluate evidence source trust.  
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Figure 42: Mean Experience (Similar Recommenders,               , 
           ) 
 
Figure 43: Percentage of Positive Experiences (Similar Recommenders, 
              ,           ) 
When weights are applied to evidence source trust assessment, this has been 
shown to have a positive impact on both mean experience and percentage of positive 
experiences. The positive impact only applies to web service selection with small number 
of exploitation. This is due to the fact that the positive impact of exploitation is able to 
overwhelm the positive impact of weighted average.  An example is shown in Figure 44 
and Figure 45. By incorporating weights, evidence source trust becomes more sensitive to 
assessment changes. The increase in sensitivity allows the trustor to more quickly filter 
out oscillating recommenders. 
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Figure 44: Mean Experience (Similar Recommenders,               ,   
     ) 
 
Figure 45: Percentage of Positive Experiences (Similar Recommenders, 
              ,        ) 
9.6.2 Dissimilar Recommenders 
The recommenders in this subsection are configured as in Table 22. In the table, four new 
variations of honest recommender have been introduced. All four variations have 
          that are greater than           . This means that the recommendations 
gathered from these recommenders could potentially be assessed negatively. These 
honest recommenders can be thought of as being “dissimilar” to the trustor. Moreover, 
there are more dissimilar recommenders than similar recommenders. 
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Table 22: Dissimilar Recommenders (Experiments) 
Number of Recommenders Recommender Type 
1 Honest (          ,        -) 
1 Honest (          ,     -) 
1 Honest (          ,      -) 
3 Honest (          ,        -) 
2 Honest (          ,        -) 
1 Honest (          ,        -) 
1 Honest (          ,        -) 
2 Malicious 
1 Oscillating (           ) 
1 Oscillating (            ) 
 
9.6.2.1 Average 
The relationship between     and              for different values of             are 
shown in Figure 46. The relationship between      and              for different 
values of             are shown in Figure 47. By comparing the experimental results of 
the max-trust strategy with the experimental results of the random strategy (Table 7 of 
Section 9.5.1.1), the results demonstrated that the computational trust calculated from 
recommendations (dissimilar recommenders) is effective in improving the selection of 
static web services. When the results are compared to Figure 40 and Figure 41 however, 
the introduction of dissimilar recommenders is shown to have a negative impact on web 
service selection. 
Figure 46 suggests that an increase in exploitation has a mixed effect on mean 
experience. This is due to the fact that a dissimilar recommender has the potential for 
leading or misleading the trustor. As a result, an increase in exploitation could potentially 
improve or deteriorate mean experience. Figure 46 suggests that an increase in 
exploitation has a positive effect on percentage of positive experiences. This is due to the 
fact that the recommendations provided by dissimilar recommenders generally are of the 
same sign as that of a web service’s usage experience. For example, if a web service has 
            , for recommendation to be negative (i.e., of different sign), a dissimilar 
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recommender needs to have               . As deviation is randomly generated, this 
is going to rarely occur when compared to the case of the recommendation remaining 
positive. The same reasoning could also apply to               and to lesser extents 
             and              . As a result, even when recommendations from 
dissimilar recommenders dominate, the calculated computational trust is still likely to 
result in the selection of a web service with positive usage experience.  
 
Figure 46: Mean Experience (Dissimilar Recommenders, Average:           
 ) 
 
Figure 47: Percentage of Positive Experiences (Dissimilar Recommenders, Average: 
           ) 
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Figure 46 and Figure 47 suggest that an increase in exploration has a mixed effect 
on mean experience and percentage of positive experiences. Given that dissimilar 
recommenders are the majority and that they could either lead or mislead the trustor, 
more exploration therefore could either improve or deteriorate web service selection. 
9.6.2.2 Experience Window and Weights 
When experience window is applied to evidence source trust assessment, a decrease in 
window size has been shown to have a negative impact on web service selection. The 
negative impact only applies to web service selection with small number of exploitations. 
This is due to the fact that the mixed impact of exploitation is able to overwhelm the 
negative impact of smaller experience window. An example is shown in Figure 48 and 
Figure 49. The negative impact of experience window is due to the fact that for the 
majority of recommenders (similar, dissimilar and malicious recommenders), there is no 
need to reevaluate evidence source trust.  
 
Figure 48: Mean Experience (Dissimilar Recommenders,               , 
           ) 
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Figure 49: Percentage of Positive Experiences (Dissimilar Recommenders, 
              ,           ) 
When weights are applied to evidence source trust assessment, this has been 
shown to have a positive impact on both mean experience and percentage of positive 
experiences. The positive impact only applies to web service selection with a small 
number of exploitations. This is due to the fact that the mixed impact of exploitation is 
able to overwhelm the positive impact of weighted average.  An example is shown in 
Figure 50 and Figure 51. By incorporating weights, evidence source trust becomes more 
sensitive to assessment changes. The increase in sensitivity allows the trustor to more 
quickly filter out dissimilar recommenders and oscillating recommenders. 
 
Figure 50: Mean Experience (Dissimilar Recommenders,               , 
       ) 
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Figure 51: Percentage of Positive Experiences (Dissimilar Recommenders, 
              ,        ) 
9.7 Experiments Based on Experience, Recommendation 
In this section, the testbed is configured with two types of evidence sources: trustor and 
recommender. In each of the subsections, the evidence sources are configured differently. 
The testbed is also configured with static web services. As the experiments are designed 
to evaluate whether experience and recommendation complement each other in 
computational trust formation, any observations made concerning static web services 
should be applicable to the other web service types as well. In terms of web service 
selection, only the max-trust strategy is evaluated. This is due to the fact that exploration 
is not needed due to the existence of recommendations.  
Computational trust formation is based on applying weighted average to 
experience-based performance belief and recommendation-based performance belief. 
Experience-based performance belief is assigned a weight of 0.7. Recommendation-based 
performance belief is assigned a weight of 0.3. The weight assignment is based on the 
observation that the trustor would always have its own best interest in mind while that 
may not be the case with recommenders. If the trustor does not have experiences with a 
web service, computational trust formation would be based solely on recommendation-
based performance belief. In terms of belief formation, experience-based performance 
belief is based on the averaging of all the trustor’s usage experiences. As for 
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recommendation-based belief, evidence source trust formation is based on the averaging 
of all the calculated recommendation assessments. The experimental results obtained 
from evidence averaging should be applicable to cases of experience window and 
weighted average. 
9.7.1.1 Trustor and Similar Recommenders 
An example of the relationship between     and              for experience, 
recommendation and experience and recommendation are shown in Figure 52. An 
example of the relationship between      and              for experience, 
recommendation and experience and recommendation are shown in Figure 53.  
In the figures, experience is based on        and         of Boltzmann in 
Table 7 of Section 9.5.1.1. This is the best experimental results based on experience. 
Recommendation is based on Figure 40 and Figure 41 with               . The 
experimental results in the figures demonstrated that in most cases computational trust 
calculated from experiences and recommendations (similar recommenders) can improve 
on the experimental results of computational trust calculated from either experiences or 
recommendations (similar recommenders) in the selection of static web service. The only 
exception is when                in Figure 53. In this case, if the recommender is an 
oscillating recommender, it could cause the trustor to try out web services with negative 
usage experiences.  
As for the reasoning for the improvement over experience-based computational 
trust, this is due to the fact that exploration is no longer random but instead is directed by 
the calculated recommendation-based performance belief. The improvement over 
recommendation-based computational trust is due to the fact that experience-based 
performance belief is given more weight and in some cases can help mitigate when 
recommendation-based performance belief is dominated by misleading 
recommendations. 
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Figure 52: Mean Experience (Trustor and Similar Recommenders, Average: 
              ,           ) 
 
Figure 53: Percentage of Positive Experiences (Trustor and Similar Recommenders, 
Average:               ,           ) 
9.7.1.2 Trustor and Dissimilar Recommenders 
An example of the relationship between     and              for experience, 
recommendation and experience and recommendation are shown in Figure 54. In the 
figure, the experimental results demonstrated that for small number of exploitation, 
computational trust calculated from experiences and recommendations (dissimilar 
recommenders) can improve on the experimental results of computational trust calculated 
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from either experiences or recommendations (dissimilar recommenders) in the selection 
of static web service. However, as exploitation increases, recommendation-based 
performance belief starts to coalesce around a single web service. Since the web service 
could be the recommendation of dissimilar recommenders, the mean experience ends up 
being lower than when computational trust is calculated from experiences. 
 
Figure 54: Mean Experience (Trustor and Dissimilar Recommenders, Average: 
              ,           ) 
An example of the relationship between      and              for experience, 
recommendation and experience and recommendation are shown in Figure 55. In the 
figure, the experimental results demonstrated that in most cases computational trust 
calculated from experiences and recommendations (dissimilar recommenders) can 
improve on the experimental results of computational trust calculated from either 
experiences or recommendations (dissimilar recommenders) in the selection of static web 
service. The only exception is when               . In this case, if the recommender 
is an oscillating recommender, it could cause the trustor to try out web services with 
negative usage experiences. As the recommendations provided by recommenders are 
usually of the same sign as that of the recommended web service’s usage experience, 
experience-based computational trust is improved upon due to the trustor seldom having 
to invoke web service with negative usage experience. As for recommendation-based 
computational trust, it is improved upon due to the mitigating effect of experience-based 
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performance belief on recommendation-based performance belief that is dominated by 
misleading recommendations. 
 
Figure 55: Percentage of Positive Experiences (Trustor and Dissimilar 
Recommenders, Average:               ,           ) 
9.8 Conclusions and Discussions 
The experiments have demonstrated the following: 
 Evidence source type and behavior plays a key role in computational trust 
formation. With only access to experiences, the trustor has to depend on 
exploration during web service selection. Too much exploration or too much 
exploitation is both undesirable. The optimal amount of exploration and 
exploitation is dependent on the available web services. With only access to 
recommendations, the trustor’s performance in web service selection is dependent 
on the composition of the recommenders. If most of the recommenders are similar 
to the trustor, recommender exploration and exploitation is desirable. This is not 
the case when most of the recommenders are dissimilar to the trustor. Although 
experience and recommendation when used together in most cases can improve 
web service selection. However, performing exploration based solely on 
recommendations as in Section 9.7 may not be the best possible solution. Some 
randomness may be needed to prevent the trustor from being misled by 
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recommendations and end up only exploiting a single web service. As evidence 
plays an important role in computational trust formation, middleware support for 
evidence gathering is provided in the computational trust architecture in the form 
of the Evidence Gathering Service.      
 Effectiveness of different computational trust formation algorithms. The 
experiments showed that weighted average is a relatively effective approach to 
computational trust formation. Weighted average works well with web services 
that are static, dynamic and fluctuating-dynamic. During evidence source trust 
formation, weighted average is also an improvement over average. The only case 
for which weighted average does not work well is with fluctuating web services. 
Since fluctuating web services only fluctuate for a small amount of time, the best 
strategy is to wait out the fluctuation as opposed to switching to a different web 
service. There is a tradeoff between switching web services too early in cases of 
fluctuation vs. switching web services too late in cases of dynamism. This is an 
area that requires further investigation. 
As for experience window, the experiments showed that it can improve 
web service selection in cases of dynamic and fluctuating-dynamic web services. 
However, experience window when applied to average also performs worse in all 
the other cases. Therefore, experience window should not be used for short term 
evidence filtering. Instead, experience window should be in long term filtering to 
limit the amount of evidence to be considered during belief formation. Identifying 
the appropriate window to use is an area that requires further investigation. 
9.9 Summary 
The experiments in this chapter are designed with two goals in mind. The first goal is to 
evaluate the role that evidence source availability plays in computational trust formation. 
The second goal is to investigate how different computational trust formation algorithms 
performed. Both goals are examined through a series of experiments. The experiments 
are conducted using an experimental testbed. Factors including web services, evidence 
sources and web service selection strategies are varied during the experiments. The 
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experimental results have demonstrated the importance of evidence source availability to 
the quality of the formed computational trust. The results have also demonstrated that 
weighted average is a relatively better algorithm than average and average with 
experience window.  
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Chapter 10  
10 Scenarios 
The focus of this chapter is to demonstrate the ability of the computational trust 
architecture (SCOUT and Trust Calculator) to support computational trust formation in 
different scenarios. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section describes a 
movie scenario. The second section describes a web service scenario.  
10.1 Movie Scenario 
The first part of this section provides a general overview of the movie scenario. The 
scenario’s implementation is described in the second part of this section. 
10.1.1 Overview 
In the movie scenario, the movie selector uses an application to view the available 
movies and to rank the movies based on computational trust. Before ranking, the 
application first needs to instantiate the Trust Calculator. The instantiated Trust 
Calculator can be configured by calling the setApplicationFactors method (Section 6.3) 
with the following input parameters: 
 application factors 
o name = “DecisionType”, value = “MovieSelection” 
The method invocation informs the Trust Calculator that it is calculating computational 
trust for movie selection. Although “DecisionType” is a decision factor, it is passed to the 
Trust Calculator as an application factor. This is due to the fact that “DecisionType” does 
not change across decisions. There is no point in passing “DecisionType” for every 
computational trust formation. To calculate computational trust in a movie, the 
application calls the calculateTrust method (Section 6.3) of the Trust Calculator. An 
example invocation could have the following input parameters: 
 trustee 
o id = “Zombieland” 
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o type = “Movie/Horror” 
 decision factors = null 
The invocation would cause the Trust Calculator to invoke the TcPlanner. 
The XMLTcPlanner uses the mappings in Figure 35 of Section 8.2.1 to select the 
TcPlan needed for computational trust calculation. The TcPlanner retrieves the 
TcTemplate named “MovieSelection” in Figure 27 of Section 6.2. The TcPlanner then 
parameterizes the TcTemplate with the parameters in the mappings. The resulting TcPlan 
is shown in Figure 25 of Section 6.2.  The tree constructed from the TcPlan is graphically 
represented in Figure 26 of Section 6.2. Computational trust is calculated as the weighted 
average of cognitive trust and emotional trust. Cognitive trust is calculated based on the 
selector’s quality belief. The formed TcPlan is returned to the Trust Calculator.  
After TcPlan formation, the Trust Calculator invokes the TcEngine to execute the 
TcPlan. The selector’s quality belief in a movie can be obtained by calling the 
getAggregateBelief method of BFS with the following input parameters: 
 trustee 
o id = “Zombieland” 
o type = “Movie/Horror” 
 aggregate belief 
o type = “Quality” 
 hints = null 
The BF-Policy responsible for calculating quality belief in a movie is shown in Figure 56. 
In the figure, the Belief Engine identified as “SCOUT-Reputation” is selected to perform 
belief calculation (line 5). “SCOUT-Reputation” implements the belief formation 
algorithm described in Section 7.1.3. The configuration of the Belief Engine (lines 6-8) is 
mapped to the algorithm as follows: 
 FeedbackThreshold →             
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 ReputationCountWeight →    
 ReputationThreshold →              
The configuration values are determined by the movie selector during BF-Policy creation. 
All SCOUT policies need to be created before computational trust calculation. The last 
step in the BF-Policy is to invoke the Belief Engine to perform belief calculation. 
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie.*" ) 
3 aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Quality" ) 
4 then  
5 beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Reputation"); 
6 beliefEngine.set("FeedbackThreshold", 10); 
7 beliefEngine.set("ReputationCountWeight", 0.3); 
8 beliefEngine.set("ReputationThreshold", 2); 
9  
10 belief = new Belief(aggBelief.getType()); 
11 beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, belief); 
12 end 
Figure 56: BF-Policy (Movie) 
 The Belief Engine calculates the selector’s quality belief in a movie based on the 
reputations stored in the Evidence Repository. To maximize belief reliability, if the 
number of reputations available is less than the “ReputationThreshold” in Figure 56, the 
Belief Engine invokes the gatherEvidence method of EGS with the following input 
parameters to gather more reputation values: 
 trustee 
o id = “Zombieland” 
o type = “Movie/Horror” 
 belief 
o type = “Quality” 
 hints 
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Reputation” 
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The EG-Policy responsible for the gathering of quality reputations of a movie is shown in 
Figure 57. In the figure, the “BroadcastStrategy” is invoked. This means that all Evidence 
Gatherers that can gather movie’s quality reputations are invoked to perform reputation 
gathering. The gathered reputations are mapped to the interval of [-1, 1] by the Evidence 
Handlers. The mapped reputations are stored in the Evidence Repository to be used in 
belief calculation. 
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type matches "Movie.*" ) 
3 belief: Belief( type == "Quality" ) 
4 hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Reputation" ) 
5 then 
6  strategy = new BroadcastStrategy(); 
7 strategy.set("EvidenceType", hint.getValue()); 
8 strategy.execute(trustee, belief); 
9 end 
Figure 57: EG-Policy (Movie) 
 The calculated quality belief is returned to the Trust Calculator. The TcEngine 
then maps the quality belief to the selector’s cognitive trust in the movie. Emotional trust 
is obtained by calling the getEmotionalTrust method of ETS with the following 
parameter:  
 trustee 
o id = “Zombieland” 
o type = “Movie/Horror” 
The ET-Policies responsible for emotional trust of movies are shown in Figure 23 of 
Section 5.4. After emotional trust is obtained, it is returned to the Trust Calculator. The 
TcEngine then calculates computational trust by applying weighted average to the 
calculated cognitive trust and emotional trust. The last step is for the calculated 
computational trust to be returned to the application to be used in movie ranking. The 
computational trust formation process is graphically illustrated in Figure 58. The highest 
ranked movie (i.e., most trusted movie) is then selected by the movie selector.  
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Figure 58: Computational Trust Formation (Movie) 
10.1.2 Implementation 
The movie ranking application was developed using the Java programming language.  
Reputations needed for quality belief calculation are obtained from Rotten Tomatoes and 
IMDb. For simplicity sake, the reputations are looked up and stored in a database. The 
reputations are stored in the same format as the original website. When EGS needs to 
perform reputation gathering, it accesses the database to obtain a movie’s reputation. An 
Evidence Gatherer and Handler pair has been implemented for accessing the reputations 
calculated by Rotten Tomatoes. A different Evidence Gatherer and Handler pair is used 
to access the reputations calculated by IMDb. 
10.2 Web Service Scenario 
The first part of this section provides a general overview of the web service scenario. The 
scenario’s implementation is described in the second part of this section. 
10.2.1 Overview 
The web service scenario described in this subsection is a more complex version of the 
scenario described in Section 1.3.2. The scenario consists of three decisions: web service 
selection, negotiation and management. Each decision along how its associated 
computational trust is calculated is introduced in the rest of this subsection. 
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10.2.1.1 Web Service Selection 
A web service discovery, selection and negotiation web service (DSN) has been 
implemented. An application could invoke the findWebService method of DSN to obtain 
a web service. The method has as input three parameters: web service type, web service 
classifications and web service importance. An example invocation could have the 
following input parameters: 
 web service type = “Type1” 
 web service classifications = [“Consumer”, “Enterprise”] 
 web service importance = “Low” 
Basically, the invocation would cause DSN to find a web service of “Type1”. The web 
service could be a consumer level web service or an enterprise level web service. The 
invocation is of low importance to the trustor. The importance level is used to determine 
computational trust formation. 
 After web service discovery based on web service type and web service 
classifications, the next step for DSN is to calculate computational trust for each of the 
discovered web services. After the instantiation of the Trust Calculator, it is configured 
by calling the setApplicationFactors method with the following input parameters: 
 application factors 
o name = “DecisionType”, value = “WebServiceSelection” 
The method invocation informs the Trust Calculator that it is calculating computational 
trust for web service selection. To calculate computational trust in a web service, the 
DSN calls the calculateTrust method of the Trust Calculator. An example invocation 
could have the following input parameters: 
 trustee 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
o type = “WebService/Type1” 
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 decision factors 
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low” 
Information about the trustee is obtained during web service discovery. As for decision 
factors, the decision’s importance is obtained from web service importance supplied to 
the findWebService method. The invocation would cause the Trust Calculator to invoke 
the TcPlanner. 
The XMLTcPlanner uses the mappings in Figure 59 to select the TcPlan needed 
for computational trust calculation. In the figure, there are two possible TcPlans.  There is 
a TcPlan for “Importance” is “Low” and another for “Importance” is “High”. In the case 
of low importance (lines 3-12), the TcPlan “WS-SelectionTrust-Low” is returned to the 
Trust Calculator. In the case of high importance (lines 13-22), the TcPlan “WS-
SelectionTrust-High” is returned to the Trust Calculator. 
 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2 <mappings> 
3 <mapping> 
4 <factors> 
5 <factor name="DecisionType">WebServiceSelection</factor> 
6 <factor name="Type">WebService/Type1</factor> 
7 <factor name="Importance">Low</factor> 
8 </factors> 
9 <tcplan> 
10 <name>WS-SelectionTrust-Low</name> 
11 </tcplan> 
12 </mapping> 
13 <mapping> 
14 <factors> 
15 <factor name="DecisionType">WebServiceSelection</factor> 
16 <factor name="Type">WebService/Type1</factor> 
17 <factor name="Importance">High</factor> 
18 </factors> 
19 <tcplan> 
20 <name> WS-SelectionTrust-High</name> 
21 </tcplan> 
22 </mapping> 
23 … 
24  </mappings> 
Figure 59: Factors-TcPlan Mappings (Web Service Selection) 
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The “WS-SelectionTrust-Low” TcPlan is shown in Figure 60. In the figure, 
computational trust is based solely on the calculated cognitive trust. Since emotional trust 
is not considered, the calculated computational trust can be viewed as “rational”. As both 
cognitive trust and computational trust have the same values, the TcPlan can be 
simplified by returning the calculated cognitive trust to DSN (lines 39-47).  
In the figure, cognitive trust calculation is the responsibility of the 
“cognitiveTrust” node (line 35). Cognitive trust is calculated from the aggregate belief 
value of “aggregateBelief”. The “aggregateBelief” node (lines 30-34) has a “cause” 
parameter (aBelief  > 0 && reliability > 0.5) that when evaluated to true based on the 
aggregate belief value of its left child (i.e., “competenceBelief”) would return the 
aggregate belief value of its right child (“avgAggregateBelief”). Otherwise, it would 
return           and               (i.e., disbelief). This aggregate belief value 
would be mapped by the “cognitiveTrust” node to          (i.e., distrust). The 
“avgAggregateBelief” node (lines 24-29) calculates aggregate belief by averaging the 
calculated accessibility belief and competence belief. Competence, accessibility and 
performance beliefs are all obtained from SCOUT (lines 4-7, 8-15, 16-23). All three 
nodes have a parameter “importance” that is set to “Low” (lines 6, 14, 22) since the 
TcPlan is selected when a decision is of low importance. Accessibility belief and 
performance belief are also calculated based on experience and reputation (lines 10-13, 
18-21). The parameters “importance” and “evidenceType” are hints to the 
getAggregateBelief method of BFS since any non-“aggregateBelief” parameter of 
“AggregateBeliefQuery” is treated as hints. The tree constructed from this TcPlan is 
graphically represented in Figure 61. As for “WS-SelectionTrust-High”, its difference 
from “WS-SelectionTrust-Low” is that its “importance” parameter is set to “High”. Also, 
recommendations are used in accessibility belief and performance belief calculation. 
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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2 <tcplan> 
3 <nodeDefinition> 
4 <node id="competenceBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery"> 
5 <parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Competence</parameter> 
6 <parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter> 
7 </node> 
8 <node id="accessibilityBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery"> 
9 <parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Accessibility</parameter> 
10 <parameters name="evidenceType" type="string"> 
11 <parameter>Experience</parameter> 
12 <parameter>Reputation</parameter> 
13 </parameters> 
14 <parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter> 
15 </node> 
16 <node id="performanceBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery"> 
17 <parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Performance</parameter> 
18 <parameters name="evidenceType" type="string"> 
19 <parameter>Experience</parameter> 
20 <parameter>Reputation</parameter> 
21 </parameters> 
22 <parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter> 
23 </node> 
24 <node id="avgAggregateBelief" class="AggregateBeliefWeightedAvg"> 
25 <parameters name="weights" type="double"> 
26 <parameter>0.5</parameter> 
27 <parameter>0.5</parameter> 
28 </parameters> 
29 </node> 
30 <node id="aggregateBelief" class="CausalAggregateBelief"> 
31 <parameter name="cause" type="string"> 
32 aBelief  > 0 && reliability > 0.5 
33 </parameter> 
34 </node> 
35 <node id="cognitiveTrust" class="AggregateBeliefToTrust"/> 
36 </nodeDefinition> 
37 <trustCalculation> 
38 <tree> 
39 <cognitiveTrust> 
40 <aggregateBelief> 
41 <competenceBelief/> 
42 <avgAggregateBelief> 
43 <accessibilityBelief/> 
44 <performanceBelief/> 
45 </avgAggregateBelief> 
46 </aggregateBelief> 
47 </cognitiveTrust> 
48 </tree> 
49 </trustCalculation> 
50 </tcplan> 
Figure 60: TcPlan (Web Service Selection) 
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Figure 61: Tree of TcPlan (Web Service Selection) 
 After TcPlan formation, the Trust Calculator invokes the TcEngine to execute the 
TcPlan. The consumer’s competence belief in a web service is obtained by calling the 
getAggregateBelief method of BFS with the following input parameters: 
 trustee 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
o type = “WebService/Type1” 
 aggregate belief 
o type = “Competence” 
 hints 
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low” 
The BF-Policy responsible for calculating competence belief in a web service is shown in 
Figure 62. In the figure, importance is not considered in belief calculation. The aggregate 
belief competence is calculated from qualification belief. Qualification belief is 
calculated from qualification signals (implemented as certificates). The Belief Engine 
identified as “SCOUT-Signal” is selected for belief calculation (line 5). “SCOUT-Signal” 
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implements the belief formation algorithm described in Section 7.1.4. The configuration 
of the Belief Engine (lines 6-7) is mapped to the algorithm as follows: 
 SignalCountWeight →   
 SignalThreshold →              
The last step in the BF-Policy is to invoke the Belief Engine to perform belief calculation. 
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Competence" ) 
4 then  
5 beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Signal"); 
6 beliefEngine.set("SignalCountWeight", 0); 
7 beliefEngine.set("SignalThreshold", 1); 
8  
9 beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, new Belief("Qualification")); 
10 end 
Figure 62: BF-Policy (Competence Belief) 
 To maximize belief reliability, if the number of signals available in the Evidence 
Repository is less than the “SignalThreshold” in Figure 62 (i.e., if there are no signals), 
the Belief Engine invokes the gatherEvidence method of EGS with the following input 
parameters to gather more signals: 
 trustee 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
o type = “WebService/Type1” 
 belief 
o type = “Qualification” 
 hints 
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Signal” 
The EG-Policy responsible for the gathering of qualification signals of a web service is 
shown in Figure 63. In the figure, the Evidence Gatherer identified as 
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“QualificationGatherer” is invoked to perform qualification signals gathering (lines 6-7). 
The gathered signals are mapped to the interval of [-1, 1] by the Evidence Handler. The 
mapped signals are stored in the Evidence Repository to be used in belief calculation.  
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 belief: Belief( type == "Qualification" ) 
4 Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Signal" ) 
5 then  
6 gatherer = Registry.lookup("QualificationGatherer");  
7 gatherer.gatherEvidence(trustee, belief); 
8 end 
Figure 63: EG-Policy (Qualification Belief) 
 Accessibility belief is obtained by calling the getAggregateBelief method of BFS 
with the following input parameters: 
 trustee 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
o type = “WebService/Type1” 
 aggregate belief 
o type = “Accessibility” 
 hints 
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Experience, Reputation” 
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low” 
The BF-Policies needed for belief calculation are shown in Figure 64. In the figure, there 
is a BF-Policy for low importance (lines 1-36) and a BF-Policy for high importance (lines 
38-45). In the case of low importance, the aggregate belief accessibility is calculated as 
the weighted average of the availability beliefs. Since the “EvidenceType” hint is set to 
“Experience” and “Reputation”, “SCOUT-Experience” (lines 11-17) and “SCOUT-
Reputation” (lines 27-33) are configured and invoked to calculate availability belief 
based on experience and reputation. “SCOUT-Experience”, “SCOUT-Recommendation” 
and “SCOUT-Reputation” implements the belief formation algorithm described in 
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Section 7.1.1, Section 7.1.2 and Section 7.1.3. The availability beliefs are all assigned 
different weights (lines 16, 24, 32). The calculated accessibility belief is returned to the 
Trust Calculator. In the case of high importance, the belief calculation is similar to that of 
low importance. The difference is that the Belief Engines are configured differently. For 
example, “RecommendationThreshold” (line 21) is set to 3 for low importance but it is 
set to 6 for high importance. This is so that for high importance, more recommendations 
are taken into account during availability belief formation.   
 In the case of experience, the gatherEvidence method of EGS is always invoked 
to gather all of the consumer’s latest experiences. The input parameters are as follows: 
 trustee 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
o type = “WebService/Type1” 
 belief 
o type = “Availability” 
 hints 
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Experience” 
The EG-Policy responsible for the gathering of availability experiences of a web service 
is shown in Figure 65 (lines 1-9). In the figure, the experiences are gathered using the 
broadcast strategy. The gathered experiences are mapped to the interval of [-1, 1] by the 
Evidence Handler. The mapped experiences are stored in the Evidence Repository to be 
used in belief calculation. 
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1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Accessibility" ) 
4 hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" ) 
5 Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "Low" ) 
6 then  
7 belief = new Belief("Availability"); 
8 evidenceTypes = hint.getValue(); 
9 aggBeliefCalculator = new WeightedAvg(); 
10  
11 if (evidenceTypes.contains("Experience")) { 
12 beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Experience"); 
13 beliefEngine.set("ExperienceWindow", 30); 
14 … 
15 expBelief = beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, belief); 
16 aggBeliefCalculator.setBelief(0.5, expBelief); 
17 }  
18  
19 if (evidenceTypes.contains("Recommendation")) { 
20 beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Recommendation"); 
21 beliefEngine.set("RecommendationThreshold", 3); 
22 … 
23 recBelief = beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, belief); 
24 aggBeliefCalculator.setBelief(0.3, recBelief); 
25 }  
26  
27 if (evidenceTypes.contains("Reputation")) { 
28 beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Reputation"); 
29 beliefEngine.set("FeedbackThreshold", 10); 
30 … 
31 repBelief = beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, belief); 
32 aggBeliefCalculator.setBelief(0.2, repBelief); 
33 } 
34  
35 aggBeliefCalculator.calculateAggBelief();  
36 end 
37  
38 when  
39 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
40 aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Accessibility" ) 
41 hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" ) 
42 Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "High" ) 
43 then 
44 …  
45 end 
Figure 64: BF-Policies (Accessibility Belief) 
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1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 belief: Belief( type == "Availability" ) 
4 hint: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Experience" ) 
5 then 
6  strategy = new BroadcastStrategy(); 
7 strategy.set("EvidenceType", hint.getValue()); 
8 strategy.execute(trustee, belief); 
9 end 
10  
11 when  
12 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
13 belief: Belief( type == "Availability" ) 
14 hint1: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Recommendation" ) 
15 hint2: Hint( name == "NumOfEvidence" ) 
16 then 
17  strategy = new EvidenceourceTrustStrategy(); 
18 strategy.set("EvidenceType", hint1.getValue()); 
19 strategy.set("NumOfEvidence", hint2.getValue()); 
20 strategy.set("EvidenceourceTrustThreshold", 0); 
21  
22 strategy.execute(trustee, belief); 
23 end 
24  
25 when  
26 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
27 belief: Belief( type == "Availability" ) 
28 hint1: Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Reputation" ) 
29 hint2: Hint( name == "NumOfEvidence" ) 
30 then 
31  strategy = new EvidenceourceTrustStrategy(); 
32 strategy.set("EvidenceType", hint1.getValue()); 
33 strategy.set("NumOfEvidence", hint2.getValue()); 
34 strategy.set("EvidenceourceTrustThreshold", 0); 
35  
36 strategy.execute(trustee, belief); 
37 end 
Figure 65: EG-Policies (Availability Belief) 
 In the case of recommendation, the gatherEvidence method of EGS is invoked if 
the number of recommendations available in the Evidence Repository is less than the 
“RecommendationThreshold” in Figure 64. This is to maximize belief reliability. The 
input parameters to the gatherEvidence method are as follows: 
 trustee 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
o type = “WebService/Type1” 
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 belief 
o type = “Availability” 
 hints 
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Recommendation” 
o name = “NumOfEvidence”, value = “3” 
The hint “NumOfEvidence” is used to inform EGS of the number of recommendations to 
be gathered. The EG-Policy responsible for the gathering of availability 
recommendations of a web service is shown in Figure 65 (lines 11-23). In the figure, the 
recommendations are gathered using the evidence source trust strategy. The gathered 
recommendations are mapped to the interval of [-1, 1] by the Evidence Handler. The 
mapped recommendations are stored in the Evidence Repository to be used in belief 
calculation. In the case of reputation, it is gathered using the same approach as that for 
recommendation. Its EG-Policy is shown in Figure 65 (lines 25-37). 
The evidence gathering and belief formation of performance belief uses the same 
approach as that for accessibility belief. Basically, aggregate belief performance is 
calculated as the weighted average of timeliness beliefs. The calculated performance 
belief is returned to the Trust Calculator. After TcPlan execution, the calculated 
computational trust is returned to DSN. The computational trust formation process is 
graphically illustrated in Figure 66. 
 
Figure 66: Computational Trust Formation (Web Service Selection) 
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For each discovered web service, the utility to be gained from invoking the web 
service is calculated as follows: 
          (            )                     
(18) 
In equation (18),                    is the utility that the web service consumer would 
gain if the web service meets the consumer’s expectations. A consumer based its 
expectation on the web service’s classification. For example, a consumer may have 
higher expectation for an enterprise level web service than a consumer level web service. 
The different expectations result in different utility gained from web service invocation. 
If the consumer’s computational trust in web service   is calculated to be -1, then zero 
utility would be gained from invoking the web service. If the computational trust is 
calculated as 0, then the web service is expected to meet the consumer’s expectations. 
Higher computational trust should lead to higher utility. After utility is calculated, the 
next step is filter the candidate web services based on utility. This is by selecting all the 
web services with                          where                 is a threshold 
determined by the web service consumer. 
10.2.1.2 Web Service Negotiation 
After DSN has performed utility-based web service selection, the next step is for the 
negotiation of contracts with the remaining web services. To determine the terms of 
negotiation, computational trust needs to be calculated. The Trust Calculator is 
reconfigured by calling the setApplicationFactors method with the following input 
parameters: 
 application factors 
o name = “DecisionType”, value = “WebServiceNegotiation” 
The method invocation informs the Trust Calculator that it is calculating computational 
trust for web service negotiation. To calculate computational trust in a web service, the 
calculateTrust method of the Trust Calculator is invoked with the following parameters: 
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 trustee 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
o type = “WebService/Type1” 
 decision factors 
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low” 
The invocation would cause the Trust Calculator to invoke the TcPlanner. 
The XMLTcPlanner uses the mappings in Figure 67 to select the TcPlan needed 
for computational trust calculation. Figure 59 and Figure 67 together forms the factors-
TcPlan mappings for DSN. In the figure, there are two possible TcPlans.  There is a 
TcPlan for “Importance” is “Low” and another for “Importance” is “High”. In the case of 
low importance (lines 3-12), the TcPlan “WS-NegotiationTrust-Low” is returned to the 
Trust Calculator. In the case of high importance (lines 13-22), the TcPlan “WS-
NegotiationTrust-High” is returned to the Trust Calculator. 
 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2 <mappings> 
3 … 
4 <mapping> 
5 <factors> 
6 <factor name="DecisionType">WebServiceNegotiation</factor> 
7 <factor name="Type">WebService/Type1</factor> 
8 <factor name="Importance">Low</factor> 
9 </factors> 
10 <tcplan><name>WS-NegotiationTrust-Low</name></tcplan> 
11 </mapping> 
12 <mapping> 
13 <factors> 
14 <factor name="DecisionType">WebServiceNegotiation</factor> 
15 <factor name="Type">WebService/Type1</factor> 
16 <factor name="Importance">High</factor> 
17 </factors> 
18 <tcplan><name> WS-NegotiationTrust-High</name></tcplan> 
19 </mapping> 
20  </mappings> 
Figure 67: Factors-TcPlan Mappings (Web Service Negotiation) 
The “WS-NegotiationTrust-Low” TcPlan is shown in Figure 68. In the figure, 
computational trust is based solely on the calculated cognitive trust. Cognitive trust is 
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calculated from the web service consumer’s dependability belief. Dependability belief is 
calculated from experience and reputation. The tree constructed from this TcPlan is 
graphically represented in Figure 69. Unlike web service selection, weighted average is 
applied to aggregate beliefs (line 25) at the Trust Calculator as oppose to at the BFS. This 
is just to illustrate a different way that aggregate belief can be calculated. The approach in 
this section allows the application to determine the weight on experience-based aggregate 
belief and reputation-based aggregate belief. In web service selection, the determination 
is left up to the web service consumer. Both approaches are equally viable and are 
supported by the computational trust architecture. As for “WS-NegotiationTrust-High”, 
its difference from “WS-NegotiationTrust-Low” is that its “importance” parameter is set 
to “High”. Also, recommendations are used in dependability belief calculation. 
 
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
2 <tcplan> 
3 <nodeDefinition> 
4 <node id="expBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery"> 
5 <parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Dependability</parameter> 
6 <parameter name="evidenceType" type="string">Experience</parameter> 
7 <parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter> 
8 </node> 
9 <node id="repBelief" class="AggregateBeliefQuery"> 
10 <parameter name="aggregateBelief" type="string">Dependability</parameter> 
11 <parameter name="evidenceType" type="string">Reputation</parameter> 
12 <parameter name="importance" type="string">Low</parameter> 
13 </node> 
14 <node id="dependabilityBelief" class="AggregateBeliefWeightedAvg"> 
15 <parameters name="weights" type="double"> 
16 <parameter>0.7</parameter> 
17 <parameter>0.3</parameter> 
18 </parameters> 
19 </node> 
20 <node id="cognitiveTrust" class="AggregateBeliefToTrust"/> 
21 </nodeDefinition> 
22 <trustCalculation> 
23 <tree> 
24 <cognitiveTrust> 
25 <dependabilityBelief><expBelief/><repBelief/></dependabilityBelief> 
26 </cognitiveTrust> 
27 </tree> 
28 </trustCalculation> 
29 </tcplan> 
Figure 68: TcPlan (Web Service Negotiation) 
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Figure 69: Tree of TcPlan (Web Service Negotiation) 
 After TcPlan formation, the Trust Calculator invokes the TcEngine to execute the 
TcPlan. The web service consumer’s dependability belief in a web service based on 
experience is obtained by calling the getAggregateBelief method of BFS with the 
following input parameters: 
 trustee 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
o type = “WebService/Type1” 
 aggregate belief 
o type = “Dependability” 
 hints 
o name = “EvidenceType”, value = “Experience” 
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low” 
The BF-Polices responsible for calculating dependability beliefs in a web service are 
shown in Figure 70. There needs to be BF-Policies for belief formation based on 
experience (lines 1-20), recommendation (lines 22-38) and reputation (not shown due to 
space limitation). For each evidence type, there is a BF-Policy for low importance (lines 
1-11, 22-29) and a BF-Policy for high importance (lines 13-20, 31-38). The aggregate 
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belief dependability is calculated from compliance belief. The formation of compliance 
belief from experience, recommendation and reputation is based on the Belief Engines 
“SCOUT-Experience”, “SCOUT-Recommendation” and “SCOUT-Reputation”.  
Basically, the belief formation is similar to the case with web service selection except 
with different evidence.  
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Dependability" ) 
4 Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Experience" ) 
5 Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "Low" ) 
6 then  
7 beliefEngine = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Experience"); 
8 beliefEngine.set("ExperienceWindow", 30); 
9 … 
10 beliefEngine.calculateBelief(trustee, new Belief("Compliance")); 
11 end 
12  
13 when  
14 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
15 aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Dependability" ) 
16 Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Experience" ) 
17 Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "High" ) 
18 then  
19 … 
20 end 
21  
22 when  
23 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
24 aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Dependability" ) 
25 Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Recommendation" ) 
26 Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "Low" ) 
27 then  
28 … 
29 end 
30  
31 when  
32 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
33 aggBelief: AggregateBelief( type == "Dependability" ) 
34 Hint( name == "EvidenceType" && value == "Recommendation" ) 
35 Hint( name == "Importance" && value == "High" ) 
36 then  
37 … 
38 end 
39  
40 … 
Figure 70: BF-Policies (Dependability Belief) 
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As for evidence gathering, the approach taken is similar to that of web service 
selection. The deployed EG-Policies are similar to those listed in Figure 65 except for the 
different evidence that is being gathered. 
By obtaining experience-based dependability belief and reputation-based 
dependability belief from SCOUT, computational trust can now be calculated. After 
TcPlan execution, the calculated computational trust is returned to DSN. The 
computational trust formation process is graphically illustrated in Figure 71. 
Computational trust could help determine the penalties to be demanded for contract 
violation. Basically, the lower the calculated computational trust, the higher should be the 
penalties as the web service is believed to be undependability. The actual steps for 
contract negotiation are outside the scope of this thesis. Of all the web services where 
contract negotiation ends up being successful, DSN would select the web service with the 
highest utility to be returned to the application. 
 
Figure 71: Computational Trust Formation (Web Service Negotiation) 
10.2.1.3 Web Service Management 
A web service management web service (WSM) has been implemented. An application 
could invoke the startManagement method of WSM to manage a web service. The 
method has as input two parameters: web service and web service importance. An 
example invocation could have the following input parameters: 
 web service 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
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o type = “WebService/Type1” 
 web service importance = “Low” 
Information about the web service is obtained from DSN. The return value of 
startManagement is a unique identifier: managementId. The managementId identifier is 
used in the endManagement method to end an existing web service management.  
Upon invocation of startManagement, WSM would instantiate a management 
agent (mAgent) to manage the provided web service. The management policies to be 
deployed into the mAgent can be selected by taking computational trust into account. For 
example, computational trust can be calculated using the TcPlan of Figure 68. For web 
services with low computational trust, management policies can be used to keep the web 
service consumer inform of changes to the provided QoS. These management policies are 
not needed in cases when the web service is computationally trusted.  
Computational trust can also be used within a management policy. An example is 
shown in Figure 72. In the figure, whenever there is an SLA violation, computational 
trust would be calculated (lines 1-6). An email is sent if computational trust has fallen 
below zero (lines 8-12). Upon invocation of the endManagement method, the WSM 
would look up the corresponding mAgent, stop its execution and destroy the mAgent. 
 
1 when  
2 Violation(  ) 
3 then  
4 trust = trustCalculator.calculateTrust(trustee); 
5 insert(new Trust(trustee, trust)); 
6 end 
7  
8 when  
9 trust: Trust( value < 0 ) 
10 then  
11 email("chyew@csd.uwo.ca", "Computational Trust < 0"); 
12 end 
Figure 72: Web Service Management Policies 
 With the end of web service invocation, the last step is for the application to 
request feedbacks from the web service consumer with regards to the invoked web 
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service. The application would request feedbacks concerning a web service’s 
competence, accessibility, performance and dependability. A consumer could choose to 
provide feedback to only some of the aggregate beliefs. The obtained feedbacks are 
mapped to the interval of [-1, 1]. Next, the provideFeedback method of BFS is invoked. 
An example invocation could have the following input parameters: 
 trustee 
o id = “www.webservice.com” 
o type = “WebService/Type1” 
 aggregate belief feedbacks 
o type = “Accessibility”, timestamp = “2010-10-06 15:10:00”, feedback = 0 
o type = “Performance”, timestamp = “2010-10-06 15:10:00”, feedback = 0 
 hints 
o name = “Importance”, value = “Low” 
The AF-Policies responsible for mapping aggregate belief feedbacks to belief feedbacks 
are shown in Figure 73. In the figure, importance is not considered since the aggregate 
belief to belief mappings are the same irrespective of importance. In the case of feedback 
to aggregate belief performance, this would trigger the policy at lines 21-29. The 
feedback to performance belief is mapped to feedback to timeliness belief (lines 25-27) 
with timeliness belief being assigned the timestamp and feedback of performance belief. 
After mapping, the provideFeedback method of EGS is invoked (line 28) with the 
timeliness belief feedback. 
The EA-Policy responsible for evidence source assessment is shown in Figure 74. 
In the figure, the Evidence Source Assessor identified as “SCOUT-Assessor” is selected 
to calculate evidence source trust (line 5). “SCOUT-Assessor” implements the evidence 
source assessment algorithm described in Section 7.2. It is responsible for all the belief 
feedbacks to web service of type one and for all the gathered evidence types. The 
assessor is configured (lines 6-7) and finally invoked (line 8) to calculate evidence source 
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trust in recommenders, reputation systems and signal providers. The same approach is 
also taken for feedback to aggregate belief accessibility. 
 
1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Competence" ) 
4 then  
5 feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Qualification",                                                                                                                    
6 aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),  
7 aggFeedback.getFeedback()); 
8 EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]); 
9 end 
10  
11 when  
12 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
13 aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Accessibility" ) 
14 then  
15 feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Availability",                                                                                                                    
16 aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),  
17 aggFeedback.getFeedback()); 
18 EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]); 
19 end 
20  
21 when  
22 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
23 aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Performance" ) 
24 then  
25 feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Timeliness",                                                                                                                    
26 aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),  
27 aggFeedback.getFeedback()); 
28 EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]); 
29 end 
30  
31 when  
32 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
33 aggFeedback: AggregateBeliefFeedback( type == "Dependability" ) 
34 then  
35 feedback = new BeliefFeedback("Compliance",                                                                                                                    
36 aggFeedback.getTimestamp(),  
37 aggFeedback.getFeedback()); 
38 EGS.provideFeedback(trustee, [feedback]); 
39 end 
Figure 73: AF-Policies (Web Service) 
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1 when  
2 trustee: Trustee( type == "WebService/Type1" ) 
3 feedback: BeliefFeedback( ) 
4 then  
5 assessor = Registry.lookup("SCOUT-Assessor"); 
6 assessor.set("EvidenceWindow", 60); 
7 … 
8 assessor.assessEvidenceource(trustee, feedback); 
9 end 
Figure 74: EA-Policy (Web Service) 
10.2.2 Implementation 
A graphical illustration of DSN is shown in Figure 75. In the figure, DSN consists of 
three different types of plug-ins. The WS-Discoverer plug-in is responsible for web 
service discovery. An example of which can be used for discovering the web services 
stored in a WSO2 Governance Registry [138]. A WS-Selector plug-in is responsible for 
web service selection. An example plug-in could implement the algorithm described in 
Section 10.2.1.1. A WS-Negotiator plug-in is responsible for web service negotiation. A 
stub plug-in is currently used as a substitute for web service negotiation. The plug-ins are 
all registered with a registry. The DSN Manager uses the registry to discover the 
available plug-ins. It employs policies to coordinate the invocation of different plug-ins. 
The policies are deployed to the Drools rule engine [37] within the DSN Manager. 
A graphical illustration of WSM is shown in Figure 76. In the figure, the WSM 
Manager is responsible for the selection of management policies. It is also responsible for 
the instantiation and destruction of mAgents. Each mAgent has its own Drools rule 
engine to process management policies. A mAgent may interact with the Monitoring 
Service to setup the monitoring of a web service. The Monitoring Service is implemented 
as a stub that provides events that trigger the management policies.  
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Figure 75: Web Service Discovery, Selection and Negotiation Web Service 
 
Figure 76: Web Service Management Web Service 
10.3 Summary 
Two scenarios are presented in this chapter. The scenarios are used to demonstrate how 
computational trust can be calculated with the support of the computational trust 
architecture. The first scenario is a movie selection scenario where computational trust is 
calculated from cognitive trust and emotional trust. The second scenario is a web service 
scenario where computational trust is calculated from cognitive trust. The calculated 
computational trust is used in web service selection, negotiation and management. 
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Chapter 11  
11 Evaluation 
The focus of this chapter is on evaluating the design of the computational trust 
architecture. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section covers the 
evaluation of SCOUT. The second section covers the evaluation of the Trust Calculator. 
11.1 Evaluation of SCOUT 
SCOUT is evaluated from three different perspectives. The first perspective examines 
SCOUT through its evolution. The second perspective examines how SCOUT supports 
the computational trust properties. The last perspective examines how SCOUT addresses 
the challenges to computational trust.  
11.1.1 Evolution 
The design of SCOUT has gone through numerous revisions. Initially, SCOUT consisted 
of numerous Trust Manager plug-ins. Each Trust Manager is responsible for its own 
evidence gathering and trust calculation. For example, there is a Trust Manager for 
calculating trust based on experiences and a Trust Manager for calculating trust based on 
recommendations. As trust is subjective, each trustor is responsible for deploying its own 
Trust Managers. The weakness of this design is that evidence gathering and trust 
calculation are tightly coupled. As a result, a new Trust Manager has to be created for 
each evidence discovery and gathering protocol and trust formation algorithm 
combination. The design does not encourage code reuse. Moreover, it also introduces 
numerous challenges to SCOUT’s maintenance.  
To address the coupling weakness, SCOUT was redesigned with Evidence 
Gatherers responsible for evidence gathering and Trust Managers responsible for trust 
calculation. With this more modular design, evidence gathering and trust formation are 
now able to evolve independently of each other though a weakness still remains in that 
there is no research that backs up the trust calculation. As a result, the cognitive trust 
view from social psychology has been adopted. In cognitive trust formation, cognitive 
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trust is calculated from beliefs and beliefs calculated from evidence. SCOUT in turn was 
redesigned to be responsible for belief calculation and evidence gathering. As for 
cognitive trust calculation, it is the responsibility of the applications. Basically, SCOUT 
is a web service that provides beliefs to the applications. 
A weakness of encapsulating both evidence gathering and belief calculation in a 
web service is that evidence gathering is not accessible to the applications. Some 
applications may already support cognitive trust calculation and could leverage SCOUT 
for more evidence. To address this weakness, the SCOUT service was redesigned into 
two services: the Evidence Gathering Service (EGS) and Belief Formation Service (BFS). 
Later, the Emotional Trust Service (ETS) is added to SCOUT to account for trust 
calculation that is not evidence-based. This three service design is the design discussed in 
Chapter 4 and graphically illustrated in Figure 10 of Section 0. 
As for the adaptation of the SCOUT services to changing computational trust 
formation needs, initially the different factors (Section 4.1.6) were implemented as input 
parameters that can be configured by the trustor. A weakness of this approach is that 
there are many factors. Moreover, different trustors may have different views on when 
adaptation is needed along with how adaptation should proceed. The result is a system 
that is complex and challenging to configure. With the adoption of policies however, the 
entire process can be simplified. All the factors that SCOUT may be interested in are 
passed in as hints. The hints are then used in policies for web service adaptation. 
Basically, the trustor could start out with simple policies. If the policies are not adequate, 
more advanced policies could be created. Adding, updating and removing policies as the 
need arises allows for adaptation without having to sacrifice ease of use.  
11.1.2 Computational Trust Properties 
SCOUT is designed with the computational trust properties listed in Section 1.2.3 in 
mind. SCOUT supports computational trust that is quantifiable, comparable, subjective, 
multidimensional and dynamic. As for computational trust being reflexive, non-
symmetrical and non-transitive, these are properties that SCOUT supports through the 
plug-ins. Example algorithms that have these properties are discussed in Chapter 7. 
163 
 
 
 
11.1.3 Computational Trust Challenges 
The challenges to computational trust are discussed in Section 1.4. The role that SCOUT 
plays in addressing these challenges is as follows: 
 Lack of standards for discovering and accessing evidence. To address this 
challenge, EGS has adopted a plug-in approach to evidence gathering. This allows 
EGS to be extended with new evidence discovery and gathering protocols. As 
EGS is a middleware service, any changes to evidence gathering (e.g. changes to 
EG-Policies or Evidence Gatherers) is transparent to the trustor’s applications and 
BFS. Basically, developers no longer have to support a variety of evidence 
discovery and gathering protocols. This also cuts down on the amount of code 
duplication due to the implementation of the same protocols.   
 Lack of standards for representing evidence. To address this challenge, EGS has 
adopted a plug-in approach to handle the variety of evidence representations. This 
allows EGS to be extended to support new evidence representations. The different 
evidence representations are all mapped to a standard representation. With only a 
single evidence representation, this simplifies evidence interpretation. 
Applications and BFS no longer have to account for the different evidence 
representations. This also cuts down on the amount of code duplication. 
 Evidence Filtering. To address this challenge, EGS has adopted the trust-based 
approach to evidence filtering. The Evidence Source Assessors are implemented 
as plug-ins. This allows EGS to be extended to support new evidence source 
assessment algorithms. By moving evidence filtering from the application end to 
the middleware end, this allows evidence filtering to be conducted transparently 
during evidence gathering. 
 Computational Trust is subjective and multidimensional. To address this 
challenge, the SCOUT services need to support subjectivity and 
multidimensionality. Subjectivity is supported through the deployed policies: EG-
Policies, BF-Policies and ET-Policies. The policies allow the trustor to 
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subjectively influence evidence gathering, belief formation and emotional trust 
formation. Multidimensionality is supported through policies and aggregate 
beliefs. Cognitive trust can be calculated from different combinations of 
aggregate beliefs. The formation of aggregate beliefs could be influenced by the 
deployed policies.  
11.2 Evaluation of Trust Calculator 
The Trust Calculator is evaluated from three different perspectives. The first perspective 
examines the Trust Calculator through its evolution. The second perspective examines 
how the Trust Calculator supports the computational trust properties. The last perspective 
examines how the Trust Calculator addresses the challenges to computational trust.  
11.2.1 Evolution 
The Trust Calculator was originally a component of SCOUT. It was responsible for 
aggregating the trusts calculated by the different Trust Managers to form trust in the 
trustee. As there are many different ways for trust to be calculated, it is the responsibility 
of the application to describe its trust calculation needs to the Trust Calculator. The 
description is expressed as a Trust Coordination Plan. An example plan is shown in 
Figure 77. In the figure, the Trust Calculator first loads and names all of the components 
needed for trust calculation (lines 1-5). For example, the class 
“ExperienceManagerProxy” is loaded and given the name “ExpManager”. Next, the 
Experience Manager is invoked to calculate trust based on compliance experiences (line 
7). The Recommendation Manager is then invoked to calculate trust based on compliance 
recommendations (line 8). The calculated trusts are then aggregated using the weighted 
average function (line 10). The last step in the Trust Coordination Plan is for the 
calculated trust to be returned to the requesting application (line 11).  
There are a number of weaknesses to the SCOUT based Trust Calculator. These 
weaknesses have been addressed in the Trust Calculator introduced in Chapter 6. For 
example, the language for describing trust calculation has been simplified. Instead of a 
language that uses dollar sign ($) to denote variables, an at sign (@) to denote 
information that needs to be filled in and square brackets ([ ]) for list creation, trust 
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calculation is structured as a tree that is described in XML. This in turn simplifies the 
specification of computational trust formation. Moreover, instead of calculating trust 
from other calculated trusts in an ad hoc manner, computational trust formation has a 
solid socio-psychological underpinning and is based on cognitive trust and emotional 
trust. The final major change is the move of the Trust Calculator from middleware end to 
the application end. This is to capture the fact that although the applications share the 
same emotional trust and beliefs in a trustee, computational trust formation is still 
adaptable to each application’s decision making needs.  
 
1 load { 
2 ExpManager: "ExperienceManagerProxy"; 
3 RecManager: "RecommendationManagerProxy"; 
4 Math: "AggregationAlgorithms"; 
5 } 
6 { 
7 $expTrust = ExpManager.calculateTrust("@Provider", "Compliance");  
8 $recTrust = RecManager.calculateTrust(“@Provider”, "Compliance"); 
9  
10 $trust = Math.weightedAvg([$expTrust, $recTrust]); 
11 return $trust; 
12 } 
Figure 77: Trust Coordination Plan 
11.2.2 Computational Trust Properties 
The Trust Calculator is designed with the computational trust properties listed in Section 
1.2.3 in mind. The Trust Calculator supports computational trust that is quantifiable, 
comparable, subjective, multidimensional and dynamic. As for computational trust being 
reflexive, non-symmetrical and non-transitive, these are properties that are supported 
through the computational trust formation algorithms (i.e., nodes). 
11.2.3 Computational Trust Challenges 
The Trust Calculator addresses the challenge of computational trust being subjective and 
multidimensional. The Trust Calculator supports TcTemplates that allows subjective 
information concerning computational trust formation to be filled in by the trustor. As for 
multidimensionality, this is supported through the Trust Calculation Planner that maps 
the different factors that influence computational trust formation to TcPlans. 
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11.3 Summary 
The computational trust architecture proposed in Chapter 4 is evaluated in this chapter. 
The evaluation is conducted from three different perspectives. The first perspective 
focuses on the evolution of the proposed architecture. The second perspective examines 
the architecture in terms of its support of the computational trust properties. The final 
perspective addresses how the proposed architecture meets the computational trust 
challenges. 
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Chapter 12  
12 Conclusions and Future Directions 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the contributions of the 
thesis are summarized. In the second section, the focus is on possible future directions 
that the computational trust research could take.  
12.1 Conclusions 
Trust has been shown to play an important role in everyday decision making. In [84], 
Marsh showed that trust can also be applied to decision making in computing. In this 
thesis, a trust model known as computational trust is introduced. The model is based on 
the work of Lewis and Weigert [75]. The computational trust model calls for the 
formation of computational trust from cognitive trust and emotional trust. Cognitive trust 
is formed from the trustor’s beliefs in a trustee. Belief can be calculated based on the 
available evidence. This thesis has identified eight different types of aggregate beliefs 
and four different types of evidence. As for emotional trust, it is based on recognition of 
the trustee. 
The implementation of the computational trust model can be challenging. Four 
different challenges have been identified. The challenges are the lack of standards for 
discovering and accessing evidence, the lack of standards for representing evidence, 
evidence filtering and computational trust being subjective and multidimensional. To 
address these challenges, a computational trust architecture is proposed. The architecture 
consists of a SCOUT middleware, Evidence Repository and Trust Calculators. The 
SCOUT middleware can be thought of as the personification of the trustor. It provides 
information about the trustor that is shared by all of the trustor’s applications. As for the 
Evidence Repository, it is a storage for all of the available evidence concerning the 
trustees.  The Trust Calculator is associated with an application. It is responsible for the 
formation computational trust that meets the decision making needs of the application.  
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SCOUT consists of three services: Evidence Gathering Service (EGS), Belief 
Formation Service (BFS) and Emotional Trust Service (ETS). EGS is responsible for 
evidence gathering. The gathered evidence are normalized before being stored in the 
Evidence Repository. The evidence stored in the repository are accessible to all of the 
trustor’s applications. EGS also calculates evidence source trust for evidence filtering. By 
taking into account the trustor’s feedbacks, EGS could learn to avoid evidence from 
untrusted or distrusted evidence sources. As for BFS, it is responsible for belief 
formation. The evidence needed for belief formation can be retrieved from the Evidence 
Repository. If there are not enough evidence, BFS could contact EGS for evidence 
gathering. As for ETS, it is responsible for emotional trust formation. Emotional trust is 
determined by the trustee’s position in a hierarchy.  
A Trust Calculator is responsible for computational trust formation. The 
aggregate beliefs and emotional trusts needed for computational trust formation can be 
obtained from the SCOUT middleware. A TcPlan can be created to describe the 
formation of computational trust. A TcPlan is written in XML. It is structured as a tree 
with tree nodes representing operations on aggregate beliefs and trusts. The TcPlanner of 
the Trust Calculator is responsible for mapping the factors that could influence 
computational trust formation to a TcPlan. If the TcPlan has information missing, it is 
known as a TcTemplate. The TcTemplate needs to be parameterized before being used in 
computational trust formation. The TcEngine of the Trust Calculator is responsible for 
the instantiation and execution of the selected TcPlan. The calculated computational trust 
is then returned to the application.  
The proposed computational trust architecture has been implemented. Algorithms 
have also been developed for belief formation and evidence source assessment. 
Experiments have also been conducted to demonstrate the importance of evidence source 
availability and how different algorithms impact the performance of computational trust. 
The computational trust architecture has been evaluated. Finally, a movie scenario and a 
web service scenario are presented. The scenarios are used to demonstrate how the 
computational trust architecture can support computational trust formation. In conclusion, 
this thesis has introduced a middleware approach to computational trust formation. The 
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approach should help address the challenges of implementing a computational trust 
model.  
12.2 Future Work 
There are a number of areas in the proposed architecture that can be improved with more 
work. The areas include: 
 Evidence filtering. There are many different ways to perform evidence filtering. 
The computational trust architecture currently only supports the formation of 
evidence source trust from feedbacks. Other evidence filtering approaches may 
include the use of recommendations, reputations and signals to calculate evidence 
source trust. Works such as [125] and [141] layer multiple evidence filtering 
approaches together to perform evidence filtering. These alternative approaches 
should be supported in the computational trust architecture. 
 Privacy. As pointed out in Section 2.3, privacy should be taken into account 
during evidence gathering and distribution. How a trustor’s privacy concerns 
should be expressed and integrated into SCOUT is an area open to future work. 
 SCOUT policies. A policy-based approach has been adopted to deal with 
computational trust being subjective and multidimensional. One weakness of the 
policy-based approach is that the specification of policies could still be too 
challenging for a trustor. A possible solution is to have default policies for 
different trustee types. For example, there would be default policies for movies 
and different types of web services. These policies can be downloaded and 
deployed to satisfy common decision making needs. Tools could also be made 
available to help in the editing of SCOUT policies. This is an area that requires 
more investigation and may involve other research areas such as human-computer 
interaction. 
 Multidimensionality of trust. Trust in one dimension can influence trust in a 
different dimension. For example, cognitive or emotional trust in a movie could 
be influenced by cognitive or emotional trust in the movie’s director and actors. 
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The relationship between dimensions is currently not explicitly represented in the 
proposed architecture. Whether support is needed for representing the 
relationships is an area that requires further exploration.  
 Emotional trust. Currently, emotional trust policies are created by the trustor. 
More investigations should be conducted on whether it is possible to automate 
some of the emotional trust assignments. This could involve access to the trustor’s 
social graph or the adoption of research in areas such as context-awareness and 
emotional recognition. 
 Conceptual model. In Lewis and Weigert’s conceptual model, cognitive, 
emotional and behavior trust all influence each other. The influences have been 
simplified in the computational trust architecture. It would be interesting to 
investigate whether some of the simplifications can be removed to create a more 
realistic computational trust model.  
 TcPlan. A GUI editor could be created to simplify TcPlan creation. Instead of 
passing XML to the TcEngine for parsing, future work could include TcPlan 
compilation to ensure faster computational trust calculation. 
 Middleware management. The trustor is currently tasked with the management of 
the middleware (e.g. configuration the middleware or deploying policies to the 
middleware). The development of an agent that stands as a representative of the 
trustor in middleware management is an area that requires further investigation. 
 Experiments. More experiments should be conducted to better understand 
computational trust formation. Specifically, the assumptions made in Chapter 9 
should be removed to create more realistic experiments. Metrics such as 
computational cost and storage cost of the proposed algorithms should also be 
measured. The societal benefit of using computational trust is another metric 
worth exploring. Finally, experts in other disciplines such as psychologists and 
sociologists may need to be consulted to determine the best way to validate 
171 
 
 
 
emotional trust, to capture a trustor’s subjective views and to compare 
computational trust with the human notion of trust. 
 Evaluation. To gain more insight into decision making based on computational 
trust, the computational trust architecture could be evaluated using more 
scenarios. Example scenarios may include access control and crowdsourcing. 
Applicability to more scenarios could help demonstrate the genericity of the 
proposed architecture. 
 Integration. For computational trust to be widely used, it should be integrated into 
the trustor’s everyday workflow. More research needs to be done to examine how 
the proposed architecture can be integrated into either a business or consumer 
oriented workflow.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Syntax of SCOUT Policies 
The syntax for SCOUT policies is shown in Table 23. Everything in bold is a language 
keyword. Everything in bold-italic is automatically inserted by the architecture. 
Everything in italics can be set by the policy author. Square brackets ([ ]) are used to 
indicate optional elements while braces ({ }) are used to indicate zero or more elements. 
 As an example, consider EG-Policy, the computational trust architecture 
automatically inserted the package and import statements to ensure that the policies are 
placed in the right package and that basic classes are available to the policy author. 
Although neglected in the discussion in the thesis, each policy should be assigned a 
policy name. Optionally, a priority could be assigned to a policy. The default salience is 
set to zero if no priority is assigned. The conditional part (i.e., when part) of EG-Policy 
must consist of at least Trustee and Belief. Hint however is optional. It is possible for 
there to be one or more Hint. Finally, RHS consists of actions to be taken if a policy is 
triggered. Any legal Java statement is acceptable though in some cases libraries may need 
to be imported. The same interpretation also applies to EA-Policy, BF-Policy, AF-Policy 
and ET-Policy. 
Table 23: Syntax of SCOUT Policies 
SCOUT Policies Syntax 
Evidence Gathering Policy  
(EG-Policy) 
package ca.uwo.evidence.egPolicies 
 
import ca.uwo.evidence.* 
 
policy policyName 
[ salience priority ] 
when  
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression ) 
belief-ref: Belief( expression ) 
{ hint-ref: Hint( expression ) } 
then  
RHS 
end 
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Evidence Source Assessment Policy 
(EA-Policy) 
package ca.uwo.evidence.eaPolicies 
 
import ca.uwo.evidence.* 
 
policy policyName 
 [ salience priority ] 
when  
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression ) 
feedback-ref: BeliefFeedback(expression ) 
then  
RHS 
end 
Belief Formation Policy 
(BF-Policy) 
package ca.uwo.belief.bfPolicies 
 
import ca.uwo.belief.* 
 
policy policyName 
 [ salience priority ] 
when  
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression ) 
aggBelief-ref: AggregateBelief( expression ) 
{ hint-ref: Hint( expression ) } 
then  
RHS 
end 
Aggregate Belief Feedback Policy 
(AF-Policy) 
package ca.uwo.belief.afPolicies 
 
import ca.uwo.belief.* 
 
policy policyName 
 [ salience priority ] 
when  
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression ) 
aggFeedback-ref: AggregateBeliefFeedback( expression ) 
{ hint-ref: Hint( expression ) } 
then  
RHS 
end 
Emotional Trust Policy 
(ET-Policy) 
package ca.uwo.trust.etPolicies 
 
import ca.uwo.trust.* 
 
policy policyName 
 [ salience priority ] 
when  
trustee-ref: Trustee( expression ) 
then  
RHS 
end 
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Appendix B: Syntax of Subscription Filters 
There are two types of filters that can be installed in the Subscription Manager: aggregate 
belief filter and emotional trust filter. An aggregate belief filter can be used to filter the 
aggregate belief calculated by Belief Formation Service. The syntax for specifying an 
aggregate belief filter is shown in Figure 78. When evaluated, an aggregate belief filter 
should return a Boolean value of “True” or “False”. If “True”, the calculated aggregate 
belief is returned to the subscriber. Otherwise, the calculated aggregate belief is filtered 
out. In terms of functions, any function in Java that does not require “import” can be used 
in an aggregate belief filter. The same also applies to emotional trust filter. Its syntax is 
shown in Figure 79. 
 
1 filter:          condition (("&&" | "||") condition)* 
2 condition:   expression | expression operator expression 
3 expression: function(expression) | "aggBelief.belief" | "aggBelief.reliability" |    
4                    "lastAggBelief.belief" | "lastAggBelief.reliability" | integer | double | boolean 
5 operator:     ">" | ">=" | "<" | "<=" | "==" | "!=" 
Figure 78: Syntax of Aggregate Belief Filter 
 
1 filter:          condition (("&&" | "||") condition)* 
2 condition:   expression | expression operator expression 
3 expression: function(expression) | "emoTrust" | "lastEmoTrust" | integer | double |  
4 boolean 
5 operator:     ">" | ">=" | "<" | "<=" | "==" | "!=" 
Figure 79: Syntax of Emotional Trust Filter 
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